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When looking back and reflecting on how this book came to be, I want to 
start by showing my appreciation to my parents, Jouko and Marjatta Lahti. It 
was they, after all, who introduced me to great Western movies such as Rio 
Bravo, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, and The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
when I was growing up in 1980s Finland. And it was they who put up with 
my often noisy and frequently disruptive plays of “cowboys and Indians.” And 
it was they as well who, back then, financed my seemingly endless appetite for 
Western comics and films. I am sure they had little idea of what it would all 
lead up to. Neither did I. As I went to college, got my PhD, and made myself a 
 professional historian specializing in the American West, they have been per-
haps a bit surprised and oftentimes somewhat puzzled by what exactly I do. But 
they have also shown true support and avid interest in my career choices, which 
I sincerely appreciate.
Academically, this book was generously supported by the Finnish Cultural 
Foundation. Its three-year postdoc fellowship provided much-valued time for 
research and writing at the University of Helsinki. There were several people 
who read parts of the manuscript or helped me in some other way as this book 
was in the works. I want to express my gratitude to Lance Blyth, Sebastian 
Conrad, Margaret Jacobs, James Leiker, Benjamin Madley, Sheila McManus, 
Roger Nichols, Markku Peltonen, Cynthia Culver Prescott, Robert Wooster, 
and David Wrobel. At Routledge, this project actually started as a proposal 
to put together a reader of relevant scholarly articles and then developed into 
what it is now, a monograph. Kimberly Guinta was instrumental in getting 
this  project off the ground. She put a lot of faith in me and in this book, for 
which I am very grateful. In fact, it was her patience and guidance that got 
me to write this. I also want to thank Jack Censer for his beneficial feedback 
early on, as well as Margo Irvin. At present, Eve Mayer and Ted Meyer have 
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proven friendly and supportive to work with. They have exhibited the full-
est  confidence in this book, which is something this author needs and values. 
Finally, it is time to remember what I, after all, need to be most thankful of. 
My wife Sanna is a true gem, and I should probably let her know that more 
frequently. Our two teenaged children Sofia and Juho have had to deal with 
my Western enthusiasm for a number of years now. They have listened aptly 
to my frequent ramblings about this or that historical subject. They have also 
proven amicable travel companions during the long car rides and endless walks 
throughout the West and its wonderful towns, nature, and historic sites. I hope 
all this has provided them some perspective on life and on the value and impor-
tance of history in our interconnected, globalizing world.

inTroducTion
The American West as Global History
I first visited the trans-Mississippi American West as a 23-year-old college stu-
dent and have subsequently spent extended time (over three years in all) there 
as a student and as a scholar. Yet in many ways the West has been part of my life 
much longer. As a young boy growing up in a small, predominantly working- 
class, town in southern Finland in the 1980s, I consumed piles of Western 
comics, pulp novels, and movies (on VHS, of course). What’s more I spent 
countless hours outdoors playing “cowboys and Indians,” using my toy Colts, 
Winchesters, and bow and arrows. When the weather turned sour, as it so often 
does where I grew up, I staged Western holdups, shootouts, and Indian fights 
in the comfort of my room. I remember owning little replica stagecoaches, 
railroad cars and tracks, and quite a few dwellings – a saloon, an army fort, 
a sheriff’s office, and a mercantile store, all made of wood, not plastic, spring 
to mind. I also had dozens of figurine cowboys, soldiers, and Indians to play 
with. In hindsight, the variety of Western-themed toys and apparel available in 
 Finland in the 1980s seems striking as one is less and less likely to stumble on 
any in today’s department stores and toy shops.
To a kid like me, the contemporary world looked pretty uninspiring and 
very serious. The Cold War was an all-too-real danger, and it was intensively 
present in the everyday lives of everyday people as Finland teetered between 
the communist East and the capitalist West. In contrast, the American West 
signaled colorful adventure with its Indians, buffalos, cowboys, and gunsling-
ers. John Wayne, Randolph Scott, and Clint Eastwood made a lasting – and, 
in retrospect, quite possibly harmful – impression on a youngster trying to 
understand the world and figure out what it meant to become a man. So did 
the massively popular (in Europe, that is) Western comics Lucky Luke and Tex 
Willer. I only realized much later that Lucky Luke was actually a French-Belgian 
product and that Tex Willer came from Italy, and that neither had made much 
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of a splash in the actual West. It also hit me afterward that the early Westerns 
of Clint Eastwood were similarly “made in Europe.”
In school, I frequently stumbled on the West. I learned that thousands of 
Finns and millions of other Europeans had moved there. Many of those who 
became settlers in the West not only took the land and built their families, 
communities, and legacies there but also kept in touch and visited the “old 
country.” More often than one would think, they also returned for good. This 
was the option my paternal great-grandfather took (luckily for me, as other-
wise my grandmother would not have been born). Some of my other relatives 
stayed and became Americans. It is this history of (relatively) voluntary settler 
migration that most families in Finland share with much of Europe, sections 
of Asia, and areas in Latin America. Pursuing my master’s and, later, doctorate 
in Finland, I had the opportunity to live in the West as a visiting student, first 
in Berkeley, California, and then in Lincoln, Nebraska. Next I returned to the 
West as a visiting scholar, this time to Tucson, Arizona, and, most recently, 
to San Marino, California. These visits and my other travels as a tourist in 
the West have taken me to numerous national parks, reservations, battlefields, 
and other historical sites across the Plains, the Rocky Mountains, the desert 
Southwest, and the Pacific Northwest. They have made me respect the vast 
landscapes and diverse peoples in the process. These personal experiences have 
also nurtured less pleasant realizations that the conquest of other peoples’ lands, 
subjugation and marginalization of indigenous peoples, the building of multi-
cultural (yet racially hierarchical) settler societies, and the extraction of natural 
resources in order to fuel the industrial revolution and mass consumption have 
been essential ingredients in Western history. I have also realized that these 
things come with lasting legacies as well as intricate transnational connections.
For the purposes of this book, the European fascination with the West, the 
transnational mobility of people, and the multidirectional processes and lega-
cies of empires and conquest – of trading, settling, and invading –  demonstrate 
in their varied ways how the American West is not just a distant land out 
there, but part of our collective, global, history. Historian Patricia Limerick’s 
definition of the West as a “place undergoing conquest and never escaping its 
consequences” and as “one of the great meeting zones of the planet”1 not only 
hits the mark but is what I take as my point of departure in this book that aims 
to provide a short introduction to Western history as global history.
A significant domain of convergence and conquest, the West has been a 
crossroads of the Atlantic and the Pacific worlds shaped by globe-spanning 
 1 Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest, 26–27; Limerick, Something in the Soil, 19. In this 
book, “American West,” “West,” or “Western” is capitalized and used in reference to 
the area between the Pacific Ocean and the Mississippi River that presently belongs to 
the United States.
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structured transformations and multidirectional entanglements; first as a shared 
world with an international cast and then as a settler colonial project with a 
globally interwoven history. The early West attracted Spanish, French,  British, 
Russian, and U.S. empires, not to mention several groups of indigenous expan-
sionists, who together formed highly competitive joint spaces of Native grounds 
and middle grounds. By the Mexican–American War and the  American Civil 
War, however, the West turned into and has remained a prime example of the 
global phenomenon of settler colonialism. Settler colonialism is usually associ-
ated with conquest, long-range migration, permanent settlement, substitution 
of Native peoples, market revolution, nationalization of space, extension of state 
power, and the reproduction of one’s own society on what used to be other 
people’s lands. According to anthropologist Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism 
differs from other forms of colonialism – including exploitation colonies like 
the Dutch East Indies or the British Raj – as it is not primarily an effort to build 
a master–servant relationship interested in exploitation of Native labor in the 
extraction of natural resources but instead is more concerned about replacement 
and access to territory, the land itself. Settler colonialism, Wolfe continues, “de-
stroys to replace.” It introduces “a zero-sum contest over land” and is charac-
terized by “logic of elimination.” Moreover, as “settlers come to stay: invasion 
is a structure not an event” or a series of isolated events.2 To discuss the West 
as a settler colonial project is to link it to shared stories of transnational settler 
colonialism taking place within the British Wests (primarily  Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and South Africa), French Algeria, the  Russian  Caucasus and 
Siberia, and German Southwest Africa, among other places.
Over the years, several scholarly works have examined particular aspects of 
Western history in a comparative and/or transnational framework.  Historians 
representing different specialties, applying multiple theories and research con-
cepts, and coming from various backgrounds – a long list of authors that  includes, 
but is not limited to, Margaret Jacobs, Glenda Riley, David  Wrobel, Gregory 
Smithers, Roger Nichols, Benjamin Madley, Erika Lee, Kornel Chang, Ann 
McGrath, Katherine Ellinghaus, James Gump, James Belich, Robert Rydell, and 
David Weber – have opened productive terrain with more expansive analytical 
possibilities that reach beyond national boundaries and toward more open-ended 
horizons and global contexts. They have discussed cross-border assertions of in-
digenous power, border control, global color lines, and migration.  Others have 
probed the multilayered histories of exploration and travel writings, and still 
 others the comparative aspects of violence, wars, armies, and genocide. Some 
scholars have in turn looked at the various facets of intimate colonialism: the 
civilizing mission and the global portability of white middle-class cultures, 
 2 Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” 868; Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimi-
nation of the Native,” 388.
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domesticity, and respectability. Scholars have also debated the worldwide ideo-
logical ramifications of the American West, its influence on settler regimes and 
imperial dreams elsewhere, as well as its role in shaping the imagination of masses 
and forms of popular culture.
Until now, there exists no synthesis that would introduce or pull together 
the main lines of these investigations in a concise manner. This study strives for 
inclusivity by discussing borderlands histories crossing national borders (mainly 
taking the present borders as reference) as well as scholarship linking the Amer-
ican West with geographically nonadjacent spaces. While it stresses newer stud-
ies published since the emergence of “New Western History” in the late 1980s, 
it will also touch on older works on comparative frontiers and hemispheric 
influences. Furthermore, set on charting what has already been achieved, this 
book also comes with a second aim: to inspire new research by exposing themes 
and networks not yet fully explored that carry further global possibilities. In all, 
this short book strives to demonstrate that the West matters in the histories of 
the modern world. More specifically, it holds that the West proves quintessen-
tial in the investigations of empires, colonialism, and settler colonialism: in the 
momentous and highly uneven transnational movements, flows, and networks 
of peoples, ideas, practices, goods, and pathogens that shaped not just the West 
but also the world during the last centuries. Indeed, the West and the world 
seem pretty much inseparable.
Frontiers and Borderlands
It is quite common among academic historians to acknowledge that a tendency 
toward exceptionalism has traditionally shaped much of American historical 
thinking. For Western history, this line of thought has been traced to  Frederick 
Jackson Turner’s 1893 frontier thesis. Turner’s view of Western history cen-
tered on a westbound process where the existence of free land, its continuous 
recession, and the advancing Anglo settlement explained a profoundly na-
tional development. In short, the frontier was uniquely American, and it made 
 America unique. At the heart of it all stood a vibrant democracy made distinct 
by individuality, pragmatism, and egalitarianism. As a historical explanation of 
national experience, identity, and disposition, the frontier process initially had 
little room for racial diversity, cultural cross-fertilization, or critical analysis 
of violence and exploitation. Neither did it leave much space for the agency of 
women or nonwhite peoples. Importantly, Turner’s thesis seemed to insulate 
American development by proclaiming a fundamental difference, a dichotomy, 
against Europe and its modes of empire and colonialism.
While Turner’s doctrine of frontier exceptionalism has lost much of its cur-
rency among academic historians today, it needs to be said that it never pre-
vented a tradition of comparative investigations. One of those who wanted to 
link the West to the world was Herbert Eugene Bolton. While in hindsight he 
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perhaps leaned too much toward the romantic and the uncritical in his analysis 
of exploration and the Spanish mission and the presidio, Bolton nevertheless 
viewed national history as a thread in a much larger strand and emphasized 
North America as a meeting point of Spanish and English civilizations. Other 
historians too have examined what the American West had in common with 
other parts of the world, while not necessarily making a substantial break with 
Turner or escaping the contours of national history. Earl Pomeroy, Jerome 
 Steffen, Walter Nugent, Richard Slatta, and others have taken Turner’s frontier 
on a world tour, discussing, for instance, differences in national development, 
the characteristics of cowboy cultures, or the tragedies and triumphs of in-
digenous resistance and Anglo expansion. Walter L. Williams in turn showed 
how U.S. policies in the West established precedents for American imperial 
policies overseas. These authors approached the frontier as the shifting outer 
limit of white expansion with which to compare other non-American frontiers. 
They also developed typologies of farming and extractive frontiers, or, like 
 Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, reinterpreted the frontier as a meeting 
point between peoples of different polities and cultures. Furthermore, sensing 
the largely untapped scholarly potential that existed in linking the West and 
the world, scholars such as W. Turrentine Jackson in the 1970s and Michael 
P. Malone in the 1990s urged their colleagues to pursue comparative investiga-
tions with increased vigor.
If studies on comparative frontiers proposed to look at the American West 
in a bigger picture, what New Western historians brought to the table was 
interpretive realignments, shifts in perspectives, and alterations in emphasis. 
Patricia Limerick, Richard White, William Cronon, Donald Worster, and 
 others generally sought to break from the Turnerian notions of frontier process, 
which had made 1890 the terminus of Western history. New Western histori-
ans wanted to tell more complex and grimmer stories and went on exploring 
themes such as dependency, exploitation, and violence. They underlined con-
quest and convergence and directed attention to the interplays of race, class, 
and gender – habitually viewed as social constructions and as contested sites 
of power – and to environmental history and to the lives of ordinary peo-
ples. While they spent much time and energy debating the regional identity 
of the West in the national context, the subject matters and emphasis in their 
works also indicated that the American West was seldom isolated from the 
transnational, globetrotting epics of the modern era: empires and colonialism. 
Limerick’s more current call for “going global” and Stephen Aron’s appeal of 
“returning the West to the world” offer recent indicators of the budding desire 
of historians to move the field toward world-embracing narratives of parallels, 
networks, and circulations.
In many ways it has been borderlands historians who have expanded the 
field of vision in Western history. In the 1970s and 1980s, borderlands scholars – 
inspired by Chicano/a studies – looked at cross-cultural relations, social and 
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economic struggle, and racism in the national period. They habitually applied 
comparative outlooks while zooming in on places close to the U.S.–Mexican 
border. David Weber expanded the field temporally, knitting together Bolton’s 
Spanish borderlands and the national period in an endeavor to produce cul-
turally subtle relational histories. Scholars such as James Brooks and Ramón 
Gutiérrez wove ethnohistory and gender and cultural studies into increas-
ingly multivocal portraits of the borderlands. Seeking an overarching, national 
history- focused, framework for borderlands histories, Jeremy Adelman and 
Stephen Aron suggested that as empires turned into nations, borderlands also 
became bordered lands.
Today, borderlands scholarship has gone continental, hemispheric, and 
global. It is no longer confined to the U.S.–Mexican border, but spans different 
time periods and various spaces of plural sovereignty – the edges of nations 
and empires – around the world: from the Great Lakes to the German–Polish 
or Habsburg–Russian borderlands, from the Caucasus to the Pyrenees, and 
elsewhere. Importantly, it expands our grasp of global history through analysis 
of many transnational local histories. It strives to reveal hitherto veiled stories 
by pushing previously neglected subjects to the center of discussion. It often 
reads as a history of entanglements and convergences, of shifting transnational 
adaptations and nuanced dialogues involving spatial mobility, cultural mixing, 
situational identities, and political contestation. Borderlands history, as histori-
ans Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett remark, was previously “the marker 
of a particular place” but has today “become a way of seeing the world.”3
Transnational Turn and Global empires
Much of the current impetus for researching the American West in transna-
tional and global settings can be traced to larger developments in the writing of 
academic history. Ongoing for nearly three decades now, the transnational turn 
in the humanities exemplifies our developing concern and desire to grapple 
with the global present and the processes of modern globalization. Coined to 
capture the present age of transformation, the term “globalization,” according 
to historians Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson, is best understood as a set 
of processes that compress time and space and accelerate the interdependence 
of peoples, societies, and states. In some ways transnational history stands as 
the newest manifestation of an approach that has successively been branded as 
international, world, or, simply, comparative history. What all these conceptu-
alizations share are attempts of interpretative and methodological realignments 
contradicting insular narratives. Comparative history is typically understood to 
point to broader patterns and to eschew parochialism as it maps the differences 
 3 Hämäläinen and Truett, “On Borderlands,” 341.
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and similarities of divergent yet interrelated realities functioning in an inter-
linked world. Where transnational history differs from comparative history is 
in its emphasis on flows, networks, and circulations that span across national 
boundaries without ignoring their existence.
Transnational historians (such as Ian Tyrrell, David Thelen, Thomas Bender, 
and many others who fit the bill) have exhibited an attempt to break out of the 
nation-state paradigm. Part of this effort is undoubtedly fueled by a mounting 
criticism of the “developed” word and the growth of global inequalities, to-
gether with the increased self-criticism inside academia. Transnational history 
has come to indicate a fresh attitude, a new start, and a wide field of endeavor 
where the central concern is with movements and circulation, a position of 
historical examination that opens up more spacious and inclusive analytical 
opportunities for grasping multifaceted networks. It enables a perspective, his-
torian Sebastian Conrad writes, that avoids a tunnel vision and allows us to 
overcome the sharp division between the internal and the external. The em-
phasis on the transnational permits us to recognize and draw links between dif-
ferent scales of historical analysis from the local to the global. At best it offers a 
multiscopic approach where seemingly disparate local arenas are in fact shaped 
by similar global processes and movements.
When one looks at the outpouring of works from scholars such as  Conrad, 
Jürgen Osterhammel, C. A. Baily, Frederick Cooper, Paul Kramer, Jane 
 Burbank, Emily Rosenberg, Ann Laura Stoler, and John Darwin, among 
others, it is easy to draw the conclusion that, in present undertakings to pen 
transnational histories of the world, the history of empires and colonialism con-
stitutes perhaps the most exciting ingredient and is commensurate with much 
of global history in the modern era. Empires were everywhere, and almost 
all societies in the world were in some form impacted by their ambitions and 
 designs. There existed a global scramble for prestige, status, resources, markets, 
settler space, influence, and control as Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, 
the United States, and others stretched their realms and coveted for power 
through colonial expansion.
Whether perceived as precursors to present globalization, or its early man-
ifestations, empires hold the key to understanding globalization’s historical 
roots. Empires and colonies, historians Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette  Burton 
write, “were never fully self-contained or hermetically sealed systems.”4 
 Instead, different empires and their agents – administrators, scientists, entrepre-
neurs, workers, soldiers, and settlers – produced forms of interconnectedness, 
intense competition, and imperial comparisons that operated on a variety of 
scales within and between empires as well as inside and beyond the boundaries 
of formal territorial rule. Also, while empires ruled much of world’s surface 
 4 Ballantyne and Burton, Empires and the Reach of the Global, 12.
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by 1914, their rule was seldom omnipotent or cohesive. Rather, their impact 
was uneven, penetrating and impacting different societies differently. They 
were diffused, contested, and fragile constructs and projects with, as Frederick 
 Cooper and Jane Burbank note, varying repertoires of control and differenti-
ated forms of rule, systems of power whose lines were seldom clear-cut.
organization
Each chapter in this book builds a distinctive pathway toward understanding the 
varied strands in the shared histories of the West and the world. And while they 
are intended to be read in sequence – that is, as a book – the chapters are also 
meant to be quite free standing. As this is a short book meant to serve as an 
introduction, those readers who yearn for deeper discussion and more specific 
histories can find them in the bibliographies of key readings that follow each 
chapter. These bibliographies are by no means comprehensive, but hopefully 
whet the readers’ appetite to learn more as well as enable them to pursue their 
interests further. In conjunction, and to save space, I have resisted my natural 
temptation as a historian to insert a long list of notes (basically only direct quotes 
are cited). Furthermore, when a historian pursues a broad topic in a concise 
space, like I do here, it is healthy to recognize that full coverage is unattainable, 
that there is always some line of investigation or some groups of scholars you 
do not do full justice to. I confess that I have concentrated on pre-World War 
II times and perhaps focused on certain topics at the expense of others. The 
choices I have made are certainly selective and they undoubtedly reflect my 
own limitations and preferences. I accept this. Hopefully the readers can live 
with them as well.
I hope that this small book will for its part encourage historians and students 
to think big, to explore in a transnational and global vein, and to avoid isola-
tionist perspectives, insular paradigms, and unnecessary divisions. There are 
many historians already at work with transnational and comparative topics, and 
their lead can help us steer toward broader horizons and wider understandings. 
We historians of the American West still have plenty of room to improve, many 
lively scholarly horizons to explore, and fresh connections and parallels to un-
ravel while extending the realms of our perspectives and thinking.
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In 1833, a ship on a routine trip carrying rice and porcelain on the Japanese 
coast was dismasted and sent adrift on the Pacific Ocean by a powerful ty-
phoon. In January 1834, that same vessel ran aground at Cape Flattery on 
the northernmost tip of the Olympic Peninsula, and the ship’s three Japanese 
survivors found themselves enslaved by the indigenous Makahs. After being 
rescued some four months later by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) brigan-
tine Lama, the Japanese sailors then adjusted to living at Fort Vancouver, the 
British company’s factory on the Columbia River. This regional headquarters 
of a London-based trading consortium was international and multilingual; its 
diverse residents comprised Scots, English, Irish, French, Hawaiian, eastern 
Iroquois, northern Plains Cree, and local Chinook. But these Japanese men 
were not there to stay. In late 1834, the HBC dispatched them to London, and 
from there they continued to Macao, evidently with the intent of returning to 
Japan. However, the around-the-world trip was cut short as diplomatic tensions 
between Japan and Britain kept the sailors from their homes.
Located on the northeast corner of the contiguous United States in what 
today is Washington State, Cape Flattery offers breathtaking rock formations; a 
densely forested, steep-cliffed shoreline; an abundance of wildlife; and restless 
water where the Strait of Juan de Fuca joins the Pacific Ocean. It may easily 
be mistaken for a natural barrier, an end point insulating the American West 
from the world. But like the above description of the Japanese sailors attests, it 
has in fact functioned more as a dynamic gateway and a crossroads for peoples, 
goods, and ideas, with these circulations connecting the West with the Atlantic 
and Pacific worlds. Already in the late 1700s, the indigenous peoples of the 
cape, the Makahs, lived surprisingly international lives. Being highly skilled 
traders, fishermen, and whalers, they interacted regularly with other Natives 
of the coast to their north and south. They also saw the Russians coming from 
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the direction of Alaska and encountered the Spanish regularly sailing their 
coastline. In 1790, Manuel Quimper even claimed Spanish possession of Cape 
Flattery and started the building of a fort on the coast. While this garrison 
lasted only for few months, more international visitors followed. James Cook, 
a flock of British traders and explorers following on his tail, and the Bostonians 
(New England traders) arrived with big ships laden with goods. To the south 
of the Makahs, on the Columbia River, the Americans Meriwether Lewis and 
William Clark reached the coast overland in 1805. The two famed explorers 
met Indians who already wore European clothes, cursed in English (and possi-
bly in other European languages), and drove tough bargains. Six years later, the 
German emigrant John Jacob Astor set up an American trading operation, the 
Pacific Fur Company, near the mouth of the Columbia. He planned to collect 
furs inland from Indian hunters, ship the pelts to China, and monopolize the 
provisioning of the Russian settlements to the far north. By then, the Makahs, 
like the Chinook and other local Natives, engaged in high-volume trade in sea 
otter pelts and whale oil, as historian Joshua L. Reid notes. The HBC ships 
often purchased more than 100 gallons of whale oil at a time. Toward the mid-
1800s, the Makahs sold some 30,000 gallons of whale oil a year. Furthermore, 
not only did the Makahs become players in far-reaching inland and maritime 
trade networks, but they also found work aboard non-Native ships that took 
them to Spanish California, Hawaii, and across the world, even as far as Africa.
One notable episode revealing the scope and intensity of the transnational 
entanglements in the Pacific Northwest happened in 1809. The Makahs held 
one Anna Petrovna, the wife of a Russian sea captain employed by the Russian– 
American Company. Anna and her husband had been on board the schooner 
Sv. Nikolai as it sailed from New Archangel (now Sitka), Russian Alaska and 
as it wrecked south of Cape Flattery. The survivors were soon attacked by 
Hoh Indians, after which some fled further inland. One of the men, Timofei 
 Tarakanov, later wrote a popular account of his ordeal, which went through 
at least five different editions in Russia and gained international fame as it was 
translated to several other languages. In one section of his book, Tarakanov 
noted that when they met the Makahs, Anna refused to leave her captors and 
chose a Makah man referred to as Ulatilla (Yutramaki), much to the anger and 
horror of her Russian husband. Seeing their options were limited, Tarakanov 
and four other Russians also surrendered themselves to the Makahs. They be-
came slaves, captives, or family members, depending on individual circum-
stances, notes historian David Igler. A year later, both Anna and her Russian 
husband had died, whereas Tarakanov and the others were sold to an American 
trading ship visiting from Boston. Thus what we have is one white Euro-
pean woman and several European men taken captive by Natives and rescued 
by Americans. But this was not the whole extent of the entanglement. Igler 
and historian Kenneth Owens posit that Tarakanov was actually a serf from 
Kursk and Anna Petrovna probably a mestizo with an Aleut or Kodiak mother. 
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They also ponder if Ulatilla’s father might have been an Irish surgeon named 
John McKay who had been left behind by the British ship Captain Cook in 1786.
Whether the latter was the case or not, it seems clear that in the early 1800s, 
a full-blown transnational convergence of empires, peoples, and goods was 
 taking place in the Pacific borderlands of the American West. Many similar 
transnational meetings were also happening in the inland West. In fact, in the 
1700s and early 1800s, an international cast of explorers, traders, workers, cap-
tives, animals, microbes, and goods converged and circulated throughout the 
West, making it a meeting ground and a crossroads of the Atlantic and Pacific 
worlds. People crossed over to the West to expand their empires, to save souls, 
and to trade and profit in furs, hides, horses, captives, and a broad range of 
other items. They also arrived to locate a global shortcut from Europe to Asia 
(the Northwest Passage). What they found was a shared, yet highly competi-
tive, world of indigenous power and plural sovereignty. This early West was 
an intermingled racial world where kin relations and alliances straddled ethnic 
and “national” lines. In these spaces, independent Indians controlled much of 
the land, and traders, trappers, and missionaries representing different empires, 
companies, and families operated in webs of multiethnic communities. This 
early West was a place where European empires negotiated in realities they 
could not control nor dictate, had they wanted to. It was a realm that Napoleon 
Bonaparte gave up voluntarily, preferring instead to build his empire in con-
tinental Europe. This West was international before it became national, and it 
became known and placed in a global context of empires, markets, epidemics, 
and knowledge before it was claimed by the United States and its brand of set-
tler colonialism.
contact Zones
Early Flows and Shortcuts
Native Americans were the West’s first transnational expansionists, making 
their presence known, claiming territory, and crossing over in search of empow-
erment. Scholars point to a series of migrations some 10,000 and 20,000 years 
ago across the then solid land route in the Bering Strait. Making the move were 
peoples from northeastern Asia, possibly from the present borderlands of Russia, 
China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan, who edged toward today’s American West 
driven by hunger, curiosity, and violence. Others, possibly from Southeast Asia, 
also may have reached the Americas by sailing across the Pacific Ocean thou-
sands of years ago. Native crossings attained diverse forms, took various routes, 
and happened at different times. Many followed a north–south trajectory, while 
others, like the migrations of the Cheyenne and the Sioux, took eastern de-
tours before reaching the West later on. Take, for example, the Athapascans. 
 Dropping southward from Artic Canada (where many Athapascans still reside) 
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into the Southwest borderlands and southern Plains, the ancestors of today’s 
Navajos and Apaches migrated piecemeal in small groups over extensive peri-
ods of time (between the 1200s and 1600s) and over various routes: through 
the Rocky Mountains, Great Plains, and Great Basin. Stopping and building 
communities that spanned from northern Mexico to Kansas in the 1600s, some 
Apaches were on the move again in the 1700s. This time they were pushed 
south by southwest from the Plains in a series of wars by the expansionist Co-
manches, who descended from the Rockies to the Plains. This ethnogenesis 
saw Apache groups vanish, integrate new members, or as individuals and fami-
lies melt into different Apache, other indigenous, or Hispanic communities on 
both sides of today’s U.S.–Mexico border.  Numerous Apaches were also forced 
to live as captives within their rival indigenous groups and in Hispanic homes 
in New Mexico and Texas, households and plantations of French Louisiana, 
Spanish mines in Zacatecas, other locales in northern New Spain, Mexico City, 
and the sugar plantations in Cuba. In short, many Apaches lived intensely trans-
national lives in the early West.
From the opposite direction of the Apaches came the Spanish, spreading 
from Hispaniola to Puerto Rico and Jamaica in 1508 and to Cuba and Central 
America in 1511. In 1513, the Spanish landed in Florida. Thinking they were 
on the edge of Asia, entering the lands of Cathay (China), the Spanish took 
on the ostensibly powerful Aztec Empire in the 1520s. Coming out trium-
phant, the Iberians soon spread to all directions in the Americas, thirsting for 
riches, converts for the church, and power. The first Spanish reached the West 
in the late 1520s. They did not move into the region on purpose, as historian 
 Andrés Reséndez demonstrates. It was the Andalusian explorer and minor no-
ble  Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, and his two Spanish compatriots and one 
black  African slave, who entered the West after their excursion went astray on 
the Gulf Coast. These disoriented men represented what remained of the disas-
trous Narvaez expedition, which had started with some 400 people to explore 
and colonize Florida. Delayed by a hurricane near Cuba, knocked off course 
by an error of navigation, and marred by a disastrous decision to separate the 
men –  trekking overland – from their ships, the Narvaez expedition turned 
desperate. Scrambling to get back to Mexico City, the survivors endured a 
horrific march through Florida, a harrowing raft passage along the Louisiana 
coast, and years of enslavement in the Southwest. They brought dysentery to 
the Indians, decimating half of the population at the Texas coastal villages of 
the Capoques and the Hans. They were also the first Europeans to see bison, 
immediately comparing them to the cows of Morocco and Spain.
After making it to Mexico City, the center of New Spain built by indig-
enous labor and imposed on the ruins of the Aztec capital Tenochtitlan, de 
Vaca and his compatriots shared tales of their trials and the Indians and animals 
they had met. They also fueled rumors of golden cities awaiting bold explorers 
in the continental interior. It was the fantastic dream of Cibola and the seven 
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cities of gold that spurred ambitious Spanish explorers to various reaches of the 
Americas, from Rio del Plata and the Amazon to the early West. Obviously, 
the conquest of the gold-rich Aztecs and Incas only added stimulation to these 
dreams promulgated by the Spanish. So did the discovery of silver at Zacatecas 
in 1546. While de Vaca’s adventures would continue in the Rio del Plata re-
gion, others headed north.
In the 1540s, Hernando de Alarcón ventured some 90 miles up the  Colorado 
River. Moving overland toward the Upper Rio Grande Valley was another 
minor nobleman, this time from Castile and León: Francisco Vázquez de 
 Coronado. He came accompanied by 300 Spanish, including mounted troops, 
as well as 800 Tlaxcalans recruited from central Mexico. The Tlaxcalans, once 
fierce enemies of the Aztecs, had become allies of the Spanish, participating as 
fighters and settlers in the conquest of the Chichimecas in northeastern Mexico 
and also in Guatemala. Now they witnessed Coronado bring Spanish might 
on the Pueblos. They partook in violence and in treks that spanned from the 
Grand Canyon deep to the Plains, experienced exhaustion and disappointment, 
and returned home disgusted and goldless. The disillusioned Coronado re-
verted to his comfortable “desk job” as an administrator in Nuevo Galicia and 
later in Mexico City.
The next wave of Spanish on the move were the missionaries who traveled 
from central Mexico to the Pueblos in the 1580s. While these Franciscans ex-
tended across much of Spanish America and worked up the Rio Grande, the 
globe-spanning networks of Jesuits spread not only to China, Japan, and India 
but also to Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora, including today’s Arizona, until ex-
pelled from the Americas in 1767. The first European settlers reached the West 
in 1598. Actually, historian Marc Simmons records, many of those first poten-
tial settlers were Tlaxcalan warriors, servants, and their families. Led by the son 
of Spanish-Basque colonists and silver mine owners from Zacatecas, Don Juan 
de Onate, a mixed bag of settlers, soldiers, and priests made their homes in the 
Upper Rio Grande Valley, establishing Santa Fe.
The Spanish arrival in the early West involved elaborate ritual laden with 
significant transnational meanings and ramifications. The Spanish customarily 
erected a cross and read aloud the requerimiento, a degree issued in 1513 by the 
Spanish monarchy. It was a customary Spanish practice that was performed all 
over the Americans when the Spanish made their rights of conquest known to 
the Native communities. It involved the absolute religious supremacy of the 
Christian faith and the political superiority of Spain, as based on the 1493 papal 
bull (Treaty of Tordesillas), which announced nothing less than the split of the 
western hemisphere between Portugal and Spain. In New Mexico, the  Spanish 
told the Natives that they were there to stay and that the Pueblo Indians could 
fight or submit, or, to put it differently, choose between heaven, meaning con-
version into Christianity, or hell, denoting the war and slavery that would 
result from resistance. While the requerimiento was normally read in Latin and 
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with no interpreters present, it could also be delivered from shipboard to some 
empty shoreline the Spanish coveted. Thus, especially after the Spanish started 
sailing the coastal Pacific, many Native Americans (in theory, at least) became 
subjects of a European monarch and subject to a European religion without 
necessarily meeting any Europeans. Of course, even when hearing the requer-
imiento in person many Natives have failed to understand (or care about) these 
ceremonies and proclamations of “international law.”
Not only expanding the realm of the crown and the church and setting up 
government and communities along the Rio Grande, but also hoping to find 
some golden cities, Onate’s men went on to explore the Great Plains and the 
Colorado River. While mountains of gold continued to elude the Spanish in 
the West, their arrival connected numerous Native communities to all sorts of 
transnational circulations. Imported Euro-Asiatic diseases quickly decimated 
many Pueblo villages, while the Churra sheep from the Iberian Peninsula rap-
idly made it into the hands of independent Indians, especially the Navajos, who 
surrounded the Spanish settlements. Then there were the horses the Spanish 
had introduced to the Americas. Traded and raided, a large-scale horse dif-
fusion followed, especially after the 1680 Pueblo revolt. Different indigenous 
communities, historian Pekka Hämäläinen comments, created different horse 
cultures. Horses reached the Shoshones by 1700 and facilitated the Comanche 
invasion from the Rocky Mountains to the plains grasslands from the 1710s 
onward. The animals also spread to the Blackfeet and Crows by 1740s, and to 
all reaches of the Northern Plains of today’s Canada by the mid-1700s.
By the early 1700s, the transnational crossing of peoples, as well as of bac-
teria, animals, and material goods, was in full swing in the West. So were the 
transnational dreams of the Northwest Passage. There were many elusive desti-
nations in modern world history – for instance, Terra Australis in the 1700s, or 
the source of the White Nile in the 1800s – that drew daredevils, romantics, and 
self-promoters from Europe. They became the stuff of feverish dreams among 
glory-hungry explorers, the sources of seemingly endless mystique among the 
broader public, as well as sites for intense competition between empires. While 
one such legend touching the West related to the cities of gold, another con-
cerned the elusive Northwest Passage. Before the Norwegian Roald Amundsen 
first navigated the route in 1903–1906, the search for a shortcut between the 
Atlantic and the Pacific, from Europe to Asia, had been ongoing for centuries.
In 1524, the Italian explorer Giovanni de Verrazano thought he saw the 
 Pacific Ocean when zooming across North Carolina’s Outer Banks. In Mexico, 
Hernán Cortés – a globetrotting servant of the empire whose resume included 
being the conqueror of the Aztecs, the first governor of New Spain, the leader 
in Spanish expeditions against Honduras and Algiers, and the head of ocean 
voyages to first spot the tip of Baja California – felt positive that a waterway 
connected the Atlantic and the Pacific. He was not alone. While Columbus had 
thought he had arrived on the outskirts of Asia, others in his wake still believed 
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that they were close to China. They supposed that America was slender, the 
Pacific narrow, and that both would be easy to cross. This notion proved ex-
tremely persistent. Exploring and setting up numerous Jesuit missions in  Sonora 
in the 1680s and in Tumacácori and San Xavier del Bac (Tucson), Arizona, in 
the 1690s, Father Eusebio Kino was just one learned man among many who 
still dreamed of reaching China overland via California. He presumed that a 
slim strait, at worst, would have to be crossed to get there.
Elsewhere, the quest for a global shortcut had prompted the Frenchman 
Jacques Cartier up the St. Lawrence in the 1530s. Beginning in the 1570s, the 
English were also in the game, and in the 1610s, Englishman Henry Hudson 
went to look for a path and wintered in the bay that now bears his name. While 
no passage was found, the race to locate it only escalated, somehow surviv-
ing every disappointment and discarding all logical arguments made against 
it. For instance, the HBC men, after expanding inland from York Factory on 
 Hudson’s Bay and setting up factories on the Saskatchewan River in 1774 and 
Lake Athabasca in 1778, soon realized there was no waterway westward from 
the bay. The Scot Alexander MacKenzie attempted in 1789 to locate a water-
course to the Pacific on a river now named after him (which flows to the north). 
He then became the first European to cross the continent overland from east 
to west in 1793. Recommending that Britain plant settlements in the Pacific 
Northwest, he proclaimed that no water route existed through the continental 
interior. Still, the quest for the passage drew numerous parties in the 1800s, 
particularly in the Arctic waters. Some, like the expedition by the British John 
Franklin, perished in the world of ice and became legendary because of that.
MacKenzie was just one explorer among many to involve the interior West 
in this quest for a global shortcut. In 1681, the French nobleman from Rouen, 
René-Robert Cavelier, Sieur de La Salle, launched an expedition down the 
Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico from New France. A one-time Jesuit 
novice as a youth, and later, a fur trader and an agriculturalist near Montreal, La 
Salle dreamed, as historian Robert Weddle points out, of a great river system, 
which he thought would flow into the Pacific and provide passage to China. 
Thirsting to find the Northwest Passage, he also planned setting up French 
trading posts in the West for future settlements. What La Salle found was a 
route to the Atlantic. Although Hernando De Soto had explored and claimed 
this area for Spain some 140 years prior, La Salle now claimed the Mississippi 
River Valley for Louis XIV, naming the territory Louisiana. He also sailed 
defiantly in the Gulf of Mexico, which was considered by Spain to be theirs.
In 1684, La Salle continued the search. He sailed from Rochefort, France, 
to locate the mouth of the Mississippi River by sea. His agenda also included 
plans to establish a settlement and a post for striking against New Spain, af-
flicting Spanish shipping, and blocking potential English expansion, as well as 
providing a French port for the Mississippi Valley fur trade. While losing more 
than half of his 500 would-be settlers early on, he did not find the mouth of the 
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Mississippi. He did establish a colony, Fort St. Louis, on Garcitas Creek near 
the southern Texas coast in February 1685. By the end of summer, half of the 
residents had perished, possibly from poor rations and overwork. In 1686, La 
Salle himself moved west overland. Looking in vain for the Mississippi River 
and the great western waterways, he made it as far as the Pecos River or the 
Rio Grande. Lost, frustrated, and desperate, he next trekked east hoping that 
the Mississippi would turn out and his party could get back to the French 
settlements at the Great Lakes. Meanwhile, motivated by fears of French ad-
vancements, the Spanish in turn sought La Salle’s French in Texas with five sea 
voyages and six land marches. Waiting for somebody to rescue them, the resi-
dents of Fort St. Louis instead faced a massacre at the hands of the Karankawa 
Indians. The settlement destroyed, La Salle’s outfit in turn came apart. La Salle 
himself was assassinated by his own men somewhere near the Brazos River. 
The Northwest Passage had eluded him to the end.
While only five Frenchmen from La Salle’s party eventually made it back to 
France, the few survivors played key roles in the exploration of the Southwest. 
Some joined Diego de Vargas in the Spanish reconquest of New Mexico in the 
1690s, while others functioned as guides and interpreters for Louis Juchereau de 
St. Denis on an exploration across Texas to the Rio Grande in 1714. Crossing 
in the opposite direction, the Spanish missionaries who reached East Texas in 
1690s were driven out by the Caddos. In 1716, a fresh crop of Spanish mis-
sionaries arrived, founding Nacogdoches close to the Red River. By 1722, 
the Spanish had a foothold of 12 missions and several presidios between San 
Antonio and East Texas.
The Great Pacific Rendezvous
Several historians (among them Warren Cook, James Gibson, Derek  Pethick, 
and, more recently, David Igler) have shown how the Spanish, British,  Russians, 
and Americans stepped up exploring the major oceans of the world during the 
late eighteenth century and how these empires met on the Pacific Coast of 
North America.
Starting in 1565 with the voyage of Andres de Urdaneta, the Spanish, 
with their large multiple-deck galleons that sailed between Mexico and the 
 Philippines, had engaged in the trans-Pacific and global commodity exchanges. 
They traded silver mined in Mexico and in Potosi, Bolivia for Chinese goods 
like silk, spices, and porcelain. Initially, these galleons skirted the beaches of 
California. In the mid-1700s, Spain grew more and more wary that the “West” 
would be lost to competition. They worried over French extensions from 
 Louisiana, British moves from Hudson’s Bay, Russian advances from Alaska, 
and all of their activities in the Pacific. While making the folly of allying with 
France, Spain also seized the initiative while France and Britain clashed in 
the Seven Years’ War. After France was defeated globally in Europe, India, 
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and  North America, Spain gained French Louisiana in 1763, while Britain 
took hold of New France. Six years later, the Spanish sent four expeditions 
made up of soldiers, settlers, and Franciscan priests to California (two by land 
and two by sea). They established the first missions in San Diego in 1769 and 
in  Monterrey the next year. The space in between was gradually dotted with 
missions approximately a day’s journey apart, while the northernmost Spanish 
bastion was Mission Dolores in the small village of Yerba Buena, better known, 
after 1847, as San Francisco.
Once it got going, Spain moved further north. In fact, already in 1539, 
Francisco de Ulloa had studied the California coast, proving it was not an 
island (although this popular belief persisted decades later). Three years later, 
Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo reconnoitered the coastline of today’s California and 
Oregon. In 1602, Juan de Fuca, a Greek navigator in service of the Spanish, 
claimed he found the fabled Strait of Anián, a waterway believed to be the 
western entrance of the Northwest Passage. De Fuca also asserted that this 
watercourse started on the coast of modern-day Washington State. Hearing 
rumors of a Russian presence nearby, in 1774, Juan Perez sailed to establish a 
Spanish claim as far north as Vancouver Island. The next year, Bruno Heceta 
sailed to up to the 58th parallel, what is now Alaska, to claim it for Spain. 
Others would soon follow, and by 1790, the Spanish occupied Nootka Sound 
and set up what would be a short-lived settlement of Santa Cruz de Nuca on 
Vancouver Island.
On the move was also the British explorer James Cook. He was searching 
for the great southern continent, Terra Australis, and sailed the eastern coast 
of Australia, bumping into Hawaii. On his third trip, 1776–1779, he reached 
Oregon and advanced to the Bering Strait, trying, like so many of his contem-
poraries, to locate the western entry of the Northwest Passage. Since 1745, the 
British government had promised a £20,000 reward to the first captain who 
sailed through this mysterious watercourse. The money had no takers as the 
passage eluded the numerous British vessels hovering around Nootka Sound, 
Vancouver Island, Strait of Juan de Fuca, and Puget Sound. Several American 
(New England) trappers and mariners were also on the Pacific coast. In 1791, 
Boston sea captain Robert Gray took possession of the lower Columbia River 
on behalf of the United States.
The Russians were also coming. After moving east across Siberia to the 
 Pacific, they went to the seas. Vitus Bering, a Dane in service of the Czar, 
reached the Aleutian Islands in 1741. The Russians soon had various compa-
nies engaged in sea otter trade, which made Alaska as attractive as sables made 
Siberia. Exhausting the Aleutian chain of furs, the Russians reached mainland 
North America in 1762. They continued the hunt, but they also established 
missions and some settlements on the coastline of Alaska. By 1788, the Span-
ish met Russians using Indian canoes on Prince William Sound and learned 
that some local Indians had visited St. Petersburg and were dressed in Russian 
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clothing. By 1799, the Russian–American Company had gained a trading mo-
nopoly and sent ships south the coast all the way to California.
Already in 1790, an international conflict had nearly emerged in the Pa-
cific Northwest as the Spanish seized British trading ships. This did nothing 
to diminish the buzzing activity, however. The busiest season so far, 1792 saw 
21 vessels from five different countries trading on the Northwest coast. Rival 
claims and the continued threat of armed conflicts resulted in the Nootka Con-
ventions. Diplomacy led to Spain abandoning its claims to exclusive sovereignty 
in the Pacific and opening the coast for European traders. The conventions also 
undermined the notion that an empire could claim exclusive sovereignty with-
out establishing some kind of actual occupation or settlements. The seed for the 
settler colonial West had been planted.
In the 1810s, the international melee picked up speed. There were the 
 Russians negotiating with John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur Company, an  American 
operation with its headquarters, Fort Astoria, on the Columbia River. There 
was David Thompson of the North West Company, who declared the por-
tion of the Columbia River above its confluence with the Snake River for the 
British. Then the British ousted the Americans from the Columbia as a conse-
quence of the War of 1812, and sorted their inner rivalries as the HBC merged 
with the North West Company. In the 1820s, the HBC’s new regional factory, 
Fort Vancouver, was erected on the shores of the Columbia. Along with it, 
dozens of lesser HBC sites dotted the coastline to the north, making it look like 
the Pacific Northwest might become British. Or perhaps it would be Russian. 
In 1812, the Russians were busy establishing Rossiya, or Fort Ross, a trading 
post and potential seed of settlement some 50 miles north of the Spanish Yerba 
Buena. Russian California lasted until 1841. By then, Russian America had lost 
its main reason for existence due to the slaughtering of marine mammals for the 
market in such volume that there were too few left (Figure 1.1).
The great trans-Pacific hunt stretched from the New Zealand shoreline to 
North America, and it often came with devastating costs to the animal pop-
ulations, among them sea otters, river otters, beavers, fur seals, and whales. 
By the 1830s, the trade also involved hides of California cattle. While the 
hunt grew to hundreds of thousands of skins per year, the commercial activity 
also quickly diversified to include provisions and various manufactured goods. 
Seamen restocked their ships with wood and water, exchanged manufactured 
goods for nutrition, as well as sought specific commodities such as whale oil. 
Able Native hunters exploited maritime and terrestrial resources from Alaska 
to Cape Flattery and California, and actually all the way to Chile, empowering 
themselves and filling the cargo holes of large non-Native trading ships. The 
Pacific Northwest maritime furs were sold mainly in China in exchange for tea, 
spices, silk, porcelain, and other Chinese goods. These were then sold to white 
consumers across Europe and North America (foremost in New England). The 
greatest fortunes from the sea otter trade tended to gravitate toward England 
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and New England. While porcelain spread to well-to-do European homes 
like wildfire, in China, sea otter furs turned into a status symbol for the elite, 
 including the royal household. Thousands of gallons of whale oil procured 
by Northwest-coast Natives also reached Europe, where, distilled into ben-
zene, it lit the homes and businesses of cities such as London. Natives in turn 
 received weapons, hardware, metal items (including knives, nails, and chisels), 
and blankets (they preferred British-made over New England-produced). As 
savvy consumers, Natives also wanted tea, rice, tobacco, sugar, and salt, as 
well as more luxurious items such as coral and Chinese-made sandalwood and 
camphor boxes.
Trade networks linked the early West with Russian Alaska, Spanish Peru 
and Chile, Hawaii, Polynesian ports, as well as with the burgeoning market 
center and open port of Canton (Guangzhou) in China. Facing stiff interna-
tional competition in China from the 1780s onward, the British East India 
Company had established its factory in Canton in 1751, one of dozens of 
such factories linking the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean and to China. 
From Canton, trade linkages also spanned to ports in Fiji; the Gulf of Siam; 
Burma, Sumatra, and Java in the Dutch East Indies; the Netherlands; and, of 
course, to Calcutta, India, to London, and all the vast reaches of the British 
Empire.
FiGure 1.1  Fort Ross. Courtesy of Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 
 Division (from Society of California Pioneers, before 1840, photogra-
pher unknown. HABS CAL,49-FORO,1—5).
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Transnational commerce also brought new people to Pacific coast commu-
nities, and it moved local peoples from one place to the next across the vast 
oceans. While many Makahs found jobs on European ships sailing across the 
Pacific, numerous East Coast Indians did so as well. Some Native American 
seamen not only sailed across the Pacific but also stayed for good, making 
their homes and living in places such as Fiji and Hawaii. Hawaiian trappers in 
turn secured employment in the HBC inland posts. In 1787, Ka’iana, a high- 
ranking Hawaiian royal, and Comekala, a Mowachant Indian from Nootka 
Sound, spent over a year sailing the Pacific on a British ship Felice Adventurer. 
They visited both China and Hawaii. Also on board were Chinese carpenters, 
who built the first non-Native boat made in the Pacific Northwest in 1788. 
Besides these and other Chinese workers, at least 30 Japanese sailors reached 
the shores of North America or Mexico as a consequence of shipwrecks before 
the mid-1800s.
The number of vessels on the Pacific coast of North America increased 
each decade, so that hundreds of them had entered the coastal waters by the 
1820s. David Igler writes that nearly half of these ships came from the United 
States, while Britain, Spain, Mexico, and Russia were pretty evenly matched 
 (approximately 10% each). But there were trading vessels from 17 other polities, 
including France, Prussia, Hamburg, Canton, Sweden, Denmark,  Sardinia, 
Bengal, and Mauritius. The list of most-visited ports was topped by Hawaii, 
where nearly half of the ships stopped. Hawaii quickly emerged as a central 
 destination in these webs of trans-Pacific trade. It also became yet another 
fancy of imperial dreams. It drew British and French interest and an ill-fated 
attempt of colonization by the Russians long before it was annexed by the 
United States in the 1890s.
Terrestrial Circulations
Overland fur trading networks also placed the West firmly with global webs of 
production, exchange, and consumption. In the Rocky Mountains, scholars in-
cluding Eric Dolin and David Wishart write, trading centered on beaver pelts. 
The felted fur provided soft yet resilient material that could be easily combed 
to make a variety of fashionable hat shapes; these included the familiar top hat, 
highly popular among many social classes in the eastern United States and es-
pecially in Europe. The northern Plains trade in turn revolved around buffalo 
hides, which were tanned into leather and then used as machine belts. Bison 
bones, fat – used for manufacturing tallow – and meat were also utilized in-
ternationally. Furs were low bulk and high value commodities that could bear 
transportation over long distances. Also, relatively little capital was needed, as 
overhead costs were low, especially if the Indians acted as primary producers.
Overland fur trade thought and functioned in global terms. Wishart explains 
that on the Plains, the annual cycle went something like this: winter hunts by 
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mostly Native American hunters provided most bison robes, while supplies and 
trade goods originated in the factories of the eastern United States and Europe, 
and exchanges took place in trading posts dotting the Plains. Trade goods were 
often specially requested by Natives, their orders relayed by St. Louis via winter 
express and by steamboat in the summer. There were standardized products and 
standing orders. Here, again, most Natives – contrary to stereotypes – proved 
very picky and knowledgeable customers. They, for example, preferred  Chinese 
vermillion over American and demanded woolen goods from England. Like 
the coastal Indians, they did not settle for blankets from Lowell, Massachusetts, 
but favored blankets and cloth provided by Leeds and Manchester textile com-
panies. It was also the Loubat Company of Le Havre that made the kind of blue 
and scarlet blankets the Plains Indians wanted, while beads should come from 
Venice and guns from Britain, Belgium, and Germany.
There were three main routes to markets, and all led through New York. 
One was by steamboat to New Orleans and thence to New York, but on this 
route, heat and humidity could damage the furs. Other courses took to the 
Ohio River and either went on to Pittsburgh and the Pennsylvania Canal or to 
Buffalo and the Erie Canal. The final destination of the furs was decided each 
time after a thorough comparative market analysis. On the East Coast, furs 
were transported to markets in New York, Boston, and Montreal, and much 
was shipped to fur marts in London and Leipzig, Germany, from which the 
products were distributed all over Europe.
In the Rocky Mountains, it was the multinational and multiethnic mobile 
outfits of trappers who did much of the work, fall and spring being the main 
trapping seasons. They worked either as freelancers or on the payroll of com-
panies, most notably William Ashley’s Rocky Mountain Fur Company (until 
it was eliminated in the early 1830s by the American Fur Company). In the 
summer, they met for an annual rendezvous, with summer being the only sea-
son the supply wagon trains from St. Louis could move across the Plains. While 
the furs headed to the global markets from the rendezvous, company trap-
pers also kept moving and divided into numerous parties delegated to various 
 hunting grounds. Something of a “fur rush” was in full swing in the late 1820s, 
but the trade lacked stability: resource base was fragile and it renewed slowly. 
 Competition also reduced prices and profits. The HBC was blamed as seeking 
to create a barren fur desert between the U.S and British operations. There was 
also a preference for short-term gain over long-term planning, and the mar-
kets habitually proved quite unstable. By the 1840s, the beaver population was 
depleted in the Rocky Mountains, but by then, trends were also changing in 
Europe, and silk hats were becoming the new fashion.
Like the Aleuts, Tlingits, Haidas, Nuu-chah-nulths, Makahs, Chinook, and 
other indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest, several Native American 
communities in the inland West encountered European crossings and became 
part of the global funneling of diseases, peoples, animals, and goods while 
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staying at “home.” Mandans were one of these sedentary, primarily horticul-
tural, peoples whose lives these circulations revolutionized. Living in perma-
nent villages on the eastern fringes of the Plains, close to the banks of the 
Missouri River in present-day North Dakota, their first face-to-face meet-
ings with Europeans, historian Elisabeth Fenn shows, happened possibly in 
1689. Then the French explorer and aristocrat Louis Armand de Lom d’Arce 
Lahontan made a foray from Michilimackinac, where Lake Huron and Lake 
Michigan meet, toward the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. His account of 
the journey, published in 1703, proved wildly popular, seeing numerous re-
prints and translations. Apparently Thomas Jefferson, an avid expansionist, was 
among those who had a copy.
The first meeting could also have happened “abroad” in Saskatchewan be-
tween 1690 and 1692, when a group of Mandan or neighboring Hidatsa hunt-
ers met Henry Kelsey, an employee of the newly established HBC on an outing 
from York Factory. We do know that when searching for a great inland sea 
that would offer river links toward China, the Frenchman Pierre Gaultier de 
Varenne de La Vérendrye visited the Mandan villages in 1738. During the next 
decades, more and more traders started showing up. They were an international 
bunch, usually of French, English, and Scottish origin, many of them mestizos 
and quite a few aristocrats. Between 1787 and the coming of Lewis and Clark 
in 1804, at least 39 parties reached the Mandans from British Canada. Others 
made their appearance from St. Louis, seeking to secure the Mandans and their 
territories to the networks of the Spanish Empire.
By 1800, their communities awash with British goods, the Mandan vil-
lages and the York Factory functioned as principal permanent trade centers 
on the northern Plains. The Sioux, who soon eclipsed the Mandans, and the 
Comanches also commanded important trade centers on the opposite reaches 
of the Great Plains. The Cheyenne operated as middlemen. Working in small 
groups, they specialized in horses, manufactured weapons, and bison robes. 
Obviously, only the latter product originated from the Plains, with the others 
being transnational imports (although horse breeding was actively practiced by 
the Comanches). In the 1830s, some Cheyenne aligned with Bent’s Fort, a new 
trading post on the Arkansas River. This fort was part of a trading nexus led by 
French, American, and mestizo men from St. Louis. These included William 
Bent, an American who married into the Cheyenne, becoming their ally and 
later their agent. Also involved was Ceran St. Vrain, a French businessmen and 
the son of French aristocrats who came to the United States when escaping the 
French Revolution.
Drawing an international crowd, the Plains trade centers were part of a 
wider web, some permanent, others annual meets, still others temporary gath-
erings, but all connecting dynamic regions and contributing to transnational 
webs and exchanges of manufactured goods, farm produce, livestock, germs, 
captives, and furs. Significant trade centers rising and falling in the West 
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included the Dalles, on the Columbia River in today’s Oregon; the Pueblos 
in New Mexico; and the Spanish Santa Fe. On the list were also the North 
West  Company’s and HBC’s posts, which dotted southern Manitoba and the 
Minnesota- Ontario borderlands and advanced in the Pacific Northwest. Taken 
together, these networks spanned the Plains, the Southwest, the Great Basin, 
the Pacific  Northwest, the Rocky Mountains, the eastern woodlands, the 
 Mississippi, and the Great Lakes: the modern West and beyond. They also con-
nected the Spanish, French, British, Russian, and U.S. realms in the Americas, 
in Europe, and elsewhere. They linked with New Orleans, St. Louis, Mexico 
City, Madrid, Montreal, New York, London, Canton, and beyond, and they 
tied to the Atlantic slave trade and thus with the Caribbean and Africa.
These circulations created and shaped communities in the early West that 
fused trapping, trading, and ethnic mixing. St. Louis was one such place, a 
fast-growing gateway town on the Mississippi River that sent traders and drew 
furs from the Rocky Mountains and the upper Missouri. Located amid pow-
erful indigenous polities, foremost among them the Osages, St. Louis was a 
cosmopolitan community established by the French (1763), controlled by the 
Spanish (1770–1800), and then reclaimed by Napoleonic France (1800–1803) 
before it was purchased by the United States (1803). Although short on Iberian 
or other European settlers, the average Spanish settlement in New Mexico, 
Texas, and California was also populated by an international cast from at least 
three different continents. The community in these places usually comprised 
a mix of Europeans, Africans, and indigenous people from a variety of back-
grounds in North and Latin America. The Tlaxcalans, for instance, remained 
fairly numerous and active settlers in various locales of New Spain. Their pres-
ence was most relevant on or just south of the Rio Grande. At El Paso, they 
were refugees from northern New Mexico after the Pueblo revolt of 1680, and 
they settled at San Juan Bautista near present Eagle Pass about 1700 to help 
instruct and control the Coahuiltecan Indians at nearby missions. In the 1750s, 
the Tlaxcalans were invited by José de Escandón to settle in his new colony of 
Nuevo Santander in the lower Rio Grande valley. Although there were plans to 
settle Tlaxcalans at several strategic places in Texas in the mid-1700s, relatively 
few actually made their homes there (few families arrived at San Saba Mission 
in 1757).
In California, Johann August ( John) Sutter instituted yet another type 
of international community in the early West. Escaping debts in his native 
 Switzerland in 1834, Sutter relocated to America, where he sought his luck as 
an entrepreneur in Kansas, Oregon, Hawaii, and Alaska before ending up in 
Mexican California in 1839. Inspired by what he saw at Fort Vancouver, Sutter 
wanted to build a Swiss colony, New Helvetia, on a Mexican land grant in 
the Sacramento Valley near the confluence of the American and Sacramento 
Rivers. What he actually ended up doing was combining a Hawaiian-style 
residential settlement with an international mix of hundreds of employees of 
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Hawaiian, Hispanic, European, and Native American descent, many of them 
working in conditions bordering on slavery. He had built an imposing adobe 
military fort and a trading post centering on maritime fur business. The settle-
ment was defended by an army of some 200 local Miwok, Nisenan, and mis-
sion Indians and German-speaking white officers, dressed in Russian uniforms 
bought from Fort Ross. Sutter’s downfall coincided with the Gold Rush, as 
his workers left to pan for gold and as miners and land speculators invaded his 
valley. Losing his fortune, Sutter settled in Pennsylvania with his Swiss family, 
which he had abandoned back in 1834 but brought to California in 1850.
St. Louis, the Spanish pueblos, Sutter’s New Helvetia, and other commu-
nities were also sites through which notions of freedom and captivity were 
constantly negotiated as Europeans as well as indigenous peoples shared in the 
practice of captive-taking and slavery. Western captive networks embraced ver-
sions of a global phenomenon of slavery that saw the taking of individuals, 
enslavement of communities, breaking down of groups, and erasure of cultures 
across the Pacific, from Australia to Russian Alaska, the Caribbean, Africa, the 
Indian Ocean area, and elsewhere. The Spanish brought the first black African 
slaves to the West, and while numerous indigenous communities had engaged 
in some form of slavery before the coming of Europeans, human captives be-
came one of the prime trade commodities through the West and its borderlands 
in the wake of Spanish arrival. Captives functioned as unpaid labor, as a way to 
gain access to other communities, and as a method for obtaining information 
on routes, peoples, and one’s surroundings. While scores of people perished in 
captivity, others were integrated into their host communities. In the Spanish 
borderlands, former captives became a distinct social class known as genizaros.
Importantly for this book, networks of captive-taking and slavery made 
peoples in the West engage in involuntary crossings that connected the West 
with the British/American areas east of the Mississippi River, New Spain, and 
French Louisiana. Scores of indigenous peoples, including numerous Apaches 
and Pawnees, ended up as forced mining and plantation workers, house slaves, 
and as adopted community members from Louisiana to central Mexico and 
Cuba. In the shores and ports of the Pacific Northwest, ocean-going vessels 
carried enslaved Africans, stolen or purchased Native American women, other 
indigenous hostages, indentured servants, and a wide array of unfree people. 
From Alaska to Baja California and stretching from the Pacific Islands to New 
Zealand, a sexual marketplace developed where indigenous women, viewed 
as natural resources and cross-cultural assets, were bartered and prostituted. 
Thousands of white seafarers came for “native hospitality,” for sexual com-
panionship that overlapped with fur trade and captive-taking. Along with sex-
ual commerce and hospitality, captivities became woven into the imaginative 
and spatial makeup of European empires in their Pacific voyages. James Cook, 
for instance, took as captives/hostages Tahitian and other Polynesian lead-
ers, Tonga chiefs, Maori boys, and others, before being killed himself while 
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trying to capture chief Kalani’opu’u at Kealakekua Bay, Hawaii. Cook was not 
alone: the British George Vancouver; Spanish Alejandro Malaspina; Russian 
Vasily Golovnin; French Jean-François de Galaup, comte de Lapérouse; and 
the American Charles Wilkes, all prominent explorers of the Pacific and its 
North American coastline in the late 1700s as well as men on the lookout for 
the Northwest Passage, each employed similar methods.
Long-distance exploration and transnational trade networks brought not 
only an international cast of people to the West but also an epidemiologi-
cal chaos. Smallpox, dysentery, measles, typhus, and other deadly maladies 
traversed oceans and wreaked havoc among Native peoples, killing scores of 
adults, plummeting fertility levels, and increasing infant mortality rates. The 
impact was most extreme in places that had dense concentrations of people. 
Intended by the Spanish to become factories for agriculture and the conver-
sion/civilizing of Natives, the Spanish missions in California and the average 
baptized Indians, or “neophytes,” that lived there saw their mobility severely 
limited and their life fall under a stringent regime of labor and prayer. Friars 
enforced obedience through imposition of moral codes (although sexual abuse 
was also common), solitary confinement, and severe physical punishments that 
included the use of whippings, branding, and shackles. But it was the imported 
diseases that turned these sites of oppression into communities of death where 
the average resident could not expect to stay alive for more than a few years. 
A vicious cycle of apathy and death resulted as the Spanish amassed more and 
more Natives from the surrounding countryside to replace those who died in 
the missions.
Like the missions, many indigenous villages were ripe for turning into hot-
beds of imported diseases that crossed borders with ease. In 1775, thousands 
of miles from the Mandans, smallpox was raging in Boston, while four years 
later it was destroying Mexico City. Traveling well, it covered much ground 
in Latin America. By December 1780, it had New Orleans, San Antonio, the 
Pueblos, and Santa Fe in its grip. In 1781, the pox struck the entire Great 
Plains. It also killed as much as one-third of the population of the Pacific Coast 
Tlingit, Haida, Chinook, and Nez Perce communities. Later this pandemic 
would make it all the way to Alaska. Lack of previous exposure, together with 
large and dense villages, made for vast suffering, confusion, and all-consuming 
grief and heartache among the Mandans. Of their thirteen clans, the Mandans 
were left with seven as the disease was through. Their neighboring Arikaras 
dropped from thirty-two towns to only two.
Transnational migrations of this type were far from over, however. 
 Whooping cough and measles emerged in tandem in the winter of 1819. 
 Norway rats, Elizabeth Fenn asserts, invaded the Mandans with force in 1825, 
coming on the keelboats of the U.S. Army. Originating nowhere near Norway, 
but possibly from the plains of central Asia, the rats were reported in Ireland 
in 1722, England in 1730, France in 1735, Germany in 1750, and Spain in 
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1800. The species went on to conquer nearly all continents, arriving in North 
America in the mid-1700s. Producing as many as 50 offspring per female per 
year, the rats stormed the Mandan grain storages with devastating effectiveness, 
displaying an insatiable appetite. The Mandans in turn went hungry. While 
the Indians tried to cope with the rats, so did the American Fur Company 
people at Fort Union, established in 1828 along the Missouri River some 120 
miles north of the Mandans. From 1832, regular steamboat traffic linked Fort 
Union, the Mandans, and St. Louis. In 1833, cholera was on board. Arriving in 
 Canada in 1832, it traveled west, reaching St. Louis by May 1833 and possibly 
the  Mandans soon thereafter.
What is certain is that smallpox returned. HBC’s brigantine Lama (the same 
vessel that redeemed the Japanese castaways from the Makahs) brought it to 
the Northwest Coast in 1836. Soon outbreaks of the disease hit everywhere in 
the Pacific, from Alaska to Chile and from California to Tahiti. The steamer 
St.   Peter’s dropped smallpox all along the upper Missouri. The epidemic ex-
ploded, killing some 10,000–15,000 Plains Indians. It wreaked havoc even 
among the more nomadic Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne. Unlike many other 
tribes in the area, the Mandans had been saved from the bouts of smallpox that 
had hit after 1781. Now, largely without immunity due to the long gap, small-
pox killed as many as seven-eighths of the Mandans. Only some 300 survived.
In the bigger picture, the repeated strikes of “old world” pathogens led 
to a near total destruction among the Mandans. Many other indigenous vil-
lages also suffered irreplaceable loss. Among them were the Makahs, who lost 
three-quarters of their population to smallpox in 1853. Nomadic communities 
were also hit. These included the Blackfeet, a once powerful confederation of 
transborder peoples in Montana and Canada with strong ties to British traders. 
By the time the U.S. settler empire reached them, the Blackfeet were pale shad-
ows of their former might.
exploration and expansion
Louisiana
Historians Robert Bush and Peter Kastor, among others, have claimed that as the 
new century dawned in 1800 it increasingly looked like the West had become 
a pawn on the chessboard of European politics. This notion applied equally to 
the Pacific Coast and to the massive landmass referred to as  Louisiana. This 
Louisiana (unlike the present state) represented an area shaped like a triangle 
(the kind that stands on its head) spanning from the Rocky Mountains to the 
Mississippi River. The claim and the authority of Madrid, Paris, or (after 1804) 
Washington on this area certainly was contested by most of the area’s indige-
nous peoples – including the Mandans, the Cheyenne, or the actively expand-
ing Sioux. Many were probably not even aware of the international reshuffling 
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of Louisiana, first in the mid-1700s and again in the early 1800s. Taken by Spain 
in 1763, the area returned to French hands in 1800 with the Third Treaty of 
San Ildefonso. This treaty represented one complex machination in a series of 
complex machinations by post-revolutionary and habitually chaotic France and 
its rising star Napoleon Bonaparte, who tried to reshuffle domestic and interna-
tional politics to his liking. Kept secret until October 1802, the treaty involved 
French authority in Parma and Tuscany, put pressure on its ally Spain, and took 
measures against its enemy Britain. While the transfer of power in Louisiana to 
the French took place in November 1803, ten months earlier American negoti-
ators had been sent to Paris to inquire if France would consider selling the area. 
A deal was struck in April and a formal cession to the United States made in 
New Orleans on December 20, 1803. Another ceremony was held in St. Louis 
on March 9–10, 1804. This event is remembered as Three Flags Day.
It is possible to argue that Napoleon’s strong continental potential and 
visions in Europe led him to abandon any possible continental machinations 
in the West. During his rise to power, Napoleon had first entertained plans 
of French imperial expansion in Africa and the Middle East. He also had 
dreams of a French resurgence in the Americas. Louisiana would ideally form 
a strong French claim at the heart of the continent, checking U.S. expansion 
and providing food, fuel, and protection to the more profitable French sugar 
islands in the Caribbean.  Political unrest inside France, the near-continuous 
fighting in continental  Europe, the looming conflict with Britain, what had 
been a less-than-spectacular expedition into Ottoman Egypt, and campaigns 
of self-promotion to become the head of state in France made Napoleon 
rethink his priorities. Shaping his decisions was also the fate of the large 
expeditionary force he sent to regain control of the wealthy colony of Saint-
Domingue (Haiti).
Influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution, in 1791 a slave insurrec-
tion had spread on Saint-Domingue, resulting in the abolition of slavery and 
the ousting of French rule. When it looked as if they would bring back slavery, 
the French and their efforts to retake the island became embroiled in a fresh 
round of rebellions. Soon French troops were frustrated and humiliated by the 
ravages of disease and fierce resistance. Deterred by these setbacks and worried 
about the resurgence of his potential enemies, a long list that included external 
threats from the British, Russian, Austrian, and Prussian rulers, Napoleon lost 
interest in North America. He sold Louisiana in April 1803 and withdrew the 
remaining French soldiers from Saint-Domingue in May. He was not weak, 
far from it. During this time, Napoleon also made himself the emperor of 
France and would soon crush coalition forces in Austerlitz and tighten his grip 
against Britain, and later, Russia. By 1807, he ruled a vast and still expanding 
continental empire in the heart of a continent. But that continent was Europe, 
not North America. For a while, it looked as if he would make Europe into a 
massive French settler empire, imposing, for example, the French language on 
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his German subjects. If Napoleon had kept his sights on North America and 
the West instead of Europe, we might with good reason ask would this book 
be written in French?
Even after Napoleon had sold it, the boundaries of Louisiana proved vague. 
They rubbed against the Spanish claims in the south (Spain insisted that Texas 
was not part of the bargain) and with the British in the north, especially closer 
to the Rockies and to the burgeoning Metis communities around the Red 
River of the North. The Americans in turn tried to figure out the extent and 
nature of their purchase. At the advent of the Louisiana Purchase, President 
Thomas Jefferson had organized the Corps of Discovery, led by his private sec-
retary Meriwether Lewis and the slaveholding planter and ex-soldier William 
Clark. Lewis and Clark were instructed by Jefferson to locate and map a prac-
tical route to the Pacific, ideally the fabled Northwest Passage that would open 
the equally fabled China trade to the United States. They should also establish 
relations between the United States and the independent Indians they met, and, 
as was the standard practice for explorers around the world, collect mountains 
of specimens of local flora and fauna.
As it turned out, the Rocky Mountains and the continental divide ensured 
that no rivers connected the Mississippi system with the Pacific. In order to 
reach the world’s biggest ocean by crossing the West, one needed to take a 
very demanding overland trip across vast plains, arid basins, and mighty moun-
tains. Obscuring this less than exciting and encouraging fact, Lewis and Clark 
nevertheless promoted the feasibility of the land passage they had carved to be 
the long-waited global shortcut. They conveyed that the (in reality, turbulent) 
Columbia River represented a potential avenue for funneling the furs from 
the Missouri River and the Rockies to awaiting ships on the Pacific coast and 
thence to the markets of China. They also predicted that this option would 
offer a faster route for inland furs to the global markets than the British system 
of shipping via Montreal to Europe.
Interior Thrusts
While Napoleon reshuffled the pack, and Lewis and Clark toured the West 
promoting U.S. rule, several indigenous peoples were also engaged in pow-
erful expansions of their own. None likely proved more powerful than the 
 Comanches, an assortment of hunter–gatherers from the Rocky Mountains 
and the Great Basin who took advantage of what the Spanish had introduced. 
Others came from farther away. The Cheyenne crossed over to the Plains from 
somewhere north of the Great Lakes, from the Hudson’s Bay area in present- 
day Canada. The Sioux in turn probably originated near Lake Michigan. These 
people embraced various cultural and economic adaptations when entering the 
West, the overall trend being from pedestrian farmer-hunters to equestrian 
buffalo hunters and horse pastoralists.
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The impacts of European contacts – disease, fur trade, new weaponry, vi-
olence, and slavery – reshuffled relations on all shores of the Great Lakes. The 
Sioux and the Cheyenne tried to take advantage of the new situation. They, for 
instance, hunted beaver pelts for French traders, who sold them to Montreal 
and then onward to Europe, where they were in high demand. When their role 
as suppliers of the latest European fashion became too precarious due to indig-
enous competition, and with the Plains in their sights, the Cheyenne moved. 
They reached the Minnesota River by approximately 1700, gradually making 
their way to the Sheyenne River in modern-day North Dakota. They concen-
trated on the Missouri River near the boundary of the Dakotas and touched 
the Black Hills by century’s end. From there, the Cheyenne advanced to the 
central Plains south of the Black Hills and north of the Arkansas River by the 
1820s and 1830s.
It is possible that the Sioux migrations took place in three identifiable stages. 
The initial movement was during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries onto the prairies east of the Missouri. This was followed by a con-
quest of the middle Missouri River region during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries as the river villagers, the Mandans, Arikaras, and Hidatsas, 
were nearly wiped out by epidemics. Lastly, the Sioux headed west and south 
from the Missouri during the early and mid-nineteenth century.  Crossing the 
Missouri River by 1800, they dominated the horticultural villagers, contested 
the Pawnees for the hunting grounds of western Nebraska, as well as struck 
their semisedentary villages and cornfields. In the 1830s, the Sioux took the 
Black Hills. They were pushing the Crows westward in the Yellowstone and 
Powder River area at the time when white overland emigrants heading for 
Oregon and California began crossing their domain regularly.
In the West, the Sioux and Cheyenne traded energetically, formed shifting 
alliances, and fought plenty when operating in contested transnational migra-
tory landscapes. They shared space with the agents of the French, Spanish, 
British, and U.S. empires as well as with thousands of more or less seden-
tary Natives and removed eastern Indians like the Cherokees, Kickapoos, and 
Shawnees. They also, either individually or in groups, incorporated many 
peoples. One significant incorporation took place when the Cheyenne, in the 
late 1700s, encountered the Sutaio, strangers from the north who spoke an 
 Algonquin language similar to theirs, and merged with them.
As the Cheyenne reached the Black Hills and the Sioux crossed the  Missouri, 
the Scottish explorer Mungo Park took his second, fatal expedition in West 
 Africa and the German naturalist Alexander von Humbolt advanced the cause 
of the Spanish Empire, and his own, in Latin America. Exploration and expan-
sion was fast transforming, from the primarily ocean and coastal ventures that 
had been characteristic of the eighteenth century to a notable thrust toward 
the interiors of Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Americas. It was also becoming 
a worldwide effort by empires to fill the blank spaces on their maps; to know, 
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categorize, and make understandable the world; as well as to instigate new 
trade relations, extract resources, and scout suitable land for settlement. As his-
torian Dane Kennedy explains, exploration in the 1800s was a key, and perhaps 
defining, aspect of the encounters white Europeans had with other peoples and 
lands. It laid the groundwork for imperial expansion, advanced a new phase of 
globalization, and fostered the rise of modern scientific knowledge and notions 
of difference (often based on race). Explorers paved the way for the settler co-
lonial advance to the West. They did the same with the settler penetration of 
the British Wests (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa), French 
thrust in West Africa and Algeria, the British expansion across India, and the 
Russian settlements in Siberia and the Caucasus. Climaxing with the surge 
toward the polar regions in the 1900s, explorers gathered intelligence for spon-
soring empires and claimed territory on their behalf. They often functioned 
as celebrated agents of knowledge, courage, and power. Some, like  David 
 Livingstone, fought against slavery and strove to spread Christianity, while 
also promoting himself and the cause of his exploration. Many had their eye on 
the needs of commerce and industry, and men like Henry Morton  Stanley and 
Richard Francis Burton certainly understood the value of publicity.
An enterprise distinct from travel, exploration developed its own scientific 
protocols and its unique partnerships with scientific societies, the state, and the 
public in the 1800s. In short, exploration became a more organized enterprise 
than ever before. Motivated by rivalry and public’s urge for land, Washington, 
Berlin, Paris, and London, as well as the regional governments in Ottawa, 
New South Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia, sponsored and conducted 
a series of expeditions. So did several geographic societies, most famously the 
Royal Geographic Society, which grew to dominate British exploration after 
its founding in 1830. Companies like the British East India Company and the 
HBC were also actively involved. Since the late 1600s, the HBC had already 
delivered entire collections of natural history specimens and meteorological 
diaries to Royal Society in London. Later, as historian Ted Binnema writes, 
the Royal Society, as well as the Royal Navy became dependent on HBC for 
data and collections relating to geology, ethnography, and hydrography – even 
craniometry, as company employees shipped Native skulls to London. The 
HBC was also the single largest provider of natural history and ethnographic 
collections to the newly founded Smithsonian Institution. Indeed, museums 
such as the British Museum and the Smithsonian, as well as universities, were 
active in promoting exploration. So were the armies of France, Russia, and the 
United States (especially with its Topographical Engineers). Many explorers, 
including Gustav Nachtigal, a German explorer of Central and West Africa, as 
well as Burton, Clark, Zebulon Pike, Stephen Long, and John Wesley Powell 
came from military backgrounds.
Regardless of what empire you played for, it was close to mandatory for 
explorers to make detailed observations of the land, its natural environment, 
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and its peoples; to collect incredible volumes of botanical specimens, geological 
samples, and ethnographic artifacts; to produce maps; and to record latitude and 
longitude. Explorers, as a rule, kept extensive diaries, filled sketchbooks with 
drawings, and penned pages after pages of reports. Many also took professional 
painters or photographers along. They required precision instruments such as 
sextants, chronometers, pedometers, and barometers for scientific observation 
and measurement. The explorers’ gaze also began to more meticulously infil-
trate even the most intimate domains in peoples’ lives.
This scientific effort impressed in its sheer quantity. Take, for example, the 
Spanish Malaspina expedition on the Americas and the Pacific from 1789 to 
1794. It produced nearly 16,000 plant and seed specimens, 450 albums of as-
tronomical observations, over 300 journals and logbooks, 80 drawings, and 
183 charts, among other things. When exploring the great lakes of East Africa, 
Burton not only kept record of rainfall levels and barometric pressure, prepared 
maps, gathered geological samples, and shipped botanical specimens (shell, 
snake, insect, and plant samples) and human artifacts to the Royal Geographic 
Society in Kew Gardens and the British Museum; he also measured genitals 
and queried about the sexual and marital arrangements of the locals in the name 
of science. Claiming scientific authority through standardization and compa-
rability, explorers not only needed to master special skills, but they were also 
held accountable for their efforts. Funding and reputation depended on results.
Explorers produced massive volumes bursting with scientific data that came 
off the press with the same regularity as exhilarating stories of adventure. 
Mungo Park’s account of his first outing to the Niger River, Travels in the 
Interior Districts of Africa, proved a best seller in 1799. So did many of Stanley’s 
works, for instance. Targeting diverse audiences, Burton published dozens of 
books. They ranged in tone from exciting personal accounts to sexually pro-
gressive translations of the Kama Sutra. He also penned travel writings on 
the American West and more serious works of exploration, such as The Lake 
Regions of Central Africa, his 1860 volume containing nearly 600 pages. Others 
were just as productive. In the 1850s, the U.S.–Mexico boundary surveyor 
William H. Emory penned two thick volumes, over 700 pages, of detailed de-
scription of the places, peoples, and nature he encountered. Another boundary 
surveyor John Bartlett’s printed narratives totaled a whopping 1,300 pages. 
Alexander MacKenzie gained distinction throughout the world by being a dar-
ing explorer as well as a successful writer and self-promoter. John C. Fremont 
gained such fame by penning successful stories of his four 1840s expeditions in 
the West, and promoting the farming potential of the Plains, that he earned the 
sobriquet “pathfinder.”
Lewis and Clark in turn kept voluminous diaries and wrote numerous re-
ports on the climate, topography, soil fertility, river drainage, and Indian cul-
tures. They also organized enough specimens to fill a small museum: dozens 
of plants; the hides of several animals, some stuffed; live magpies, sharp-tailed 
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grouses, and prairie dogs; and a variety of embalmed insects. All this and 
much more they packaged and sent to Washington. In the drive to collect and 
categorize, Lewis and Clark differed little from Burton in Africa, from the 
British explorers of Australia, or from what numerous others had done and 
would do in the West. In fact, they were following an established tradition. 
Only as self-promoters did Lewis and Clark pale in comparison to Burton, 
Stanley, and others, as their achievements were largely overlooked in a time 
when explorers hurried to gain fame by filling the last blank spaces of the 
world.
Scores of international explorers and scientists touched on the West. 
These included the Scottish botanist Archibald Menzies, who explored the 
Pacific Coast in the 1790s, and David Douglas, who reached the region in 
the 1820s (sending 7,000 species back to Britain). John Bradbury in turn 
studied areas in and around St. Louis in the 1810s, while his fellow Scot 
Thomas  Drummond botanized through Texas from 1833 to 1835. Aboard 
the Russian Rurik in the 1810s, a Russian expedition lead by Captain Otto 
von Kotzebue included  Adelbert von Chamisso, a French-born, Berlin edu-
cated exile, nobleman, poet, and naturalist, as well as the Prussian- Russian 
painter Louis Choris.  Departing Europe in July 1815, the expedition sur-
vived Cape Horn, touched land in Chile, and cut across the Pacific to winter 
in Kamchatka. The next year, the Rurik not only scouted the Bering Strait 
and the Aleutian Islands for the  Northwest  Passage but also anchored in 
San Francisco Bay. This offered Choris the opening to paint the  Native 
and Spanish inhabitants before the expedition continued to Hawaii, and 
actually ended up circumnavigating the globe. In 1819, Choris had his 
drawings and paintings published in Paris using the comparatively novel 
technique of lithography. He ended up selling copies of his volume of more 
than 100 plates to the Russian czar and the kings of France and Prussia, 
among others (Figure 1.2).
There were numerous other international scientists making their name in 
the West later in the century as well. Gustaf Nordenskiöld was one of them. 
This nobleman and scholar of Finnish-Swedish descent, and the eldest son of 
the polar explorer Baron Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld, landed in New York in 
May 1891. Applying his scientific training, Nordenskiöld conducted the first 
archaeological excavation of the Mesa Verde ruins in Colorado. Loading vol-
umes of artifacts onto railroad cars, being arrested by locals angered by this 
looting, but acquitted by the court for having broken no laws, he eventually 
headed back home. The bulk of the Mesa Verde items Nordenskiöld plundered 
were brought back to Sweden, and they ended up in the National Museum of 
Finland, where they still are.
The close companion of exploration was expansion. Lewis and Clark were 
in the West to advance the federal government’s authority and interests;  Choris 
advocated the Russian cause; Burton spearheaded British authority in  Africa; 
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Nachtigal made local rulers sign treaties acknowledging German rule in 
 Cameroon and Togo; and Stanley worked to expedite the claim of Belgium’s 
King Leopold II in Congo. Many followed established European traditions of 
claiming dominion over “new” lands through raising flags, making speeches, 
and putting pen to paper. Lewis and Clark, for instance, performed the change 
in dominion through voluminous speeches, music, flag ceremonies, saluting, 
and some more speeches. Whether their Native audience understood or took 
them seriously is another matter entirely.
In truth, the West remained very much a contested imperial domain. The 
American explorer Zebulon Pike first found this out as he brushed against 
the British assertions when in search for the source of the  Mississippi River 
in 1805. Next he explored the western reaches of the Louisiana  Purchase. 
Dubbing much of the Plains the “great American desert,” the American 
 Sahara unfit for white futures, Pike and his party studied the Kansas and 
Arkansas rivers area, reached the Rockies in present-day  Colorado, and 
then crossed the “border” into Spanish territory in New Mexico. Pike os-
tensibly thought he was on the Red River, while he actually was on the Rio 
Grande. The Spanish had been searching him already earlier, but now they 
imprisoned Pike and his party for spying in what essentially amounted to 
FiGure 1.2  Jeu des habitans de Californe, painting depicting Native women watch-
ing men play a game, possibly related to gambling, at a mission 
near San Francisco, California.1822 by Louis Choris (1795–1828). 
 Courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, 
LC-DIG-ppmsca-02900.
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an “illegal” border crossing. Pike was escorted via Santa Fe and  Chihuahua 
to Natchitoches in Spanish Texas before deported as an “illegal.” Back in 
the states, he nevertheless published a popular narrative of his exploits, 
gaining fame and, as historian Jared Orsi remarks, wanting recognition as 
a national hero.
But things were changing. In two decades, Missouri merchants would be 
crossing the U.S.–New Spain/Mexico border, as defined by the Adams–Onís 
Treaty in 1819, with permission from Mexican authorities. While numer-
ous British, French, and German explorers hurried to all corners of Africa, 
many American expeditions in turn mapped, described, categorized, and 
 catalogued the West, its physical landscapes, and human populations. The 
federal  government conducted big expeditions in the 1840s and still did so 
decades later, including those led by Clarence King, Ferdinand V. Hayden, 
and George M. Wheeler. In 1869, John Wesley Powell took on the Green 
and Colorado Rivers, becoming the first European to go through the Grand 
Canyon.
In 1848, the Spanish (Mexican), Russian, and British claims had been elim-
inated in the West and dominion transferred to the United States. Furs de-
pleted, Russia made treaties with the United States in 1824 and with Britain 
in 1825 limiting their presence north of the 54th parallel. After the Crimean 
War, much of Russian focus was on settler colonial projects on the Caucasus 
and on southward expansion in Central Asia, where it ran the risk of collid-
ing with British India. Russia sold Alaska to the United States in 1867. After 
some heated negotiations and escalating tensions, Britain and the United States 
reached a compromise, splitting the Pacific Northwest in 1846. In the same 
year, the United States waged a short, aggressive, and successful war, gaining 
half of Mexico as a result. While American on paper, the West would remain 
very much a crossroads of the Atlantic and Pacific worlds, a place of conver-
gence for different peoples, cultures, and pathogens, as it had been, in one shape 
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In his twenties, Peter Wigen became a transnational settler when he relocated 
from Selbu, a tiny municipality in Norway, to Minnesota in the 1870s. A de-
cade later, he had married his Selbu sweetheart, Beret “Betsy” Kjosnes, and 
started a family and a dairy farm. It was 1901 when the Wigens were again on 
the move. They first caught promotional writings in the Norwegian-American 
paper Skandinavien advertising the prairie lands of La Crosse, Washington State. 
Learning more about the location through their Norwegian connections, the 
family sold their Minnesota farm and bought 800 acres of land in the interior 
Pacific Northwest. Like Minnesota earlier, their destination was land wrestled 
from indigenous peoples through wars and treaties, in this case the Nez Perce, 
the Umatilla, and the Walla Walla. Soon, two of Peter’s brothers also relocated 
from Minnesota to La Crosse, as did at least 11 other former Selbu natives from 
Minnesota, historian Robert Elliott Barkan explains. In 1906, Betsy personally 
crossed the Atlantic to Selbu on a recruiting trip. The outcome: she prompted 
some 25 people to proceed to La Crosse. In the meantime, more Norwegians 
from North America and Europe continued to cluster at La Crosse, chang-
ing the face of the area in the process. But some Norwegians, who struggled 
with the relative scarcity of farming lands, soon moved again; they headed 
for other ethnic Norwegian communities, this time in Canada and Colorado. 
Once more these settlers crossed borders and/or settled on lands taken from 
Natives, joining familiar ethnic surroundings and using their ethnic networks 
for  information and assistance in getting there.
These transregional and transnational circulations to La Crosse and beyond, 
and millions of other chain, step, and community migrations like it, illus-
trate the nineteenth-century global “settler revolutions,” to use historian James 
 Belich’s term. The trans-Mississippi West remained richly multicultural in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s – meaning it saw ethnic mixing and drew people 
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representing different races, ethnicities, and religions. Yet, this settler colo-
nial West was less the syncretic meeting ground of cultures, communities, and 
empires the West had been in the past and more a realm where settlers came 
to stay, take the land, substitute the Natives, and instigate racial hierarchies 
and policies of exclusion. In short, the early West of shared worlds and middle 
grounds gradually and unevenly made way for a settler colonial West as the 
nineteenth century progressed. As a settler colonial space, the West was made 
into a target for a distinctive form of colonialism, a social formation and project 
where the settlers destroyed and replaced the Natives and made the land their 
own. It involved conquest, long-range migration, permanent settlement (or at 
least intent of such), and the reproduction of one’s own society. It took place 
in various stages and impacted areas unevenly from the Texas Revolution, the 
Oregon Compromise, and the Mexican–American War to the American Civil 
War, the Gilded Age, and beyond. The West continues to be settler colonial 
today: it represents a geographical and cultural space in which white Europeans 
have invaded and settled on what used to be other peoples’ lands, where they 
and their offspring have become and been/remained politically, economically, 
and culturally dominant, and where a diverse society has developed in terms of 
class, ethnicity, and race despite intense racialization and measures to exclude 
specific, often nonwhite, settler groups.
This settler revolution involved, coincided, spurred, and was a consequence 
of industrial and transportation revolutions, massive population growth and 
outward migration from Europe, idealization of yeoman farming cultures, 
the rise of print culture and intense marketing (boosterism), mining rushes, 
the spread of market economy, and capital flows in extractive industries and 
agribusiness that crossed national borders and signified new forms of global 
 integration. It also saw extended state power and nationalization of impe-
rial spaces. And the West was not alone. It had earlier precedents in the na-
tional context in the Ohio region, the Kentucky frontier, and in the cotton 
South where the settler project also involved chattel slavery. The West also 
shared much in common with parallel settler colonial processes taking place 
in the British Wests (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, and to 
a lesser extent Rhodesia and Kenya), French Algeria, Russian Caucasus and 
 Siberia, many Latin American countries, and German Southwest Africa and 
the  German–Polish borderlands. These settler revolutions typically linked the 
local and the global through far-flung networks and circulation of knowledge, 
ideas, and peoples, and their histories increasingly appear as complex webs of 
entanglements, crossovers, transfers, and exchanges.
Luring scores of immigrants from Europe and driven by the logic of elimina-
tion against the Natives as sovereign polities, by the late nineteenth- century the 
American West had become the global standard for a  successful settler colonial 
project. Some settler projects proved more effective in their long-term substitu-
tion of Natives and positioning of settler cultures than did others. In Australia 
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and New Zealand, the settlers overpowered and outnumbered the Natives and 
made their presence permanent. In South Africa and Algeria, sizable numbers 
of European settlers also employed harsh measures targeting the indigenous 
populations, but in both places settlers remained a minority and their power 
would not last. Following the genocidal wars against the indigenous Hereros 
and Namas by the German government,  German Southwest  Africa still had less 
than 20,000 white settlers by World War I when Germany lost its formal col-
onies. The German drive to the East and dreams of living space inside Europe 
also crumbled with their defeat in World War II. Japanese settler colonialism in 
Korea and Manchuria also came to an inglorious end by 1945.
Initially the settler colonial West tried to look very much like a “white man’s 
West.” The right kind of whites – meaning of northern European ancestry and 
preferably decent, respectable peoples and families – constituted the ideal settlers. 
In practice, however, settler projects such as the West attracted a diverse pool of 
peoples in term of class and race and often needed nonwhite labor. These “non- 
desirables” included poor whites from eastern and southern Europe, emancipated 
black slaves from the South, Chinese and other Asians, as well as  Mexicans. Their 
transnational migration and settlement contributed to the setting up of racial hi-
erarchies and policies of exclusion. The West, together with settler projects in 
Australia, South Africa, and Canada, developed new methods of border enforce-
ment, immigration policies, and racial privilege in an effort to make their settler 
spaces into “white man’s countries.” Still, the borders of these settler colonial 
spaces proved habitually contested and uncontrollable, acting more as avenues of 
mobility for peoples, industry, and goods rather than as walls separating them.
Chin Lung was one “unwanted” settler who crossed the Pacific Ocean to 
reach the West. He arrived from China to California in 1882, ten years later 
than Peter Wigen made his first crossing to Minnesota. Chin claimed status as 
an agricultural merchant, and his successful operations in Stockton and later 
Sacramento both cemented his place in the West and enabled his transnational 
mobility. In 1888, Chin returned to China to marry Leong Shee, and five years 
later he was even able to sponsor his wife to join him in the West. Eleven years 
and five kids later, Leong, unhappy in San Francisco, where the  Chinese were 
openly discriminated against, returned to China and converted to  Christianity 
there, Barkan writes. Chin instead remained in the West for the most part. 
While the aspirations of Chinese settlers often halted at the borders, and while 
Chin lived on a different continent than his family, he was able to skirt exclu-
sion and make periodic trips to China and back, siring two more sons in the 
process. Eventually all of his five boys relocated to the West, while his two 
daughters married in China (some of the latter’s offspring entered America in 
the 1940s). As for Chin, a successful merchant and a settler with family mem-
bers on two continents, he took his exit and returned to China and his wife 
in 1932. The two eventually settled in Portuguese Macao and spent the latter 
years of their transnational lives there.
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Age of mobility
Some 650,000 British and Irish immigrants and some 100,000 Germans had 
moved to North America before 1780. Less than two million British and 
 Spanish had relocated to the whole of North and Latin America up to that time, 
compared to the approximately 10–12 million sub-Saharan African slaves who 
crossed the Atlantic in chains before 1810. However, the floodgates of migration 
opened in nineteenth-century Europe, as well as Asia, even as they slowed in 
the black Atlantic. Historian Adam McKeown has identified three major long- 
distance migratory systems between 1840 and 1940. First is the approximately 
55–58 million people to the Americas. These were mostly  Europeans who 
crossed the Atlantic to the settler colonies in North and Latin America. As James 
Belich claims, approximately 36 million of those engaged in far  settlement were 
“Anglos” – English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish, but also native-born Americans and 
Germans. In all, some five million immigrants entered the United States from 
1820 to 1860, and 30 million more before the restrictions of the mid-1920s. 
This is the flow most Europeans and Americans know quite well. But its equals 
in size were the migration of 48–52 million people to Southeast Asia, the Indian 
Ocean Rims, and the South Pacific, mainly from India and Southern China, but 
also (some four million) from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and northeastern 
Asia. The third major flow saw 46–51 million people move to Manchuria and 
Siberia, mainly from northern China and European Russia.
If the majority of the people on the move in the world were not  Europeans, 
neither did the majority of Europeans on the move enter America or its West. 
Instead, they went from the countryside to mushrooming industrial urban 
spaces within Europe. Many also chose Canada, Australia, Brazil, or  Argentina 
over the United States. Several also crossed borders within Europe. Tens of 
thousands of Italian workers moved to France in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
while Germany, especially the industrial Ruhr Valley and the rural eastern 
Prussia, drew scores of Polish laborers. Many French, Italians, Spanish, and 
Greeks crossed the Mediterranean, some 480,000 of them being busy building 
a settler colonial state in Algeria by 1890. The settler movement also often con-
stituted of several smaller steps. Many Irish first went to Liverpool, Glasgow, 
or other industrial centers in Britain. Countless stayed, but after a time others 
moved forward to the Americas or to the British Wests, in which a lot of them 
kept on moving in irregular intervals. Following their arrival to the eastern 
seaboard of North America, the settlers changed the face of Boston, New York, 
and Philadelphia, but others opted for shorter stopovers prior to pushing west-
ward. The Germans, for instance, made their mark in Cincinnati and  Chicago, 
before taking over the northern Plains. Some settlers chose detours via Canada 
before ending up in the West; others moved from the West to Canada (and 
possibly back again). In all, it seemed that for the majority of settlers, borders 
existed just to be crossed over.
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Transport Webs
The settler revolutions were enabled by a steam-driven revolution in transport 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Steamboats and railroads made leaving more 
fathomable, getting there easier, and staying in touch across national borders 
and oceans normal. The first commercially viable steam engines were devel-
oped in 1807; steamboat traffic started regularly on the Mississippi River from 
1817, and ocean steamers started crossing the Atlantic in the 1840s, dominating 
the traffic in people and freight by the 1860s. The opportunities for a truly 
global movement improved quickly as boats got bigger, faster, and safer, and as 
tickets became cheaper and travel more regular. For example, on the Atlantic 
each of the White Star Line’s ships carried an average of 1,000 passengers in 
the 1870s but by the turn of the century the new liners could fit at least twice 
that many people. And there grew a fierce rivalry for passengers: the Red Star 
Line shipped settlers from Antwerp, Liverpool, and Southampton; the Cunard 
Line and the American Line from Southampton and Liverpool; the Holland 
 America Line from Rotterdam; and the Norddeutscher Lloyd from Bremen.
Intense competition resulted in bigger ships and ship line merges but also 
expansion to world markets. According to McKeown, just approximately half 
of the world trans-oceanic migration between the 1840s and 1940s went to the 
Americas. For example, the Hamburg–Amerika Linie was making weekly pas-
sages to New York (via Southampton), but it also reached Baltimore as well as 
ports in the West Indies, Mexico, Latin America, China, Japan, and  Australia. 
It thus transported goods and settlers across the world, not just between Europe 
and North America. The Latin American route, for example, included stops 
at Hamburg, Antwerp, Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, Santos, Buenos Aires, Punta 
Arenas, Chacabuco, Castro, Puerto Monti, Valparaiso, Antofagasta,  Arica, 
Callao, Guayaquil, and Buenaventura. Regular steamship routes also began 
to operate between Japan, China, and California, so that by the end of the 
century six lines in the Pacific were regularly packed with passengers. The trip 
across the world’s biggest ocean took less than 12 days in 1898, while it had 
lasted some 22 days just a decade earlier. By 1911, there were 14 major shipping 
companies sharing the oceans, several of them displaying a global reach with 
operations not only on the Atlantic but also in Asia and Africa.
While the trip across the Atlantic to the United States was cheaper and quicker 
than to Australia, Asia, or Latin America, reaching the West was far from easy. 
Often potential settlers, especially if short on economic means, had made prepa-
rations for weeks, months, or even years in advance. Europe was teeming with 
potential settlers without permanent homes as thousands  journeyed overland 
every year from various corners of Europe to reach the seaports of Antwerp, 
Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, Southampton, and  Liverpool where it was pos-
sible to catch a ride to America. Bucharest, Vienna, Warsaw, Berlin, Danzig, 
Stockholm, and other major cities were buzzing with transit people, who came 
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from small villages and rural areas and who yearned to reach the Atlantic port 
cities. Potential settlers often had to cross several borders and encounter hard-
ships, unfamiliar languages, and government officials and citizens who did not 
respond to them too kindly or sought to take advantage of them. They also 
underwent health inspections, disinfections, and harassment (sexual and oth-
erwise) in the process. Sometimes travel funds were spent before reaching even 
the port of departure, which meant that settlers and their families had to work 
en route, depend on charity organizations, and beg to obtain food, temporary 
accommodation, and preferably boat tickets to America. Many individuals and 
families were stuck in the port cities for weeks or months, subject to unsanitary 
conditions, diseases, and exploitation. Some never got to the seas.
Heading from the eastern seaboard of North America toward the West, people 
quickly realized that the West’s major waterways, like the Missouri, flow north 
to south, while those rivers aligned from west to east, like the Platte and Red 
Rivers, habitually proved unnavigable for steam-powered vessels. At first over-
land traffic had to be done using wagons, on horseback, and by walking. Settler 
wagon travel to Oregon and California grew into epic proportions in the 1840s 
and 1850s. But it was a time-consuming and potentially hazardous endeavor on 
the account of vast distances and shortages of water on many sections. And there 
was always the danger of winter catching up on travelers in the Rockies, ruining 
your trip and possibly costing your life. Although the settlers could hunt along 
the way if they knew how, and while the U.S. Army had set up a few posts – 
such as Forts  Kearney and Laramie – as stopover stations on the major routes, the 
migrants from Europe had to haul much of their supplies with them. Tradition-
ally these overland trails and covered wagons have represented historical images 
strongly linked with the West. Yet, similar migrations took place elsewhere. The 
Boer trek to Orange and Transvaal in the early 1800s was very much an over-
land wagon trek, in this case an evasion to put some distance against the British. 
 Images of wagons and settlers also featured heavily in the Australian national 
imaginary, in the Argentinian Pampas, and in German settler movements in 
Southwest Africa and in Eastern Europe all the way to World War II.
By the late 1800s, rails also moved settlers, supplies, and labor to the settlers and 
carried farm produce and natural resources to markets. In Canada, the railways 
enabled the settlers to reach the prairies and jumped national grain production 
and exports to Britain. The reach of the British in Australia, Africa, and India was 
also very much centered on tracks. The South African gold and diamond rushes 
prompted rail construction, which in turn drew more settlers. In  Australia, wool 
production and mining spread side by side with rails. So did cotton  production 
in India when rails linked the fields with the mills in  Bombay and Calcutta. 
In Southwest Africa, the German settler access to inland pastoral and farming 
lands relied on the Swakopmund-Windhoek-rail line, while subsequent lines 
connected the coastal Lüderitz to the booming diamond fields in the interior. 
Rails also allowed for the rapid deployment of the  military. The latter happened, 
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for instance, in the Geronimo campaign of 1885–1886 and in Germany’s  conflict 
against the  Hereros and Namas in  Southwest  Africa. The success of  British mil-
itary campaigns against the Boers was also very  dependent on the railroads. 
 Railroads were also the iron spine holding together the administrative structures 
of many colonies, and they would make capitalistic market agriculture possible on 
the Great Plains, interior reaches of Africa, in the highlands of Kenya, in French 
Indochina, in the settler enclaves of northern Algeria, on the Moroccan Plains, 
and in German East  Africa. The Chinese immigration to Manchuria and Siberia 
would also have proven impossible in the scale it took without the railways, and 
the competing Russian claim and settler expansion in the Siberian-Manchurian 
borderlands also relied heavily on trans-Siberian railroad networks.
The impacts of the railroads were often as intense as was the growth in the 
volume of tracks. India had no tracks in 1850. In 1900, it had 25,000 miles 
of them. Mexico had mere 400 miles of line when Porfirio Diaz took office 
in 1876, but 12,230 miles when he resigned in 1911. Rails also rapidly re-
placed other forms of mobility. The number of porters going inland from Dar 
es  Salaam to Lake Tanganyika in German East Africa dropped from 43,000 in 
1900 to 193 in 1912 with the advent of the railroad. In 1877, civilian freight 
contractors operated 19 wagon routes from California and one from Colorado 
to supply the U.S. Army forts in Arizona, while the garrisons in New Mexico 
were maintained by eight supply routes from the East. Five years later, the 
 railroads had driven most of these freighters out of business.
The world’s first transcontinental railroads crossed the American West in 
1869 as the Union Pacific and Central Pacific joined in Utah. This achievement 
was immediately hailed by numerous European commentators as an extraor-
dinarily effective agent of colonization. By the time of the trans-Siberian link 
opened in 1904, three more transcontinental lines operated on the northern 
Plains (of which one was in Canada) and two in the Southwest and the southern 
Plains. The latter lines spanned across the border and linked to copper mining 
communities run by multinational corporations in northern Mexico. Other 
transcontinentals were also in the plans, none more ambitious than the  British 
Cape-Cairo or the French trans-Saharan connections. Despite decades of plan-
ning, surveys, and smaller completed track sections, these big lines, unlike 
the Western transcontinental connections, which had also been in the works 
 decades prior to completion, never materialized in their intended scale.
Heavily subsidized by the federal government, the transcontinental railroad 
companies gained the right of way and some 20 square miles of land for each 
mile of track. They ended up transferring millions of acres of land to  market 
appropriation, drawing and moving large masses of settlers from inside the 
United States and from Europe and Canada, and generating mushrooming, yet 
sometimes short-lived, communities along the tracks. Together with shipping 
lines, railroad companies enabled the import of material goods produced in 
eastern factories and in Europe and the export of Western livestock, grain, 
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timber, and gold, silver, copper, and other minerals in unprecedented  quantities 
to the industries and consumers in urban market places on both shores of the 
Atlantic and the Pacific. In fact, intersecting rail and ship lines provided the 
skeleton for global integration. European capital was also often invested in 
Western railroad construction, as were globe-spanning dreams. The famous 
Missourian Thomas Hart Benton and many of his contemporaries saw the con-
struction of a travel route across the continent as an American road to China. 
Indeed, many saw the motive in the Mexican–American War in the potentially 
lucrative Asian markets achieved in part by transcontinental rails.
The railroads also prepared the Plains for the transnational settler and mar-
ket invasion by fueling the wholesale slaughter of the bison, animals that were 
essential for the economy of most Plains Indians. Railroads transported an es-
timated 5,000 hunters to the Plains and took tongues or hides out to global 
consumers. The former proved a highly sought-after delicacy among the chic 
upper classes of Europe, and the latter, when tanned into leather, were in high 
demand as machine belts throughout the industrializing world. Bones too were 
gathered and shipped via rail to destinations such as Chicago for processing 
into industrial carbon and fertilizer. That you could shoot the animals without 
leaving the comfort of the trains proved enticing for upper-class hunters, many 
arriving from Britain and continental Europe for these bison-killing extrav-
aganzas. Importantly, bison slaughter made the grass and water available for 
settlers’ livestock, farms, and industries.
Settler Networks
Various push and pull factors have been suggested by scholars to explain  settlers’ 
transnational movements. Certainly the rapidly developing transportation  systems 
provided avenues for running away from poverty, unemployment, overpopula-
tion, troubles with the law, personal problems, or oppression such as the Jewish 
pogroms that hit Europe. Dreams of a more prosperous and  respectable life, what 
can be called “settler utopianism,” also proved powerful. One particularly strong 
notion revolved around the notion of agrarian  pioneers as harbingers of civili-
zation and the promise of yeoman freeholds – the owning of one’s own piece of 
farming land, home, and some domestic animals. While many settlers moved to 
established communities taking place in urban environments, the yeoman ideal 
attracted the European landless classes as it combined the prospect of dignified 
labor conditions, the opportunity for social advancement, and economic indepen-
dence. It also promoted Western lands as ripe for the taking, extremely bountiful, 
and free of Natives (and the bison). Relocation to the West seemed to promise life 
free of servitude and class barriers that marred the everyday of masses in Europe. 
As free individuals, settlers could imagine they were the co-owners of society, na-
tion, and empire, not lowly subjects to undemocratic rulers. These notions lured 
not only people heading toward the West, but entered the social psyche in various 
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other settler  landscapes in the British Wests, Algeria, and Latin America. In fact, 
one could argue that throughout the settler colonial world it was the agrarian 
pioneers and the promise of individual freeholds that stirred the imaginations of 
 countless potential settlers. This is made visible in European literature; for exam-
ple,  German publications promoting settler spaces in Brazil, the German–Polish 
borderlands, Southwest Africa, and the American West alike emphasized individ-
ual  opportunity, land ownership, and the social advancement that accompanied 
them. Even in tsarist Russia, peasants were similarly perceived as carriers of the 
agrarian ideal, the purveyors of modernity, and equal to  American pioneers.
While farming had reached the edges of the Great Plains in the 1850s, it is 
usually the Homestead Act of 1862, and to somewhat lesser extent the  Desert 
Land Act of 1877, that is seen to catapult the rapid change from plains/deserts 
to fields, from Native lands to settler spaces, in one generation. Although some 
700 million acres of land were sold in the market, much of it by the railroads, 
the Homestead Act’s 270 million acres sold and 50% success rate (counted from 
the more than 1.4 million applications from 1862 to 1900), certainly mattered. 
Also, for instance, in Nebraska some 45% of all acres sold were distributed 
under the act, which was the largest percentage in any state. In all, some four 
million claims were made as homesteading continued until the 1970s, with 
1913 being the peak year. The Homestead Act gave European peasants and 
urban laborers something concrete on which to base their dreams, something 
that would make the idea of moving seem more fathomable, as practically free 
land grants were allocated to anyone who could prove “improving” the claim 
after five years.
By the 1880s, the settler penetration was in full swing on the Plains, in-
cluding those sections hardly suited for long-term agriculture on the High 
Plains. The population jumped: Montana’s population grew from practically 
no white people in 1860 to 39,000 in 1880 and to 143,000 by 1890, and North 
 Dakota’s increased from 37,000 to 191,000 between 1880 and 1890. Nebraska 
grew from 28,000 in 1860 to 1.1 million in 1890. And this influx was very 
much transnational in character. Some 45% of North Dakota residents were 
recent  immigrants in 1890, mainly Germans or Scandinavians, more than 
anywhere else in the country at the time. Ten years later, North Dakota had 
319,000 inhabitants, of whom over 70% were foreign-born. From 1890 to the 
early 1900s, about half of the population in Nebraska and South Dakota were 
also foreigners, as were 25% of people in Kansas and Washington State, 18% of 
Oregonians, and 14% of Texans.
Advancing to the American West or the British Wests, the German,  Swedish, 
Polish, Irish, Czech, and other settlers often practiced community, chain, and step 
migration. Much like Peter and Betsy Wigen and the other Selbu people, they fol-
lowed relatives and clustered close to people from the same town, region, or coun-
try of origin, forming transnational ethnic settler networks in the process. Finn 
Hilma Tolonen Salvon revealed the raw reasoning behind these choices: “When 
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somebody sends you a ticket from America – well, you go.”1 In Hilma’s case, it 
had been her father’s cousin who had relocated to Astoria, Oregon, while Hilma, 
her parents, and four siblings followed suit. They left eastern Lapland, where the 
family was involved in the local lumber industry, for Astoria, where the family 
also entered the logging  business. Opportunity and the chance to move in the 
footsteps of one’s kin and to a familiar profession made for a usual story. Hilma and 
her family received tickets, borrowed money, and gained all kinds of practical help 
and advice from their relatives and from the large Finnish community in  Astoria. 
They did the same in turn for those coming in their wake. Ethnic networks also 
arranged not only jobs and living quarters but also marriages.
If many settlers wanted the opportunities of individual landholding, they 
preferably did it in familiar ethnically homogenous environments. The Plains 
were dotted with German, Czech, Swedish, and Norwegian ethnic commu-
nities, where people found a familiar social and cultural environment in a new 
geographical setting. Frequently settlers were kept on their toes and habitually 
on the move by cycles of agricultural boom and bust. Some of the vulnerable 
Plains regions in western Kansas and Nebraska were losing population  already 
in the 1890s. More heartache followed as droughts and giant dust storms crushed 
many settler dreams of yeoman freeholds on the Plains by the 1930s. Numerous 
European transplants moved on, heading toward urban centers, to California, 
and back home to Europe. They again moved as individuals but more so as 
families and kin groups seeking familiar ethnic clusters. Also, as farming com-
munities grew due to immigration and natural increase and  therefore experi-
enced shortages of lands, young people, especially married couples, could join 
together and leave to find a suitable ethnic cluster somewhere else.
All the links in these transnational settler networks typically kept up com-
munications, shared information of new opportunities, and maintained their ties 
within the migrant-filled multicultural West and beyond. This is how the Wigens 
behaved throughout their lives, as did Chin Lung and his family. The settlers 
especially strove to stay in touch and involved with the society they had left be-
hind. They turned into eager consumers of art and popular culture of their former 
homelands. They also sent home money (cash in letters or in the form of money or 
postal orders) to ease the lives of relatives and friends. And this was the case not just 
with European settlers. Asians and immigrants from Latin America commonly 
used (and still use) their ethnic networks for information and help; they sent remit-
tances back to their families, supported political causes, and traveled back and forth 
between the West and the locales where their family members lived.
Settlers and their ethnic enclaves circulated multiple cultural practices and 
traditions across the oceans and between empires. In the settler colonial world 
from Australia and New Zealand to North America, different groups  celebrated 
 1  Quoted from Barkan, From All Points, 70.
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their own religious and cultural festivals, such as the Scottish Highland games. 
An array of organizations, religious and secular, were created to enforce  the 
national consciousness of settlers who had left their homes and moved to the 
West. For example, the Finns in the West had the Knights of Kalevala and 
the Finnish Socialist Club; the Swedes put together the Valhalla Lodge; and 
the Norwegians met at the Norse Club and the Ancient Order of Vikings, 
among many other examples. The Sons of Malta, the Sons of St. George, and 
the Albion Society were all active in bringing Englishmen together in the 
West, although such organizations were less prevalent among the English than 
with the Irish, Scots, or Germans. There were also dozens of foreign-language 
newspapers in the settler colonial West, among them numerous German papers 
such as the San Antonio Zeitung, New Braunfels Zeitung, Minnesota Staats-Zeitung, 
Omaha Taegliche Tribuene, and Nebraska Deutsche Zeitung.
Religious membership and organizations further linked the settlers in the 
West to transnational networks. Not only the larger nominations, but also 
smaller groups, such as Mormons and the Mennonites, made their homes in the 
West. Mennonites were Anabaptists, products of the Protestant  Reformation in 
the 1500s, and many had migrated to the United States or Russia in  response to 
persecution. Thrown out of the Russian Empire in the 1870s, they journeyed to 
North America, entering Kansas and Missouri as well as  Mexico and Canada. 
They were drawn by the Santa Fe Railroad that sent recruiters to  Russia. From 
the Plains some Mennonites continued to northern  Mexico during World War I, 
again escaping maltreatment. For the Mennonites, their prime allegiance contin-
ued to be their religious group, not any particular nation- state. With their strong 
commitment to pacifism, their diaspora spanned several empires and dodged 
calls to arms in Russia, Prussia, and the United States. Mormons also took their 
brand of religion overseas, sending thousands of recruiters to gather converts 
from the industrial centers of  Britain and from Sweden,  Denmark, and Norway. 
Even Brigham Young conducted missionary work in Liverpool in the 1840s. 
Europeans flocked to join the church and its Western settlements, centered on 
Utah and dotting much of the Rocky  Mountains and Great Basin but also spread 
past the  Canadian and Mexican borders.
All these organizations, newspapers, and church denominations enabled 
a heightened awareness of ethnicity and national origin. Many immigrants, 
who previously had identified with multilayered webs of localized villages, 
broader regions, or linguistic and religious identities in Europe that poorly fit 
national designations, now increasingly saw themselves as “Poles,”  “Germans,” 
“Czechs”, or some other specific nationality. Thus, transnational mobility 
played a key role, not only in cultural exchanges but also in forging more tightly 
defined understanding of nations and ethnicities. Wanting a stable identity, and 
on guard against rootlessness, many settlers retained their foreign  nationality 
even after years of living in the West, Canada, or Australia. Some nations re-
sponded in turn. The Kaiserreich sought to preserve the  Germanness among 
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its emigrants, being especially fearful of losing Germans in what was seen as 
the melting pot of the West. In the mid-1800s, Germans replaced the term 
 Auswanderer, emigrants, with Auslandsdeutsche, Germans abroad, and extended 
it to cover the German diaspora in and outside of Europe. New terminology 
functioned as part of the Reich’s Weltpolitik, representing a mental shift and 
serving as basis for imagining a global Germanness, a shared ethnic and cultural 
connection not confined by the borders of the Kaiserreich. As  historian Stefan 
Manz writes, pockets of  Germanness existed in places as varied as the American 
West, Shanghai, Samoa, New Zealand, Brazil, and Russia, demonstrating a 
collective commitment to the old homeland, including the notion of contrib-
uting actively to its trade and colonial ambitions. In short, there were strong 
claims that there existed a people identified as Germans, that these  people re-
mained Germans, and that they shared a membership in a global community of 
Germans, wherever they went.
These notions of Auslandsdeutsche also reflected very concrete desires for 
German colonies in the American West. The earliest border-crossing white 
mass settler migrations in the West targeted Texas. The American business-
man Moses Austin secured a land grant from Mexico, and his son Stephen 
 Austin catapulted an Anglo settler invasion in the 1820s. Others soon fol-
lowed, swelling the non-Spanish speaking population and leading to a shift in 
allegiance away from Mexico that culminated in rebellion and independence 
in the mid-1830s. As an attempt to lure Anglo settlers and redirect their loy-
alties to a non-Anglo state, Texas proved a costly and embarrassing mistake 
from Mexico’s viewpoint. No other settler colony would try such a project. 
Desiring the whitening of their population, Latin American countries like 
Brazil and Argentina would focus on attracting Europeans from many dif-
ferent countries, preferring settlers from northern Europe but managing to 
lure large numbers not only of Germans but also of Portuguese, Italians, and 
Spanish. Mexico in turn would attract very few European settlers of any kind 
after Texas.
Texas also offers an early example of transnational settler movement from 
Europe to the West and of the aspirations to build German colonies in the 
West. Having heard of the Austin land grant, settler-promoter and eager mar-
keter of Texas Johann Friedrich Ernst from Lower Saxony, applied and in 
1831 received a grant of more than 4,000 acres in today’s Austin County. 
This would be the basis of “New Germania,” where Ernst soon established 
the  Teutonic Order of Texas, a German Catholic military society. Drawing 
settlers from Holstein, Westphalia, and Oldenburg in what became a chain 
migration, Ernst’s Texas project was widely publicized in Germany. This at-
tracted others dreaming of German colonies in the West. Among those inter-
ested was a group of noblemen that included Prince Frederick of Prussia as one 
of its founding members. Spearheaded by Prince Carl of Solms-Braunfels, who 
toured Texas in 1844 promoting immigration and establishing New Braunfels, 
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this group set up an organization on the Rhine called the Mainzer Adelsv-
erein, or the Verein zum Schutze Deutscher Einwanderer. These noblemen felt that 
 German colonization in Texas would bring them wealth, power, and prestige. 
It could also, they thought, alleviate overpopulation in rural Germany. This 
project managed to draw thousands of Germans to Texas from 1842 onward, 
even negotiating a private treaty with the Comanches on the account that one 
of the Germans’ land grants stood on Comanche lands (Figure 2.1).
Although many Irish figured in the development of Texas independence 
and statehood, the Germans – historian Terry Jordan, among others, shows – 
formed the largest white ethnic group in Texas (and they still do). What was 
referred to as the German Belt stretched from Houston to the west of San 
Antonio. “German customs of life still hold sway” in this “most thoroughly 
Germanized portion of the United States,” a 1907 report stated.2 German com-
munities differed from each other in many ways. Some had Protestants, while 
others consisted of Catholics, Jews, Slavic Wends, or atheists. People also came 
from a variety of German provinces, although old neighbors who had lived 
close together in Germany tended to do the same in Texas. In the 1880s, 60% of 
the residents of Dallas were German. By 1910, one-third of the 60,000 people 
in the Spanish-established San Antonio had German roots, numerous enough 
that many African Americans and Mexicans in the city also spoke German. 
Still, the German immigration slowed down by the turn of the century and 
ended by the time of the two World Wars and the anti-German sentiment that 
 2 Quote from Barkan, From all Points, 77.
FiGure 2.1  Logo of the Mainzer Adelsverein. Courtesy of Paul Fearn/Alamy stock 
photo.
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accompanied these conflicts. In many places, intermarriage, rural depopula-
tion, the move to the suburbs, the breakup of old German neighborhoods, and 
the closure of German papers and schools eroded German cultural basis and 
directed the Germans toward the Anglo mainstream by the mid-1900s.
The British also sought to establish ethnic communities in the West. 
 According to historian Peter Pagnamenta, one enclave of Britishness, 
 Runnymede, Iowa, was complete with polo fields, football clubs, tennis 
courts, and private social clubs. But the harshness of farming and an unfa-
miliar  environment, including tornados, sent most settlers packing. By 1892, 
 Runnymede met a humiliating end after the railway was routed two miles 
away from the town, and the prosperity it might have brought never materi-
alized. Another British effort in 1873 saw an enterprising Scottish nobleman 
named George Grant coming up with an idea of a settlement in western Kansas 
inhabited solely by the British upper classes. By demanding that the residents 
had to have at least £2,000 in assets and would each get at least a square mile 
of land, Grant kept out the  working-class settlers. Instead of the mud-brick and 
grass-roof dwellings that many other Europeans on the Plains built, here the 
settlers lived in English-style brick villas with gardens and hedges. They even 
erected a limestone church with donations from Britain. Victoria, as the settle-
ment was patriotically called, was talked of back home as a second Eden, but 
the new arrivals – an estimated 200 people, most of whom had zero  farming 
experience – quickly realized that the Plains was a difficult environment in 
which to be a landed gentleman. Following Grant’s death in 1879, the settle-
ment also died, and it was overshadowed by scores of ethnic Germans arriving 
from Russia. It had been aggressive and far-reaching advertising campaigns 
that attracted these Germans from the Volga River region to the West. They 
soon planted wheat on the Kansas Plains, helping to break the myth of the 
“great American desert,” at least until recurrent drought and explosive dust 
storms proved their optimism wrong. The Germans also renamed Victoria as 
 Herzog (after their township in Russia) although the new name did not stick 
(the  community was renamed Victoria in 1913).
Although they formed ethnic clusters, settlers were distributed in the West 
very unevenly. In addition to Germans, nineteenth-century Texas had sig-
nificant minorities of Austrian, Bohemian, Scot, and Swiss immigrants. The 
Swedish community in Texas was larger than in any other southern state, yet 
still small when compared to Swedish presence on the Plains or the Pacific 
Northwest. Texas had only a few Italians before 1880, but after that their 
numbers increased somewhat. Typical Italians in the West, in Denver and 
Los Angeles, for instance, included unskilled urban laborers and miners. For 
their part, the Basques (from Spain and France) remained closely associated 
with  shepherding and clustered on appropriate locations in Oregon, Califor-
nia,  Nevada, and Idaho. The Finnish presence in turn concentrated on the 
 timber- and farming-intense lakes region of Minnesota, as well as such places as 
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 Astoria, Oregon, which was also a logging, farming, and fishing center. In fact, 
 concentrations of Finns and Swedes controlled much of logging and milling 
operations in the Pacific Northwest, while numerous Scandinavians such as the 
Wigens engaged in agricultural endeavors across the West. Many Finns, as well 
as Cornish and Irish, were also found in mining centers such as Bisbee,  Arizona 
and Butte, Montana. In the latter place, where one-fourth of the world’s copper 
came from, the population, just below 30,000 people in 1900, included at least 
12,000 Irish, many of them originating from Cork and with previous work ex-
perience in copper mines. The city’s principal business, the Anaconda Copper 
Company, was also Irish owned. Yet Butte also had a sizable Finntown and a 
big Cornish and Italian presence.
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, a sizable percentage of settlers kept on 
crossing borders, using their networks for relocating or for heading back to 
their country of origin. Waves of repatriation typically accompanied economic 
downturns, but the estimates of how many actually went back differ quite a 
bit.  Tracking down all the exchanges, scholars have said that, for  instance, 
around 20% of Swedes or as many as 40% of all English emigrants returned, 
but that not many Irish went back. Going back home was of course a quite 
logical choice for those who started out as seasonal workers or with the in-
tent to work abroad for just a few years, which became more common as 
transportation fares got cheaper and travel time quicker. Numerous people 
also  returned temporarily, to marry, to attend funerals, or to visit family and 
friends, each arriving with firsthand knowledge and connections to the place 
he/she had settled into, which, in turn, impacted others contemplating on 
becoming transnational  settlers. But many also returned for good after their 
dreams were smashed by the realities of the West, the economic failures, and 
other adversities in everyday life.
Information Flows
Settler revolutions promised not merely unprecedented transnational mobil-
ity for common people, or overlapped with the transportation revolution, but 
also coincided with a spectacular growth in literacy rates, mechanized paper-
making, steam-powered printing presses, the rise of international postal ser-
vices, and the targeting of mass audiences by publishers and promoters. Booster 
and travel literature, newspapers – including numerous ethnic papers – and 
letter-writing gained immense popularity. While the United States had 200 
newspapers in 1800, the figure for 1860 stood at 3,000. Practically everybody 
in Europe knew somebody who had gone to America, and most settlers in 
America had some relative, sweetheart, or friend back Europe. Thus correspon-
dence between the West and Europe was intense, and in many households and 
communities, nothing was expected as much or speculated on as excitedly as 
the arrival of the mail, both national and international. Post offices multiplied 
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and prior to the transcontinental railroads, high-volume mail services like the 
famous Pony  Express and Butterfield Overland Mail, a stagecoach service run-
ning the southern overland “oxbow” route between San Francisco and St. Louis 
and  Memphis via Fort Smith, Arkansas, already linked people across national 
borders and delivered information in unprecedented fashion.  Butterfield, es-
sentially an international line in itself – as it crossed some 115 miles in  Mexican 
Baja California and had several of its stations in Mexico – connected the Pacific 
and the Atlantic worlds through the West. The short-lived Pony Express did 
much the same. It delivered British home dispatches from China during the 
Second Opium War. Advancing the rapid surge in the flow of information, 
telegraph wires crossed the Atlantic in 1858, wired the North American conti-
nent 1861, and spanned the Pacific in 1902.
Exploding after 1815, boosterism was practiced by government agencies, 
charities, cultural organizations, pressure groups, labor unions, newspapers, 
and shipping, land, and railroad companies. They printed millions of  copies 
of books, pamphlets, brochures, fliers, and ads in a global recruitment drive 
for settlers. The Northern Pacific Railroad alone mailed over 600,000 pieces 
of literature in numerous languages to Britain, Germany, Switzerland, the 
 Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. The transatlantic shipping 
lines in turn sent over 3,000 booking agents as passage brokers in the  British 
Isles alone. These efforts encouraging settler mobility targeted moneyed 
people as well as common folk. And the texts were shamelessly partisan and 
polemical. They were still hugely influential, although displaying a paradise 
complex. The West just abounded with Gardens of Eden, El Dorados, and 
all kinds of promised lands, to use David Wrobel’s book title. The texts 
were filled with religious or earthly escapes, singular guarantees of brighter, 
more prosperous futures. Many marketers also catered to people with urban 
angst when promising  getaways to simpler and more genuine times lost to 
industrialization.
Also at work was an armada of lecturers. From 1845, 33 states and territories 
sent emigration agents and publications to New York and to Europe in their 
hunt for potential settlers. The Northern Pacific Railroad forwarded 831 rep-
resentatives to Britain and another 124 to northern Europe in the late 1880s. 
One speaker, James Erwin, an agent for the Southern Pacific Railroad, by 1914 
had delivered his presentation “Wonders of the Western Country” 3,357 times, 
reaching an estimated audience of more than 1.5 million people.
Marketing settler spaces was never solely about the West. Ever since 
taking over the coastal enclaves of Algeria in the early 1830s, the French 
government actively promoted settler possibilities – highlighting farming, 
land ownership, and respectable family life – for Europeans in northern 
Africa. In the early 1900s, the New Guinea Colonization Society targeted 
Dutchmen, especially mixed-blood Indo-Europeans (offspring of European 
men and indigenous women), to create a new Netherlands in New Guinea. 
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Drawing inspiration from Mormons in the West and the Boers in South 
Africa, the organization called for a space where the nearly 200,000 Indo- 
Europeans (1930) could remain European, own land, and become yeoman 
farmers. This fantasy, which mixed notions of racial purity and awaiting 
virgin lands, drew plenty of attention and hundreds of colonizers. It did 
not, however, last.
In the 1870s, Australia and New Zealand outstripped both the United States 
and Canada in promotional activity. New Zealand had 73 agents in Scotland 
alone, and it advertised in 288 Scottish papers. The booster  literature titles 
 describing New Zealand include such stereotypical gems as “The Land of 
Plenty” and “An Earthly Paradise.” Not all governments were pleased, and by 
the mid-1800s some British and German politicians already feared that settler 
trails that led to the West and other settler colonies would sap from their coun-
try its youngest and brightest, its energy and strength.
Removing the authority of the Hudson’s Bay Company in western  Canada 
during the Fraser River gold rush in the 1850s, the British government for-
mally extended its imperial control to the Pacific. With the setting up of 
 Native reserves, the 1870s and 1880s saw scores of new settlers. They were 
drawn by the Canadian Dominion Lands Act of 1872, which was similar to 
the U.S. Homestead Act of 1862. Both offered 160 acres, used the grid, and 
charged a small fee. Canada required a three-year residency against the five 
years in the United States. Still, it was the early 1900s that witnessed the 
bigger boom. The population of Western Canada tripled, the growth cen-
tering on urban centers of Winnipeg, Calgary, and Edmonton. There was 
also a huge increase in wheat exports to Britain. From 1896 to 1906, the 
 Canadian government and the transcontinental railroad spent four million 
dollars publicizing the opportunities for settlement in what was called the 
“last, best West.” The Canadian Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton, 
began a vigorous effort to recruit experienced farmers from Europe and es-
pecially from the American West. His invitation applied to whites only; no 
blacks or Chinese were welcome, much like in the policies of the United 
States and  Australia. What Sifton got was a significant number of Germans, 
Scandinavians,  Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles: some directly from Europe, 
others via the American West. In addition to an aggressive and widespread 
advertising campaign, Sifton’s men invited American journalists to visit and 
write about the Canadian West. They also set up nine Canadian agencies 
south of the border in 1897. By 1914, there were already 21 of them. The 
agencies produced a mass of supporting literature on the Canadian West, in-
cluding pamphlets, books, maps, and circulars. The titles of such publications 
included “The Wondrous West,” “Canada, the Land of  Opportunity,” and 
many others. The best seller, which was in the press year after year, however, 
was “The Last Best West.” In short, Canada represented a fresh and dynamic 
West, the finest of what might prove a limited supply  (Figure 2.2).
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Rushes and Markets
Stressing their shared causes, characteristics, and results, historian Douglas 
Fetherling claims the gold rushes in the United States, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, and South Africa, while not identical, were part of a single 
discontinuous event essential to settler revolutions worldwide. Much like ag-
ricultural expansions, rushes flooded what used to be Native lands with thou-
sands of people. Yet they did it in a shorter time and pulled fewer families 
and more young, single, ambitious, or restless men, hit hard by economic 
slumps. The  literature covering settler colonial exchanges across the world is 
full of references to  “fevers,” “manias,” and “rushes,” suggesting that people 
could be swept up by a sense of belief that a particular movement was their 
life calling or would solve all their prevailing problems. Take, for instance, 
the peak in global immigration as news of gold in California and in  Victoria, 
Australia drew people from across the world from the late 1840s to the 1850s. 
In both cases, the crowd was as big as it was varied. Both California and 
Victoria pulled in some 100,000 people a year at their peaks, and both had 
a gross inflow of 500,000 people, Belich notices. Melbourne quickly rivaled 
FiGure 2.2  The Last Best West. Advertisement of the Canadian government in 
the Christmas edition of The Globe encouraging the settlement of 
Western Canada, December 25, 1907. Courtesy Library and Archives 
Canada/Wikimedia Commons.
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San  Francisco as a major boomtown, and in the 1880s it boomed again and 
actually outgrew San Francisco.
In California, an international cast arrived by land from the East, crossed 
the border from Mexico, or took maritime routes via the Panama isthmus. The 
crowd included native-born Anglo men, Mormons, and both slave and free 
 African Americans. Some 40%, says the 1860 census, were foreign-born, from 
several dozen counties. This was, historian Walter Nugent writes, three times the 
U.S. average at the time. The biggest groups included 35,000 Chinese, 33,000 
Irishmen, 21,000 Germans, and 17,000 British. There were also some 9,000 
Mexicans – some of them escaping the cross-border Apache and  Comanche raids 
that peaked in the 1840s and emptied the countryside in northern Sonora. There 
were also Chilean merchants, Indians from across California, and Indians from 
India. While it is often noted how France was the one major global power whose 
people did not move to the American West or to the  British Wests in large num-
bers, the California gold rush actually drew thousands of Frenchmen. Many of 
them were escaping the political turmoil of 1848, which had ended the Orleans 
monarchy and initiated the Second Republic in France.
Many British, Australians, and others who flocked first to California in 
1849 next headed to Victoria. Among them was an Australian named  Edward 
 Hargraves. He left America empty-handed, only to find gold in his own backyard. 
A South African named Pieter Jacob Marais had departed to California merely 
a week after the news reached his native Cape Town. The arduous journey via 
England only increased his desire for panning gold. He got enough to open a 
small business, which burned in late 1850 in what was one in a series of fires that 
almost destroyed San Francisco several times over between 1849 and 1851. Marais 
next headed for the mining areas in Australia, returning home poorer than ever. 
Then he worked on copper mines and prospected in the Transvaal on the slopes 
of Witwatersrand. There Marais found specks of gold, hurried to tell the world, 
and aroused a general interest in gold prospecting. The big rush would not occur 
until 1886 at Rand, with fortune-seekers from across the globe congregating 
there and leading to the establishment of Johannesburg. The Kimberley diamond 
rush to the south in Cape Colony had already preceded it by nearly two decades.
Many veterans of the California and/or Victoria rushes also headed to New 
Zealand’s Otago rush in the 1860s. In the American West, rushes followed in 
quick succession, including the first Comstock boom in Virginia City,  Nevada, 
in 1859 and near Denver in 1859 (“Pike’s Peak or Bust”). Then came the 1863 
rush to Virginia City, Montana, the 1864 boom at Helena, Montana, the second 
Comstock strike in 1873, the Black Hills gold rush in 1874, the  Tombstone silver 
boom in 1878, and many more. There was also the Fraser River strike of 1858 
in British Columbia and the Klondike rush in 1897. In all these cases, national 
boundaries proved no deterrent for people on the move. In fact, the Klondike 
boom not only drew men across the world; the through traffic in peoples, sup-
plies, and other goods practically made modern Seattle, then a burgeoning town 
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which was over 30% Scandinavian in the early 1900s. While people moved from 
one rush to the next, they grew older but not necessary any richer in the process. 
Being male-dominated societies, the best chance of earning in all these rushes 
was typically in mining the miners: providing food, booze, gambling, prosti-
tutes, accommodation, picks and shovels, and all sorts of other supplies.
These rushes also proved representative of the global settler revolutions, as they 
linked settler exchanges with transnational circulations in extractive industries 
and corporate capitalism. These were aggressive intrusions to  Native domains: 
for example, the California rush leading to genocide of numerous local indige-
nous communities, the Black Hills rush replacing the Sioux and  Cheyenne claims 
through bloody conflicts, and the Tombstone boom occupying the Chiricahua 
Apache domains. Taking over indigenous space, many rushes left ghost towns 
and a terrain punctuated with tunnels and debris in their wake. But the land 
was seldom, if ever, returned to the Natives. Rushes also spurred the growth of 
major modern urban settler communities such as Victoria, Johannesburg, San 
 Francisco, and Seattle. It also happened that most strikes that lived past the initial 
rush quickly developed into corporate businesses that called for capital, invest-
ments, machines, workers, and technical know-how necessary for underground 
mining. Over time what had started as rush of the masses was dominated by fewer 
and fewer men. Yet this did not mean an end to mobility.
Techniques and capital circulated in the global mining sector as did quali-
fied professionals who took their “Western” mining skills abroad in the service 
of multinational businesses and foreign empires. Fitting the new professional 
type was Herbert Hoover. Before the presidency, he took advantage of British 
capital and worked for the British mining interests. He served in a number of 
locations, including Western Australia, New South Wales, and in China as an 
engineer building a railroad from Peking to the Mongolian border. There were 
several other Westerners as well who became prominent in the global mining 
industry using their Western know-how from South Africa to Australia in the 
late 1800s. They worked: for instance, for Cecil Rhodes and became caught in 
the notorious Jameson Raid in 1895 and the Boer War.
These kinds of global exchanges extended from mining to livestock and 
agribusiness. A recent study by Edward Melillo shows how Chilean mi-
grant workers and mining techniques as well as crops and fertilizers shaped 
 California during the gold rush and the subsequent rise of agribusiness. The 
turn-of-the-century Miles City, Montana, in turn, was a livestock center from 
which horses were shipped around the world, especially to the Boer War in 
South  Africa where the Boers were able to escape the British infantry on their 
 Western mounts. One young cowboy working himself into the horse business 
in Montana, Fred Barton, was invited by a visiting Russian delegate to build 
massive horse ranches for the Czar. Barton arrived in Vladivostok, Russia, in 
1911. When World War I interfered and the Russian Empire collapsed, he went 
to work for the Chinese commanders. In 1917, he organized and partook in an 
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epic horse drive from Mongolia to northern China. To please his Mongolian 
hosts, Barton and his fellow Montanan wranglers put on a Wild West show 
with roping, shooting, and riding exhibitions. He also set up a massive ranch in 
the Shansi province and bred a new stock combining Mongol ponies; Russian 
Orlov mounts from Khabarovsk, Siberia; and American Morgan horses. After 
he returned to Los Angeles, Barton married himself into a prominent family 
and became part of the Hollywood social scene.
Another career that linked the West and the world by joining settler activities 
with capital flows was that of the Frenchman Marquis de Morés. In the 1890s, de 
Morés hoped for a reputation as a dashing figure in service of the French Empire 
in North Africa. But before that he had an unpredictable career as an army offi-
cer in Algeria, a rancher in the Dakota Territory, a railroad promoter in French 
Indochina, an anti-Semitic politician in his native France, and an explorer of 
the Sahara. In 1883 he established Medora along the Northern Pacific rail line, 
naming the community after his new bride Medora von  Hoffman, who was a 
daughter of a wealthy New York banker. De Morés purchased 45,000 acres of 
land for ranching, had a 26-room house known as the Chateau de Morés built 
for his family, opened a stagecoach business, and erected a meatpacking plant 
for shipping refrigerated meat via the railroad. His efforts toward becoming a 
big businessman crumbled as de Morés quickly made enemies due to his fierce 
temper – he was possibly arrested twice and suspected of murder in Dakota but 
acquitted – and by stepping on the toes of the big and powerful in the meatpack-
ing industry of the Chicago stockyards, who had little toleration for competition.
The family returning to France, de Morés claimed that Chicago and its livestock 
operations were run by vicious Jews. Openly anti-Semitic and a growing favorite 
of the far right in France, he traveled across Asia and lived for a while in French In-
dochina. In the mid-1890s, de Morés tried to recruit the Tuareg, the famed desert 
warriors, against the Jews in French Algeria. Known to dress in a cowboy hat and a 
buckskin jacket with a revolver in the hip, and being an ardent and famous duelist, 
de Morés was raided and killed by the Tuareg in 1897 in Sahara. After the death of 
her husband, Medora never returned to Medora, North Dakota, but died in France 
in 1921, allegedly of a disease she had first caught in India.
The mobility of European, predominantly British, capital also character-
ized mining, the livestock industry, and corporate agriculture in the West, 
as well as in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, southern Africa, and much of 
Latin  America, a sphere of informal British, and later American, imperialism 
since gaining independence from Spain. As British money brought millions 
of acres under cultivation worldwide, the cheaper farm exports drove many 
peasant farmers in Europe out of the market. Many made the move to cities, 
and many headed as settlers for the American and British Wests. Some well-
born Britons who crossed North America to see the Indians and hunt buffalo 
in turn used their wealth to invest in cattle ranching, mining, and urban devel-
opment, buying up vast tracts of land in the West. A 1884 report by the federal 
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government estimated that foreign businessmen, most of them British, owned 
21 million acres of America, the equivalent of a ten-mile wide strip running 
from the  Atlantic to the Pacific. While the Alien Land Bill of 1887 barred non- 
Americans from buying land, it was seldom stringently enforced.
European corporate agriculturalists operated factory-type systems in the 
West using a sizable multinational labor force. The large-scale British-invested 
wheat operations in the Red River Valley of the North provide one exam-
ple that involved absentee ownership, strictly market-oriented production and 
specialization, and seasonal work forces drawn from both sides of the U.S.– 
Canadian border and from Europe. These ventures were the object of much 
public interest. A delegation of members of the British Parliament visited the 
Red River farms in 1879, and newsmen described the undertakings in the 
London Times. But even these bigger operations were vulnerable to dropping 
wheat prices around the world and to cycles of drought, which culminated in 
parceling off many of the biggest estates.
The global shifts in demand and prices and the local shifts in weather were 
very much evident in the cattle business as well. Rising beef prices in Britain 
had prompted a royal commission to support investing in the American cattle 
business. The number of investors interested in placing cattle across the Plains 
multiplied in the 1880s, and soon too many cattle overgrazed too many eco-
logically vulnerable ranges. Drought-filled summers and the winter storms of 
1886–1887 decimated the herds amassed by British investment companies. This 
“big die-up” on the Plains led to restructuring of the industry, yet it did not 
diminish the role of British money. For instance, the Scottish-owned Swan 
Land and Cattle Company and the Matador Land and Cattle Company reduced 
stocking the herds and began to move the cattle in a systematic fashion, while 
also installing wells and reservoirs. Set up in 1885, the famed XIT ranch in 
the Texas Panhandle was owned by the Capitol Freehold Land and Investment 
Company of London, a syndicate of mostly British investors, including the Earl 
of Aberdeen and Henry Seton-Karr, a Member of Parliament. The operations 
started with the equivalent of roughly $5 million invested. Comprising over 
3,000,000 acres and run like a corporation, the ranch had at its peak some 
150,000 cows, 325 windmills, 100 dams, and 1,500 miles of fence.
The transnational networks and exchanges in cattle ranching and agricul-
ture were not limited to foreign money, ownership, the use of multiethnic work 
forces, or even the rise of settler societies. They ran much deeper in the colo-
nization of the Americas. According to Terry Jordan, the practices of  Western 
cattle ranching can be traced to livestock areas spanning from equatorial 
west Africa north to the Shetland Islands, with main contributions stemming 
from the interplay of British and Iberian (especially Andalusian) influences. 
 Distinctively, Iberian ranching practices were first transferred to the Caribbean 
by the Spanish in the 1500s. There they encountered new environments and 
soon merged with British and African herding practices before moving to the 
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mainland. There more merges took place, primarily with British husbandry 
traditions, to form a hybridized Anglo-Mexican cattle culture. It shot north 
and west from Texas after the Civil War, reaching the Pacific Coast and the 
Canadian Plains. After the big cattle die-up in 1880s, Midwestern  Anglo cattle 
raising techniques from Iowa and Missouri in turn gained more hold in the 
West, on the Great Plains and beyond toward the Pacific and Canada.
Exchanges, of course, did not mean the straightforward transplanting of  Spanish 
or British practices to new settler-occupied settings. Lassoing, for instance, al-
though closely connected with the Spanish cattle culture in the  Americas, was not 
an Iberian practice but an innovation of African cowboys in seventeenth- century 
Mexico. If the variations in ranching cultures from  Patagonia to the Yukon were 
grounded on a vivid Spanish influence, they also shared much in common with 
each other. The lives of Western and Canadian cowboys,  Mexican vaqueros, 
Venezuelan llaneros, Argentinian gauchos, and Chilean huasos shared much in 
key values and characteristics; in their  social status; professional pride and sense 
of superiority; values of everyday lives  (emphasis on humble, simple lives); and in 
work and leisure practices, as historian Richard Slatta writes.  Furthermore, these 
exchanges did not hit a brick wall as they reached the Pacific. Recently historian 
John Ryan Fischer has shown how  Hawaii and  California became major linked 
nodes in the  livestock economy of the Pacific world through the circulation 
of labor and trade in livestock products, such as hide and tallow. In the 1830s, 
Hispanic California cowboys had already started working in  Hawaii, at approxi-
mately the same time as the Hudson’s Bay Company was bringing Hawaiian and 
other Pacific Islander trappers to the Pacific Northwest.
Borders and exclusion
Asian Transfers
Certain types of transnational mobility were not welcome in the settler revolu-
tions in the American West or in settler colonies elsewhere. Since the  Jacksonian 
Era, doubts and protests had regularly surfaced among the native-born white 
Americans against the migration of Irish and other Catholic settlers. Even af-
ter the mid-century, the whiteness of Jews, Mormons, Eastern and Southern 
 Europeans, as well as the Irish remained in doubt. Strong anti-German feelings 
also erupted by World War I, as did protests against the Mexicans, especially 
in the 1930s and again in the late 1900s. But the main focus in the pre-World 
War II West was on curtailing the migrations of the Chinese and other Asians, 
who were on the move as much as or more so than the Europeans. While a 
relatively small number of Chinese were drawn to their own “far west” of 
Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, some 30 million Chinese, mainly from north 
China, made the move to the Manchurian frontier. Some migrated, and still do 
today, to Siberia, the vast East-Uralian expanse that was also a principal target 
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for those Russians engaged in far settlement. Another approximately 20 million 
people, many from southern China, moved to Southeast Asia, to the countries 
around the Indian Ocean, and to the southern Pacific. The third big migratory 
flow took some 2.5 million Chinese workers, chiefly from the rural and urban 
underclasses, to the west coasts of North and Latin America, as well as to the 
Caribbean, Australia, and southern and eastern Africa.
This third form of Chinese mobility, often referred to as the “coolie trade,” 
ostensibly signified a return to slavery. It represented a form of contract labor 
and settlement that bordered on kidnapping and was characterized by inhu-
man transport conditions, petty wages, tight discipline, and cruel treatment. 
In reality, most of those involved emigrated more or less voluntarily, although 
countless went to fill the labor gaps left by the abolition of slavery around the 
world. It was the growing labor demands of expanding colonial powers, the 
surge in sugar and cotton plantations, building of transportation networks, and 
booming extractive industries like mining that called for a reliable, cheap, and 
mobile workforce. The Chinese seemed to offer the answer, but they were not 
the kind of answer white settler societies cared to embrace. Measures targeting 
Chinese exclusion connected the white settler societies across the P acific. But 
some Chinese, like Chin Lung and his family, found ways to negotiate and 
overcome the boundaries set up against their movement.
From the late 1840s onward, this coolie settler immigration, historian Madeline 
Hsu shows, originated predominantly from the five small regions in the southern 
Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. Natural catastrophes, population 
pressure, the loss of Canton’s monopoly on foreign trade and the subsequent unem-
ployment, the secession of Hong Kong to Britain, and the devastation and political 
and religious oppression caused by the Taiping Rebellion made people in southern 
China consider emigrating. Often passing through Singapore, the hotspot of in-
ternational labor recruitment in Asia, the Chinese spread to plantations and other 
workplaces from Hawaii and Fiji to Cuba, Trinidad, and Peru. By the end of the 
century, over 100,000  Chinese were employed in the tobacco plantations in Deli, 
on the eastern coast of  Sumatra on the Dutch East Indies. They also went to work 
in wool production in Australia after the deportation of British convicts there 
ended in 1840. Many also made it to German East Africa and  Germany’s colonies 
in Guinea and  Samoa, becoming the principal labor force in these Pacific colonies. 
There were even talks of importing Chinese workers to Germany itself in the late 
1800s to replace the Polish seasonal workforce in Germany’s eastern provinces. 
Nothing came of this plan, however, and the Prussian agriculture continued to 
rely on Polish and Ruthenian (Ukrainian) migrant laborers (many of whom con-
tinued their border crossings by emigrating to the West).
Many Chinese also followed the gold trails to California as well as to  Victoria, 
Fraser River, South Africa, and Klondike. In 1852, there were some 30,000 
Chinese in California, while some 40,000 Chinese had reached Australia by the 
late 1850s. In South Africa, the Boer War resulted in difficult times for the gold 
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mines, and one way of cutting costs was to hire Chinese laborers. From 1904 to 
1906, some 63,000 “coolies” were brought to Transvaal. In the West, Chinese 
workers were employed in railroad construction, most famously on the Central 
Pacific line. To get through the Rockies, the Canadian  Pacific Railway also used 
thousands of Chinese workers in the 1880s. They were brought north on the ini-
tiative of an American contractor. In the early 1880s, over 28,000 Chinese com-
prised the principal labor force in the burgeoning California agriculture. They 
worked as laborers for Anglo landowners or on their own as tenant farmers, leas-
ing land, growing their own crops and often hiring their countrymen to work 
at their sides. Many also were active in marketing their crops or partnered with 
Chinese merchants like Chin Lung. Some, prior to the enactment of the Alien 
Land Law of 1913, were even able to own the land they farmed. Furthermore, as 
many as 78,000 Chinese worked on commercial ships traversing the Pacific. The 
Chinese in fact constituted a sizable percentage of “American” seamen.
As the numbers of Chinese climbed, so did alarmed writings that circulated 
widely across the American West, British Wests, and beyond. Beginning in the 
1850s, the racial character of “John Chinaman” was created, and reinforced images 
of the Chinese in songs, plays, fiction, newspapers, and minstrel shows. It depicted 
the Chinese as unassimilable pollutants who endangered the futures of white set-
tler societies and as laborers who threatened to replace white workers. Their dress, 
customs, language, and ethnic clustering, together with their secret societies, made 
the Chinese appear more than suspicious in the eyes of numerous whites who sys-
tematically  dehumanized them. The Chinese were seen as the lowest kind of beasts 
of burden, animal-like inventive torturers, prone to predatory cruelty, opium, and 
vice. Comparisons to various other nonwhite groups were also made: for instance, 
the Chinese were seen as Jews of the East. They were also depicted as sexually ag-
gressive and mischievous and thus as a severe threat to white women.
Fears of racial mixing were coupled with notions that the Asian settlers would 
replace and destroy whites, who were at that time in the process of substituting 
and destroying the indigenous peoples. Historian Kornel Chang writes about how 
fears over massive Asian settler flood helped various  European ethnicities to find 
a common ground across the Pacific. Labor unions and writers in  Washington 
as well as in British Columbia took their cues from Australia and commonly 
used Natal as a warning of what could happen. In Natal, as its economy moved 
to sugar production and needed cheap labor, some 150,000 Asian  (Indian and 
Chinese) workers entered the province from 1860s onward. By 1902, Asians 
outnumbered the whites, although restrictions to Asian immigration had been 
adopted in the Natal Acts of 1896–1897. Also, the neighboring Cape  Colony 
passed an Immigration Restriction Act targeting Asians in 1902. By then the 
British Empire had transported more than one million contract workers from 
Asia to Mauritius, the Caribbean, East Africa, and the Pacific Islands.
It was the Chinese who, as a racial group, were first barred from enter-
ing the settler societies. State policies curtailed Asian immigration from the 
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1860s onward and created a global color line by World War I. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 (repealed in 1943), and the preceding Page Act of 1875, 
which targeted “undesirable” immigrants (Asian forced laborers, prostitutes, 
and convicts), limited Chinese immigration to the West. While the 1882 act 
targeted laborers only, and denied the Chinese the right of naturalization, 
the law was very broadly interpreted. It was also followed by a succession 
of acts targeting other Chinese groups, which made female migration, for 
instance, very difficult. With no women, there were no Chinese families and 
no offspring, and thus no Chinese settler futures in the West. Thousands of 
Chinese had also entered the West by first relocating to Hawaii, where they 
constituted the second largest ethnic group and the principal farm workers in 
the 1880s after Native Hawaiians. In 1900, the Chinese entry to the West via 
Hawaii was barred after its U.S. annexation, as American exclusion laws were 
extended to the islands.
The first Chinese exclusion act from 1882 had been closely followed in 
 Europe, and it was soon emulated in various parts of the world. After 1888, ships 
with Chinese passengers were not allowed in Australian ports, and by the time 
of the “White Australia Act” of 1901, the reaction against Chinese migration 
had become one of the central components in the nascent Australian national-
ism. British Columbia took various discriminatory measures from 1898 to 1908, 
as Asian immigrants kept coming to the Canadian western provinces as well 
as using Canada as back door for reaching the American West. While Canada 
allowed Chinese entry for a fee, Mexico actively encouraged Chinese migration 
since it had failed in attracting white settlers during the Porfiriato (1876–1911).
The prevention of Chinese settlers from entering the West became a 
 contested issue on both the southern and northern land borders in the early 
1900s. Active smuggling networks developed around the Chinese, who were 
 provided local guides for the crossings as well as American money, dictio-
naries, railroad maps, guidebooks, fraudulent immigration documents, and 
 Chinese American newspapers. They were also provided appropriate dis-
guises to hide their ethnicity, and many Chinese entered the West dressed 
as Mexicans or as  Indians.  Historian Erika Lee notes how American  officials 
pressured Canada and  Mexico to assist in enforcing U.S. exclusion laws, 
sought moving the immigration control from the U.S. border to Canadian 
and Mexican ports of entry, and encouraged its neighbors to adopt immigra-
tion laws that were compatible with American goals. While U.S. immigration 
officers conducted inspections on Canada’s sea border, Mexico refused such 
cooperation. And while the 1923 Exclusion Act (revoked in 1947) forbid all 
people of Chinese origin or descent from entering Canada,  Mexico,  despite 
strong anti-Chinese protests in the country and U.S. pressure, passed no such 
legislation. On the other hand, the Chinese also remained hated outsiders 
in Mexico, where they easily became victims of nationalistic  xenophobia, 
historian Elliott Young writes (Figure 2.3).
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Asian settlers kept coming legally to the West in the form of the Japanese, 
until their entry was restricted by the so-called gentlemen’s agreement between 
the United States and Japan in 1908 and by the Alien Land Laws that spread like 
wildfire: California in 1913, Arizona and Washington in 1921, Idaho, Montana, 
and Oregon in 1923, Kansas in 1925, and several other  Western states such as 
Utah and Wyoming up to 1943. This type of legislation was meant to keep 
the Asians out, to prevent their settlement by restricting their ability to own 
land and property. Like the Chinese, the Japanese would-be settlers frequently 
carved exceedingly transnational lives while negotiating the long shadows of 
exclusion and racial prejudice in the West. They included people like Hiroka 
Maeda, whose grandparents had emigrated from Japan to Oregon in the 1890s.
Maeda was not only a native-born Westerner, born in The Dalles, Oregon, in 
1918, but also a member of immigrant networks that spanned several continents. 
She was adopted by a Japanese family after her mother succumbed to influenza, 
renamed Suma, and raised on a small truck farm outside Portland. She attended a 
local community college and went to Japan to study in 1938. There she married 
a Norwegian pilot who had fled Nazi occupation in his homeland and who had 
reached Japan via Russia. Meanwhile, her brother had relocated to Canada and 
her biological father had remarried, ventured back to Japan, joined the flow of 
Japanese emigrants to Latin America, and settled in Brazil. Back in The Dalles in 
FiGure 2.3  Chinese immigrants at the San Francisco customhouse. Courtesy  Library 
of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62–93673.
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the early 1940s, Suma, a native-born American with a European husband fight-
ing the Nazis and with family on three different continents, became a suspected 
enemy alien, a Japanese infiltrator, in the eyes of the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. She was ordered to Pinedale Assembly Center near Fresno. Like 
thousands of other Japanese immigrants and their offspring, Suma spent much of 
the war interned in California. She was a prisoner while her Norwegian husband 
was shot down over England. After being released, Suma remarried in Chicago 
and returned to The Dalles. This time she – a woman with more than 50 rela-
tives in the settler colonies of Canada and Brazil, and probably many more in the 
United States – faced what was open racist discrimination from local whites who 
simply saw her as a Japanese turncoat. After being treated as a potential traitor by 
her government, she  became a social outcast in her place of birth.
Borderlands Crossings
Ever since they were drawn and surveyed, the southern and northern land 
borders of the American West proved mobile spaces. These borders were at 
first mere lines in the woods or sand, with border markers few and far between 
and even those decaying and destroyed. Certainly boundaries were meant to 
establish national sovereignty and political control, assert state claims to natural 
resources and inhabitants’ loyalty, establish (closed) zones of economic activity, 
and, in myriad ways, determine who was in and who was out of the settler proj-
ect in the West. But by the late 1800s, Western land borders were not the zones 
of increased anxiety they became in the second half of the twentieth century.
Borders enabled crossings of various kinds. There were the Anglo filibusters 
seeking expansion in Mexico and engaged in violent turmoil in the 1850s and 
the Apaches and Comanches who raided deep into Mexico (see Chapter 3). 
Then there were the European settlers who crossed from the West to Canada 
and back. In the 1840s and 1850s, the Mexican government, with the intention 
of establishing a buffer zone between Mexican settlements and the Comanche 
and Anglo threat stemming from the north, invited eastern Indians who had 
relocated to the Indian Territory to settle in Coahuila. Many Kickapoos and 
Seminoles as well as some Cherokees, Shawnees, and Delawares answered the 
call. Disappointed with their treatment and violence in Mexico, many soon 
returned to the Indian Territory.
After the bitter defeat in the Civil War, people from different social classes 
in the Confederate South moved across the border to Mexico, while many 
others journeyed to Venezuela, British Honduras, and Brazil. Their settler vi-
sions and experiences in Mexico, historian Todd Wahlstrom comments, proved 
quite complex and multifaceted. Many sought to transplant the Dixie to Latin 
 America, others accepted integration to their new host societies, and most 
simply wanted to improve their standing in life. There were also those who 
thought in global terms, exhibiting broad commercial and hemispheric visions.
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Exiles’ efforts to rebuild plantation lives at the colony of Carlota in  central 
Mexico, for instance, mostly failed. While high-profile immigrants such as 
Jubal Early and Sterling Price rather easily drew close to the administration of 
Emperor Maximilian von Hapsburg, the French-backed “puppet” ruler, most 
ambitions for the colonization of northern Mexico faltered in the violent mael-
strom that spanned the Texas–Coahuila–Nuevo Leon–Tamaulipas borderlands 
and involved Comanches, Apaches, and Kickapoos as well as French troops and 
Mexican ranchers and bandits. Some Southerners also tried to make a name 
for themselves in railroad construction, while less well-to-do settlers found 
headway in mining, which often involved Chinese labor at San Louis Potosi 
and in the Tuxpan-Tampico region on the Gulf of Mexico. While some better 
accustomed themselves to Mexican Catholicism and culture and fitted into the 
political climate of the Porfiriato, many southerners soon returned back north 
across the border after the downfall of Maximilian and the French in 1867.
Borderlands were also places that railways and mining and ranching oper-
ations crossed in volume. Two years after the Southern Pacific Railroad made 
its way through Arizona and New Mexico, it branched south across the bor-
der to Guaymas, Sonora, in 1883. Soon more American railroads linked the 
Southwest and northern Mexico. This was at a time when no tracks led from 
northern Mexico to the interior of the country. While more people arrived 
into the borderlands, significant quantities of copper and cattle were shipped 
out. Mining was the centerpiece of economic growth, and venture capitalists, 
both American and European, invested in smelters and livestock production 
on both sides of the border. The demands of mining for skilled and unskilled 
labor created new communities such as Bisbee, Globe, Clifton, and Jerome in 
Arizona and Nacozari and Cananea in Sonora. These became destinations for 
workers arriving from established mining areas in Germany, Scotland, Ireland, 
and Cornwall. The latter especially had earned a special reputation as mine-
workers of colonial empires.
Miners made up most of the 250,000–300,000 Cornish who moved abroad 
before World War I. You could find skilled Cornish in the U.S.–Mexico 
 borderlands as well as in the mines of Australia, South Africa, Brazil, Cuba, and 
Chile. As British money financed much of the mines, the Cornish directors of 
these operations preferred hiring proven Cornish workers, some of whom lived 
for the better part of their adult lives moving internationally from one job to the 
next, with fixed contracts and return tickets bought in advance. But whether 
transient or permanent, the Cornish, like so many other settlers, formed tight-
knit communities and did not lose contact with either the people or the customs 
of their homeland. Wrestling competitions took place in the new settlements, 
Cornish Methodist chapels were constructed, and pasties and saffron cakes be-
came well-known, as did the sound of brass bands and Cornish carols.
The majority of the European settlers who made it over the Mississippi had 
not reached the Southwest borderlands in the mid-1800s. Short on farming 
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lands, lacking manufacturing and industrial foundation, these areas offered lit-
tle immediate economic promise for the potential settlers. These areas also had 
few white women, high percentages of nonwhites (New Mexico), or lacked 
the familiar ethnic communities where the immigrants could move in and feel 
at home. Still, Arizona and New Mexico had a few thousand Irish,  Germans, 
Scots, and Swiss settlers by the 1880s, while several Jewish immigrants made 
their name as businessmen. Many Irish and Germans originally arrived to the 
borderlands as soldiers fighting the Apaches. In fact, the late- 1800s roster of 
the Indian-fighting U.S. Army throughout the West carried a very cosmopol-
itan tone and included men from practically every European country plus the 
British Wests. Military service proved a suitable way for these potential settlers 
to acquaint themselves to the land and the English language. When their army 
contracts (usually five year stints) ran out, many immigrant soldiers stayed in 
the West to make their permanent homes there.
It was the copper mining boom that drew not only larger numbers of  Cornish 
but also numerous Mexicans, Italians, Spanish, Czechs, Serbs,  Montenegrins, 
Finns, and Bohemians to the borderlands communities dominated by Phelps 
Dodge. In borderlands mining towns, like in the mining regions of southern 
 Africa, visible racial hierarchies existed. Campsites, for instance, were  segregated 
into different European nationalities, Anglos, and Mexicans. Better paying and 
more skilled jobs went to Anglos, while the Mexicans occupied the lower tiers. 
Until World War II, when the huge infusions of federal investment altered con-
ditions on the U.S. side, the copper industry provided an important attraction 
for potential settlers as well the number one source of personal  income and 
tax revenue on the borderlands. Yet it was a precarious world. World mineral 
prices and mining investments or disinvestment determined how the border-
lands  operations grew or did not. A rise in the price in Paris or the  opening of a 
new mine in Chile impacted life in the mines of the borderlands and through-
out the West. In 1893, the information that the  British government ceased 
the practice of coining silver rupees in India brought immediate chaos to the 
mining and smelting centers in Colorado (Leadville, Aspen), Utah,  Montana 
(Butte, Helena), and Idaho’s Coeur d’Alene area.  Unemployment threatened 
close to a third of the workforce in many places.
The crossings of some nonwhite laborers caused tensions on the border-
lands early on. Global cotton trade linked Texas and the South with the  British 
 Empire, but also linked them with Mexico as black slaves escaped across the 
border. Indeed, prior to and in the aftermath of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
 Hidalgo (1848), runaway slaves from Texas, aware that the border separated 
two sovereignties, sought refuge on the other side, historian James David 
 Nichols writes. And so did the peons from northern Mexico crossing in the 
opposite direction. These border-crossing Mexican workers proved important 
in filling labor shortages in Texas. Stuck in debt and violent repression, neither 
the Mexican peons nor the American blacks saw the border as a limit, but rather 
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as a gateway to freedom and the opportunity for settler life as free people. Thus 
a line intended to seal off one side from the other and keep  people bound in 
their place served the contrary function of increasing mobility.
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, whites and Mexicans could typically cross 
the land borders of the West relatively easily. There were the custom officials on 
both sides of the line, arriving in the 1880s as railroads crossed the borderlands and 
new towns sprang up along the lines. They were, at least at first, less interested in 
peoples and more inclined to collect a duty on the growing stream of cross-border 
commerce. They also designated a few points of the boundary line as ports of en-
try and in theory sealed off the rest to traffic. Enforcement of regulations proved 
typically flexible, yet duties and crossing regulations still made it more difficult 
to move a wide range of goods, commodities, and animals across the border. 
Ranchers used to operating on both sides of the line could now face considerable 
payments for the border crossings of their own livestock. Cross-border traffic 
involved disputed realms and plenty of smuggling, from cattle and horse thieving 
on the southern border by Apaches, Mexicans, and whites to opium transport in 
the Puget Sound area. In the latter area, there even existed something we can call 
“contraband salmon,” as fishermen ignored the border and instead sold their catch 
to the highest offer on either side of the U.S.–Canadian line, as historian Lissa 
Wadewitz has shown. In the south, the Mexican revolutionary unrest in the 1910s 
led to new emphasis on smuggling weaponry, drugs, and alcohol.
It was still the Chinese that caused the biggest alarm and saw the largely 
unguarded U.S.–Canadian and U.S.–Mexican borders gradually develop into 
sites of state policing and deterrence. Surveillance included a network of cus-
tom officers, train employees, diplomats, and civilian informants. Immigrant 
inspectors began to include “line riders” and “Chinese catchers” in the late 
1800s, and they extended their reach from the border into interior cities, striv-
ing to institute a vigorous policy of arrests and deportations. A new type of 
immigrant, the “illegal immigrant” was coined with the Chinese in mind by 
the American public, and by the 1920s, the borders were effectively closed 
against “illegal” Chinese. In hindsight, one can say that the Chinese exclusion 
functioned as a “trial run” for the turning of the U.S.–Mexico border into 
the militarized zone it is today. Designed to deter immigration from Mexico 
and Latin America, the present border is a space of fences; 24-hour, high-tech 
surveillance; civilian volunteers; and of course the U.S. Border Patrol, today’s 
small army that has grown from much humbler beginnings since it was first 
established to stop the Chinese in 1924.
It was in 1924 that the Johnson–Reed Immigration Act restricted and 
brought national quotas to European immigration, thus a year that marked 
a shift in the settler revolution that tied the West and the world together. As 
settler flow from Europe rescinded, entanglements with Mexico and the larger 
Latin America grew from a stream into a torrent as the twentieth century pro-
gressed. Approximately 1.5 million Mexicans (or 10% of Mexico’s population) 
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crossed the border from 1900 to 1930 compared to the 17,000 Chinese “ille-
gals.” American businesses eagerly lobbied for Mexican labor, arguing that there 
was not enough (or it was not cheap enough) of a white settler workforce, so it 
was necessary to hire Mexicans for the growing mining and agricultural sector. 
They also believed that the Mexicans would return back home once their jobs 
were done. The boom in irrigation, the industrialization of  California and 
Texas agriculture, and the shift from cattle ranching to agribusiness quickly 
grew to rely on the Mexican workforce, as did much of the borderland mining 
operations. The literacy test and head tax imposed on the Mexicans in 1917 
went actively unenforced by U.S. border officials and the American railroad 
companies. Agricultural enterprises from the Plains to California sent recruit-
ers and promotional material to and across the border in order to attract more 
Mexican laborers. In Salt River Valley, Arizona, cotton growers even orga-
nized special trains to move whole families directly from Mexico. Together 
with Filipinos, emigrating from the recently acquired U.S. overseas colony, 
Mexican workers became the leading agricultural labor group in the West. For 
instance, the 120,000 acres of intensive crop farming operations in California’s 
Imperial Valley, close to the border, depended on irrigation and Mexicans, who 
made over 30% of the labor force in 1920.
The driving factors of the increase in Mexican border crossings stemmed 
from the rise of debt peonage among Mexican workers. This in turn repre-
sented a result of land policies during Porfiriato that encouraged the setting 
up of large haciendas and a move from maize, the all-important staple of ordi-
nary Mexicans, to export crops. Transnational passages also overlapped with a 
population boom in Mexico and its accompanying labor surplus and reduction 
of wages. The revolutions and political unrest in Mexico also shoved refugees 
across the border. Most border-crossing Mexicans originated from northern 
Mexico or close to the railways further south. In the 1890s and 1900s, new rail 
lines linked northern Mexico efficiently with the population centers of central 
Mexico, thus making transnational mobility much easier.
Mexicans often practiced step migration, meaning that most of those who 
ended up in the West normally first moved, and only intended to move, within 
Mexico. They frequently went from small villages to urban centers such as 
Mexico City, which saw its population multiply threefold between 1900 and 
1930. Furthermore, it was often older sons from rural areas who sought income 
in Mexican urban or mining centers, while younger men journeyed to the 
West. Many migrants, especially families, who eventually settled in the West 
first made the move to border communities, such as Tijuana, Baja California; 
Nogales, Sonora; Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua; and Piedras Negras, Coahuila. 
Together with their American counterparts such as El Paso, Texas, these locales 
developed into bustling ports for cross-border labor and economic mobility and 
exchange. Many also frequently moved within the West. Before ending up in 
Los Angeles in 1919, Zeferino Velázquez, a native of León, Guanajuato, had seen 
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many places. He first crossed the border to El Paso with his  brother-in-law. 
From El Paso, historian George J. Sánchez writes, the two men were instantly 
recruited for railroad work in Kansas, an occupation from which  Zeferino soon 
switched to meatpacking. To avoid the Kansas draft for World War I, he skipped 
to California and found farm work in the Imperial Valley. In 1918, he went to 
Ciudad Juárez to help his father, his sister, and her children to cross the border, 
before the whole extended family settled in Los Angeles.
Mexicans also characteristically practiced circular migration. They exhib-
ited a pattern of back-and-forth mobility that would continue for several years. 
In short, many of those Mexicans who started to move stayed on the move, 
sometimes for much of their lives, while also staying in touch with their place 
of origin. Also, most men who crossed into the West believed their stay was 
only temporary, but upon their return to their local villages, these men actively 
disseminated knowledge of the West among the residents. In all likelihood they 
increased the number of potential settlers contemplating on leaving.
Legally white for the most part, Mexicans were not white enough in the 
eyes of most Anglos and European settlers in the West. Capitalistic agribusi-
ness proved an exploitative economy, a dual labor system often defined by Jim 
Crow-type segregation and disparities in labor conditions. Social isolation of 
the Mexican migrants, ethnic hierarchies that placed native-born Anglos on 
top, what seemed like a permanent and universal working-class status, poor 
labor conditions, and the tensions between corporate control and unionization 
led to frequent bouts of labor violence, all of which further reinforced the eth-
nic Mexican identity. Yet, from the perspective of the Mexicans the pay was 
better north of the international line. There were also more jobs, less political 
unrest, and brighter prospects for the future. While the continued need for 
Mexican workers north of the border and the continued need of Mexicans to 
find jobs in the north led to mounting cross-border mobility, it also turned 
many of the newcomers into settlers.
When the U.S. economy collapsed in 1929, the appetite for Mexican mi-
grant labor also collapsed, only to rise again with the start of World War II. 
In the 1930s, Mexicans workers turned from desirable to expendable. Massive 
repatriations, deportations, and voluntary return migration saw one-third of 
them, an estimated one million people, leave the American West. Two-thirds, 
however, stayed put, many of them establishing permanent settler roots in 
Western communities such as San Antonio and Los Angeles. Then the  Bracero 
Program brought some 4.5 million Mexican guest agricultural workers north 
of the border between 1942 and 1964. These people, who were supposed to 
be participants in a short-term work program, also eventually stayed, while 
countless others also practiced circular migration. World War II had stimulated 
massive economic growth in the West, fueling its agricultural and industrial 
sectors. In the process, many employers grew more and more dependent on 
Mexican labor. Coinciding with the braceros, there was also a rising number of 
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illegal Mexicans entering the West, which prompted protests from the Anglo 
populace and led to mass deportations, like Operation Wetback in 1954. Still, 
by the mid-century Mexican immigrants vastly outnumbered all other settler 
newcomers in the West and had in fact done that for quite some time already.
The settler revolutions in the West linked the local and the global and car-
ried people, capital, goods, and ideas across maritime and terrestrial spaces 
and revolved around the contested dynamics of exclusion and inclusion. As 
the twentieth century progressed, the settler projects of the world moved to-
ward increased multiculturalism. More and more Asians arrived to Australia, 
 Canada, and the American West, while the latter continues to draw millions of 
workers from Mexico, many of whom become settlers over time. Today, several 
areas in the settler colonial West, such as California, New Mexico, and Texas, 
have, or will soon have, noticeable nonwhite majorities. In all likelihood, the 
transnational networks that have connected the settler West and the world con-
tinue to take fresh trajectories that are bound to further undermine any no-
tions of the West as a “white man’s country.” The West was, is, and will in all 
likelihood remain an ongoing and constantly changing settler project drawing 
potential arrivals from all corners of the world.
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Emilio Kosterlitzky was a transnational warrior, one man among many who 
specialized in violence while crossing empires and borderlands. Historian 
 Samuel Truett writes that Kosterlitzky was born to a Russian, or possibly 
 Cossack,  father and a German mother in Moscow in 1853. Raised in Russia and 
Germany, Kosterlitzky trained at a military academy in St. Petersburg before 
joining the Russian navy. In 1872, he deserted a Russian training vessel for the 
coast of Venezuela. He took one ship to New York and boarded another head-
ing for San Francisco, making it no further than Guaymas, Sonora, on Mexico’s 
Pacific coast. Soon he joined the Mexican Army and rose in their ranks while 
fighting in northern Mexico against the indios barbaros, the Apaches, in the 1870s 
and early 1880s. Sometimes he worked in cooperation with the U.S. troops, 
while on other occasions, he thought that he was protecting the Mexican peas-
ant communities against the U.S. Army Apache scouts who operated south of 
the international line. In 1886, Kosterlitzky was chasing Geronimo and the 
independent Chiricahua Apaches. By then he had also worked for the Mexican 
customs guards. He would continue to serve the borderlands corporate and 
national elite against bandits and organized labor on both sides of the border. 
In 1906, the cosmopolite, who purportedly spoke Russian,  German, Spanish, 
French, Polish, Italian, Danish, Swedish, and  English, became  Colonel Emilio 
Kosterlitzky in the Mexican Army.
When the Mexican Revolution spread to the borderlands, Kosterlitzky was 
caught between U.S. troops and revolutionaries in a fight in Nogales in 1913. 
He surrendered to U.S. authorities. Next he joined hundreds of other Mexican 
refugees at Fort Rosecrans in San Diego. Authorities released him in  September 
1914. Instead of returning to Mexico, Kosterlitzky remained in California and 
Los Angeles, where he had vacationed previously. Now the Russian-German 
youth, Mexican/Indian fighter, and customs policeman became a spy for the 
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United States in the borderlands. Kosterlitzky first worked for the Bureau of 
Investigation (a precursor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and then as a 
permanent agent for the Department of Justice until 1927. By the time of his 
death, in 1928, he was a legend in the violent folklore of the borderlands. As 
a transnational man, Kosterlitzky’s identity aroused speculation among those 
who tried to fix him to a single nationality. He has been variously described as 
a Russian or German immigrant and a Mexican patriot. There exist claims that 
he was ethnically Mexican, an American-born soldier of fortune from Maine, 
or an ex-U.S. Army officer. There was, however, no debate on whether or not 
Kosterlitzky had been a transnational warrior, a fighter who crossed multiple 
national spaces and touched on several nineteenth-century wars for empires.
As Kosterlitzky’s story illustrates, histories of violence seldom come in 
neat packages or with internal coherence and clear beginnings and endings. 
Nor do they follow the boundaries of the nation-state. Instead, in its different 
shapes and formations, violence connects the West with the world. It oper-
ates on  different scales and with gradated intensities blending individual,  local, 
 national, and global concerns and flows in those Western spaces where rival 
peoples, communities, groups, nations, and empires competed for military 
 advantage, economic gain, resources, land, and cultural and social supremacy. 
Works exposing the many subtle facets of violence in the West in  comparative 
and transnational contexts include those of William Carrigan, Brian  DeLay, 
James Gump, Benjamin Madley, Robert Utley, Bruce Vandervort, David 
Weber, and others. They make the world of empires and borderlands – their 
networks, circulations, and parallels – their frame of reference alongside the 
nation-state. They offer mappings of violence from individual acts of murder, 
mob lynching, and labor conflicts to raiding, wars, and genocide and show 
how violence  originated from and involved private individuals, corporate 
mercenaries,  organized labor,  indigenous polities, and federal and state forces. 
This chapter outlines a  sampling of these diverse practices of violence and their 
cross-border ramifications and transnational associations.
social conflict
If you ask the public in the United States, Europe, or pretty much anywhere 
in the world about violence in the American West, they most likely answer the 
gunfighters and shootouts first and the Indian wars second, or vice versa. Much 
historians’ ink has also been spilled describing the violent doings of cowboys 
and gunslingers in “rowdy” settler communities such as Dodge City, Kansas 
or Deadwood, South Dakota. No less attention grabbing have been epic gun-
fights such as the one at the O.K. Corrall in Tombstone, Arizona. Plenty has 
also been written of men like William H. Bonney (Billy the Kid) or Wyatt 
Earp, the two being frequently depicted by authors as symbols of American 
individualism. Explaining violence in the West through the personal is not 
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only common but tempting for both the public and for historians as it makes 
for vivid stories that underpin notions of American national exceptionalism. 
It makes possible claims of extraordinary staying power, such as the assertion 
that American individualism is rooted on a rugged frontier ethos. It has also 
advanced arguments that democratic and moral society is somehow grounded 
on the purifying and justice-bringing impacts of interpersonal violence. But 
what is much less appealing is acknowledging that the mythic force of inter-
personal violence in Western history allows us to sidestep painful questions 
about social conflict springing from racialization, class divides, and cultures of 
masculinity and femininity that accompanied settler colonialism. Emphasis on 
interpersonal violence can camouflage these things and the global connections 
they carry.
It can also make domestic violence invisible. As in most places around the 
world, the majority of interpersonal violence in the West took place inside 
ordinary people’s homes. In the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
borderlands communities in British Columbia and Washington, as suggested by 
historian David Peterson del Mar, wife beating, rape, and child abuse proved all 
too common. So did frequent feuding and brawling among working-class men. 
Both were linked to complex notions of manliness, to the need to prove one’s 
worth at home and in front of other men. They could derive from men’s fears of 
losing their standing as men, of being disgraced in front of other men, women, 
or family, and of being controlled by more formidable men. Significantly, these 
forms of violence were usually nonlethal.
However, the main comparative aspect and the central dispute in Western 
histories of interpersonal violence have traditionally concerned homicidal gun 
violence. Historians such as Richard Maxwell Brown, Robert Dykstra, Roger 
McGrath, and Randolph Roth have used cattle towns and mining camps – 
 select social environments that suffered from an excess of young, single men – 
as their principal foci. They have for decades tried to assess how deadly the 
West actually was but have yet to reach a consensus. Many have pointed out 
that epic shootouts were few and far between, and cattle towns were actually 
much safer (at least in number of homicides) than one would think, because 
many of them enforced gun control and recruited organized police forces. For 
instance, Dodge City at the height of its overland cattle drive activity had less 
than two reported murders annually. Also, in mining and timber camps – as 
well as at military posts, railroad construction sites, and other places occupied 
by a high percentage of single men prone to compensate for their hard work and 
loneliness with even harder drinking and reckless brawling – corporate regula-
tion and communal pressures often tempered lethal interpersonal  feuding. Fear 
of serious sanctions and punishments reduced whatever homicidal tendencies 
there surfaced.
So was the West not so lethal after all? As scholars have contrasted  Western 
violence with other regions in the United States, they have come up with 
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provocative results. Preferring homicide rates to raw numbers, some have 
placed side by side today’s cities – populations in the hundreds of thousands 
or in millions – and the nineteenth-century Western cattle towns and mining 
camps – that usually had from one to five thousand residents. Looked at this 
way, Dodge City comes out as highly lethal. The town’s homicide rate be-
tween 1876 and 1885 amounts to 129, which is twice that of violence-plagued 
St. Louis’s 60 in 2016, which topped U.S. cities for that year. And Dodge City 
is not an anomaly in the West. In the nineteenth-century California mining 
camp of Bodie, the murder rate soared to 116 between 1877 and 1883, while 
Globe, Arizona, topped this with a homicide rate of 152 between 1880 and 
1884. Still, there were “just” 29 killings total in Bodie and 17 in Dodge City 
during all these years combined.
While comparison of murder rates by applying the “adult homicides per 
100,000 population” formula to very small human aggregations can lead to 
contested conclusions, one could imagine that more suitable comparative per-
spectives into homicidal interpersonal violence could be offered by situating 
Western cattle towns and mining camps alongside similar “frontier commu-
nities” in other parts of the world: the Australian, South African, Algerian, 
or Argentinian settler frontiers, for example. Still, hardly any transnational 
 comparisons exist outside the works of social science historian Randolph 
Roth.  Relying on quantitative analysis, Roth linked the West with nineteenth- 
century Canada and Western Europe and produced cross-regional analyses 
within the United States. In Roth’s reading, the West was an exceptionally vi-
olent region. Its adult homicide rates were consistently far greater than those of 
Europe and comparable with the extreme conditions that afflicted communities 
in the South where political or racial violence spiraled out of control during the 
Civil War and Reconstruction era.
With his eyes set on individuals rather than numbers, the veteran military his-
torian Robert Utley modified the scholarship of Western gun fighters to incor-
porate global outlooks when discussing the parallel lives of Billy the Kid and Ned 
Kelly. Connecting outlaw life in the American Southwest with the bushranger 
experience in Australia, Utley shows how two disadvantaged and disgruntled 
outcasts graduated from petty crimes to killers on the perilous  margins of settler 
societies. Both joined gangs of misfits, took up armed robbery as a way of life, 
got arrested, and escaped. Both also witnessed personal injustice and lived on the 
run, preoccupied with survival and escape from those hot on their tails. Both 
also died violently at the hands of authorities. And both were transformed by 
writers and filmmakers into legends postmortem. Both also became prototypes 
of  “social bandits,” untamed everymen pushed to  violence: men who represented 
the common people against greedy big business and government bullies.
Outlaw biographies can tell us something about what drove individuals to 
violence in different settler societies. When investigated closely, much of what 
looks like interpersonal violence was typically part of larger, often complex social 
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struggles linked to nationalization of colonial spaces, industrialization, and the 
global integration of markets. New Mexico’s Lincoln County War, where Billy 
the Kid made much of his name in 1878, was a business rivalry, a clash for the 
economic upper hand between two rival circles. Disputes over land use and own-
ership, class gulf, and ethnic tensions (Irish against British) among settlers also 
drove Ned Kelly to arms in Victoria in 1878. Both New Mexico and Victoria 
witnessed distrust and antagonism against the powerful economic and political 
factions, whether it was the Australian “squattocracy” of established grazers or 
the American merchants of the “Santa Fe ring.” In both situations, social distrust 
exploded into a series of violent confrontations in which governments – while 
ostensibly neutral – sided with the “law and order” and the economically pow-
erful, contributing to the villanizing and squashing of the rebellious “outlaws.”
It is this context that the stories of Billy the Kid and Ned Kelly tie in with 
the wider world of social conflict stemming from economic rivalries, class 
 divisions, and racial hierarchies that came in many shapes and sizes in the West 
and the world being remade and penetrated by colonial powers. There is no 
reason why, for example, the Pleasant Valley War, a violent feud between two 
ranching families in Arizona’s rim country in the 1880s; the Johnson County 
War, a clash between ranchers of various pedigrees in 1890s Wyoming; or the 
mining clashes in Colorado in the early 1900s should not be discussed on the 
same plane with similar disputes over land use, access to resources, and control 
over labor in other colonies and empires. Many social conflicts in the West 
seemingly carry quite explicit transnational characteristics relating to industri-
alization, class warfare, and racial tensions, the heated questions surrounding 
the development of the modern world.
Usually viewed as a prime Western example of the kind of open class warfare 
that characterized much the industrial relations in nineteenth-century Europe, 
the Ludlow Massacre in Colorado echoed the expanding global hierarchies of 
whiteness. Before their camp was demolished in the attack by the Colorado 
National Guard on April 20, 1914, which left 20 people dead, the community 
of 1,200 striking miners at Ludlow spoke over 20 languages. Indeed, the ma-
jority of the community consisted of immigrant Greeks, Italians, Slavs, and 
others from southern and eastern Europe. Arguably, the strike and the massacre 
demonstrated a growing gulf between the wealthy, often native-born Anglos, 
and the largely immigrant workers. This show of corporate power was also 
a chapter in an ethnic warfare that sought to limit access to the privileges of 
whiteness. If eastern and southern Europeans were shunned, the Chinese and 
the Mexicans were straightforwardly excluded from the “white man’s” West 
and from other “white man’s” countries (Figure 3.1).
As discussed in the previous chapter, anti-Chinese agitation, racial fears of 
being swamped by a flood of Chinese settlers, and exclusive measures in leg-
islation drew from transnational circuits straddling the various settler colonial 
communities of the Pacific and beyond. So did anti-Chinese violence. In the 
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West and in Australia, antagonistic whites set up anticoolie clubs or other social 
alliances and political pressure groups with a knack for racist propaganda and 
tolerance for mob violence. Such whites blamed unemployment, poor pay, and 
other difficulties related to labor conditions and economics on the Chinese. In 
the goldfields of Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland, the  Chinese were 
regularly targeted for violence over several decades. For example, in 1860 and 
1861, a series of violent acts in New South Wales flamed into what is known as 
the Lambing Flat Riots. Dreading Chinese competition, a mob of white workers 
looted and sacked Chinese dwellings and camps and beat and forcefully evicted 
Chinese miners. It all climaxed when white miners stormed the police force 
sent to quell the disturbances. Some two-thirds of the 55  anti-Chinese riots in 
the West between 1871 and 1887 took place in California. In 1871 Los  Angeles, 
a mob consisting of hundreds of white men entered the local  Chinatown to 
attack, rob, and murder its residents. The outcome: 18 dead Chinese. In the 
mid-1880s, waves of violence rocked Chinese communities from California to 
FiGure 3.1  The anti-Chinese wall in North America goes up as the Chinese  original 
goes down. A cartoon showing laborers, among whom are  Irishmen, 
an African American, a Civil War veteran, Italian,  Frenchman, and a 
Jew, building a wall against the Chinese. Congressional mortar is used 
to mount blocks of prejudice, nonreciprocity, law against race, fear, 
etc. Across the sea, a ship flying the American flag enters China as the 
Chinese knock down their own wall and permit trade of goods such as 
rice, tea, and silk. 1882, Cartoon by Friedrich Graetz (c. 1840–c. 1913). 
Courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, 
LC-USZC4–4138.
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British Columbia to the Plains. Chinatowns were burned to the ground and the 
Chinese were murdered and evicted from many communities: for example, in 
Vancouver, Seattle, and in Rock Springs, Wyoming. In the latter, 28 Chinese 
were beheaded, scalped, mutilated, and hanged by the white coal miners.
Social conflicts carrying transnational implications also revolved around 
Anglo-Mexican relations. In the Southwest borderlands, disputes over land and 
the commercialization of agriculture and mining created rigid racial hierarchies 
and violence that crossed borders. Already in 1859, in the overwhelmingly 
 Hispanic region of South Texas, Juan Cortina, a large ranch operator, came 
into conflict with an influential group of lawyers and judges of Brownsville, 
whom he accused of expropriating land from its Hispanic owners. According 
to historian Jerry Thompson, Cortina, fed up with Anglo harassment and dis-
crimination, shot and wounded a local sheriff whom he witnessed mishandling 
an elderly ranch hand. Then Cortina went into exile and gathered a paramil-
itary following. He and his men stormed Brownsville, looting and executing 
four Anglos known for their crimes against Hispanics but who had previously 
gone unpunished. A war of sorts broke out between Cortina’s followers and 
Texas Rangers, Cortina evading and crossing the border, and the Rangers at-
tacking ethnic Mexicans in the region indiscriminately.
In 1877, Anglo attempts to curtail access to the salt beds at the base of  Guadalupe 
Mountains in San Elizario in the vicinity of El Paso exploded into a “salt war.” 
What the local Hispanic populace had used as a communal  resource, Anglo 
businessmen saw as a valuable commodity, historian Paul Cool explains. After 
years of arguments and deliberations among politicians and speculators, an Anglo 
banker from Austin made a claim on the salt in 1877 and tried to  enforce it. This 
sparked a violent insurgency as local, mainly Hispanic, residents challenged the 
claim. The situation climaxed with the intervention of U.S. troops, which further 
 empowered the local Anglos while eroding the power of the area’s Hispanics.
In the early 1900s, countless more ethnic Mexicans were killed and made 
to leave the United States. Perhaps the most notorious and violent cross-border 
deportation took place in Bisbee, Arizona, in 1917. The mining corporation 
Phelps Dodge attacked workers who demanded better working conditions and 
who had organized a peaceful strike to achieve them. If the unions as such rep-
resented radical leftist ideas and dangerous “un-American” activity, the heavy 
Mexican presence among the strikers challenged the prevalent racial order. 
When the U.S. Army refused to help, Phelps Dodge organized a posse of “loyal 
Americans” that swept through the town, arresting, harassing, and knocking 
workers around. They drove some 1,300 people into railroad boxcars and drove 
them out to the border. Rather than solely ethnic Mexicans, the deportees 
proved in fact to be an international bunch, representing some 20 different 
nationalities. There were over 200 Mexicans but also some 140 Brits, 80 Serbs, 
dozens of Irishmen, and over 70 Finnish workers.
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Bisbee forms an episode of cross-border social conflict where class tensions 
and ethnic prejudice intersected, targeting the workers and the unprivileged. 
Other violent outbursts drew from Mexico’s inner political turmoil that spilled 
across the international line. On September 15, 1891, Catarino Garza, a  Mexican 
journalist and political activist, led a band of Mexican rebels out of South Texas 
and across the Rio Grande. Garza, historian Elliott Young  remarks, declared 
a revolution against Mexico’s dictator, Porfirio Díaz.  Drawing support from a 
broad cross-border coalition of ranchers, merchants, peasants, and discontented 
military men, Garza’s insurgency was the biggest and longest lasting threat to 
the Díaz regime up to that point. It took two years of sporadic fighting and 
the combined efforts of the U.S. and Mexican troops, Texas Rangers, and local 
law enforcement to subdue the uprising. Forced into exile, Garza was killed in 
Panama in 1895.
In 1915 and 1916, a revolutionary fervor of transnational proportions again 
gripped South Texas. Drawing from global ideological currents and calls 
for a socialist revolution, Plan de San Diego provided for the formation of a 
 “Liberating Army of Races and Peoples,” to be made up of ethnic Mexicans, 
African Americans, and Asians. The plan, seriously understudied prior to histo-
rian Benjamin Johnson’s work, aimed to carry out the “freeing” of Texas, New 
Mexico, Arizona, California, and Colorado from U.S. control. The liberated 
states would be organized into an independent republic, which might later seek 
annexation to Mexico. Soon a revised plan emphasized the liberation of the 
proletariat and focused on Texas. It called for a social republic to serve as a base 
for spreading the revolution throughout the Southwest borderlands. Native 
Americans should also be enlisted to fight for the cause of the oppressed and the 
workers. Texas Rangers, law and order leagues, and private mobs responded 
with a far bloodier campaign that killed an unknown number (between 300 
and 5,000) of ethnic Mexicans. The worst killing spree ended when the U.S. 
Army intervened to reclaim control from lynch mobs. But after the war, an 
anti-Mexican Ku Klux Klan revived local vigilantism in a region that shared 
a similarly volatile commercial agriculture system with the South. And, as in 
the South, vigilantism worked to install a system of harsh racial segregation and 
tightly managed labor.
It is little surprise that many of the social conflicts involving the Chinese 
or ethnic Mexicans shared a particular form of violence: lynching. Although 
usually seen as predominantly Southern and Jim Crow practice, lynching 
 represented a transnational subset of violence. Blending ethnic suppression and 
interpersonal violence, it has been used for defending structures of power or 
to implement them and for affirming racial hierarchies and otherness in the 
West and the world. Ethnic Mexican, Native American, and Chinese men were 
frequently targeted for lynching in the West. Unlike African Americans in the 
South, who were vilified as sexual predators bent on raping white women, 
most Mexicans were not lynched for fears of their uncontrollable sexuality, 
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arguably because Anglo stereotypes frequently conceived them as a nonthreat-
ening race. Much like the lynching of blacks in the South, however, Western 
lynching targeting racialized groups served as a form of social control. But 
Western lynching was also a method of ethnic cleansing, of driving the racial 
minorities away.
Older accounts, like those penned by historian Richard Maxwell Brown, 
 applied clearer boundaries between vigilantism (organized) and lynching 
(unorganized), but modern interpretations see the lines between legal/state- 
sanctioned and community-driven/extralegal actions as increasingly blurred. A 
case in point is the San Francisco Vigilance Committee of the 1850s, which went 
after Irish, Chinese, Mexican, and other immigrants. As the committee grew 
to more than 10,000 members and after its members won several positions of 
public office, it held immense social influence and actually became synonymous 
with law and order. The line between state power and vigilante violence was 
muddled also in the Arizona mining communities of Clifton and Morenci half 
a century later as ethnic Mexican workers were lynched in order to keep this es-
sential labor source cheap, docile, and available. According to historians  William 
Carrigan and Clive Webb, the men responsible for lynching in the Southwest 
borderlands from Texas and California often acted in open  disobedience of the 
law and with the approval of the majority of their communities.
Lynching was made visible and rested on public performances and  spectacles. 
It also gained acceptability and visibility in postcards, souvenir cards, and 
 published photographs of mob violence that were widely circulated and col-
lected in the United States up to the 1930s. Interestingly, at the same time, simi-
lar images of colonial violence – for example, of the German-Herero conflict in 
1904–1907 – were also made into popular trading cards series in Europe, as his-
torian Benjamin Madley has shown. The author and artist Ken  Gonzales-Day’s 
analysis confirms that these often-romanticized visual celebrations of “frontier 
justice” in the West were of public killings “guided by anti-immigration senti-
ments, the fear of miscegenation, a deep frustration with the judicial system, or 
in combination with white supremacy.”1
Lynching operated in a global context, and it carries a long history from 
the ancient Middle East to twentieth-century South Africa, the late  Ottoman 
 Empire, Brazil, and Northern Ireland. Furthermore, British, Russians,  Japanese, 
and others proved keen observers of American lynching in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s. Historian Gregory Smithers identifies lynching as a ritualistic af-
firmation of white unity in Australia and the United States. In its twin roles 
as a real and a rhetorical threat, lynching served to discipline racialized male 
bodies and enforce the social order and hierarchies of races in both  Australia 
and the American West. In both settler societies, lynching of racial others was 
 1 Gonzales-Day, Lynching in the West, 3.
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usually socially acceptable for the sake of order and to guard white women 
against miscegenation. Historian Robert Thurston takes a different approach. 
He suggests that lynching was too random and that it was too often used against 
whites to qualify as systematic form of racial control in the colonial world. 
Instead, Thurston sees lynching primarily as a collective response based on 
local circumstances of political instability: lynching constituted of reactions to 
immediate social threats caused by a lack of legitimate and effective authority.
Wars for empires
When historians write of “Indian wars” in the West, they ordinarily refer to 
clashes pitting communities of indigenous residents against the U.S. Army, 
white settlers, or other Indian groups. Often these histories, which typically 
take place on the Great Plains or in the Southwest, have taken the nation-state, 
or the territory or state, as their principal frame of analysis, positioning the 
wars in relation to the master narrative of U.S. frontier expansion. In recent 
years, borderlands scholars have been in the forefront in rethinking wars in the 
West. Their revisionist works have taken indigenous power seriously and have 
 examined both smaller, more intimate, threads of conflicts involving fami-
lies and communities while mixing these investigations with explorations of 
transnational, even hemispheric, trends. Borderlands scholars have examined 
different shapes and different temporal and geographical spaces of violence – 
transcending the early West with the settler colonial period – that intersected 
with the paradigm of imperial rivalries or later settler colonial and national 
expansion but did not necessarily confine themselves to either.
Spain relied on violence throughout its American empire. Violence was 
instrumental in toppling the Aztecs, subduing the Incas, and in establishing 
and maintaining exploitative mining and plantation economies built upon 
forced indigenous and African labor. Violence was also crucial in Spain’s at-
tempts to bring under its control the indigenous peoples from New Mexico 
and Texas through the northeast coast of Venezuela and the Andes all the way 
into Patagonia. Culturally, violence drew from an active root system. Many 
 Spanish men in the Americas carried deeply implanted family legacies from the 
 generations-long reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from Muslim rule. They 
not only brought deadly diseases to the Americas but also made demands for 
forced labor and farm produce, abused indigenous women, and interfered with 
 Native belief systems and social practices. As a consequence, fierce indigenous 
resistance flamed in the 1600s. The Pueblos revolted in New Mexico in 1680, 
as did the Zuaques (1600) and the Tehuecos (1611) in Sinaloa and the Acaxees 
(1601) and the Xiximes (1610) in Durango. In 1616, the Tepehuán of Nueva 
Vizcaya (Chihuahua) drew widespread indigenous support to their rebellion in 
the mining towns on the Sierra Madre. Then in 1640, it was the Tobosos, and 
in 1648–1652, the Tarahumaras and the Conchos who challenged Spanish rule 
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in northern New Spain. These uprisings then spread to Nuevo León (including 
modern-day south Texas) in the 1660s and to present Arizona as the O’odham 
rebelled in 1695 and again in 1751. After the initial shock, the Spanish response 
was typically fierce everywhere, and it involved killing, mauling, and publicly 
executing scores of people suspected of defying its authority.
According to historian David Weber, in the 1700s, Bourbon Spain’s imperial 
dreams and efforts throughout its American empire relied heavily on violence 
coupled with diplomacy. Military campaigns, slave raids, deportations, and 
bodily mutilations were common across Spanish America. But the Spanish met 
their match as indigenous polities ranging from the Araucanians in the south to 
the Yaquis, Comanches, and Apaches in the north adopted and invented prac-
tices of violence – including lighting raids for plunder and slaves, ambushes, 
and their own bodily mutilations. Several indigenous raiders made the Spanish 
pay tribute to them and recognize indigenous autonomy and superiority, thus 
inverting the relationships of power that Europeans since Columbus and the 
conquistadors had imagined as proper and normal.
In northern New Spain (the Southwest borderlands), Spanish violence 
resonated far beyond the immediate reach of the Spanish whose principal 
settlements lined the upper Rio Grande in New Mexico. Spanish demands 
for labor and human captives coexisted with the diseases, horses, crops, and 
manufactured goods they introduced. Both dispersed throughout the West, 
prompting a maelstrom of exchanges where violence became the lifeline of 
survival and power. It, historian Ned Blackhawk asserts, recalibrated in-
digenous lives toward cutthroat competition and caused much Indian pain 
in the Great Basin. In the “interior world” of the Colorado River basin, 
historian Natale Zappia points out, the Quechans, Mojaves, and Cocopahs 
quite  successfully thwarted and challenged the power and the impacts of the 
Spanish yet adapted and incorporated their goods, tools, and markets. These 
Indians used trading and violence to harness economic and political power 
through the formation and expansion of a captive and livestock raiding econ-
omy that operated within transnational systems ranging from the California 
coast and the Pacific Ocean far to the desert interior of New Mexico, Sonora, 
Chihuahua, and beyond.
Some independent Indians dominated outsiders in the transnational vortex 
of borderlands violence. The Comanches, an assortment of hunter-gatherers 
from the Rocky Mountains and the Great Basin, made themselves into bison 
hunters and horse pastoralists and engaged in an expansion of their own on 
the southern Plains and northern New Spain in the 1700s. Historian Pekka 
Hämäläinen showcases how the Comanches controlled wide trade networks 
between northern New Spain and French Louisiana and incorporated subject 
peoples as kin and slaves. They also pushed the Apaches off the southern Plains 
in decades-long wars and confronted, and often bested, the Spanish, Osages, 
Cherokees, and Cheyennes on the violent edges of their realm.
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In many borderlands communities, violence became an instrumental part 
of ordinary life. It was practiced for economic reasons. Raiding smoothened 
inequalities of individual wealth. It furthered social status and solidified group 
unity. It created and maintained cultures that centered the warrior and male 
accomplishment. Men typically became to identify themselves as specialists in 
violence. In Hispanic borderlands communities, a man’s worth was equally de-
termined by his record in Apache and Comanche killing. This vibrant militant 
ethos then spilled over to the period of Mexican Revolution in the early 1900s. 
Youngsters in Comanche villages, as well as in Apache communities occupying 
both sides of the present U.S.–Mexico border, participated in meticulous and 
systematic warrior-training programs expected of them by their communities 
and designed to produce superior fighters. Feeding a perilous dependency on 
products available only from others, violence was, as historian Brian DeLay 
suggests, also a goal in its own right, a method for revenge, for upholding in-
dividual and communal honor and reputation, and for creating fear in subject 
or tributary peoples.
Violence recalibrated manliness and became a tool that borderlands com-
munities, marked by cultural and ethnic mixing, used to make sense of them-
selves and their world. According to historian Lance Blyth, for the Chiricahua 
Apaches and the Hispanic community of Janos, Chihuahua – the jurisdiction 
of which originally bridged both sides of the current U.S.– Mexico border – 
violence built cultural identity, social cohesion, and networks of economic 
and social relations for multiple generations. And it was not just Janos and 
the Chiricahuas who expressed their power and need for intimacy though 
 violence. Violence and gender proved the glue of the relational field of captiv-
ity, kinship, ethnicity, and community in the world of rival and inter-reliant 
Spanish and indigenous peoples throughout the borderlands and southern 
Plains.
Historian Karl Jacoby tells four parallel stories of borderlands communities, 
relations, and violence – that of the O’odham, Mexicans, Anglos, and Aravaipa 
Apaches – that culminated in a bloody massacre at Aravaipa Canyon, near 
U.S. Army base Camp Grant, Arizona, in 1871. There a posse of O’odham, 
 Mexicans, and Anglos whose lives and interests traversed both sides of the 
border smashed an unsuspecting camp of Aravaipa Apaches, who thought they 
were under protection of the U.S. Army. More than one hundred Apaches 
died, mostly women and children, and the attackers took numerous children 
as captives. The attackers shared long (O’odham and Mexicans) or shorter 
 (Anglos) histories with the Apaches where wars, raids, vigilantism, and inti-
macies blended and coexisted and where violence denoted relations between 
neighbors sharing transnational spaces. Their intergroup relations comprised 
of cycles of raiding and reprisals, private, temporary, peace pacts, contraband 
trade, and the mutual stealing of material property and captive-taking and 
adoption, as well as voluntary migration of peoples between groups.
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In the 1820s, the international boundary between United States and New 
Spain/Mexico, as stipulated by the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819, ran along the 
Red and Arkansas Rivers and the 42nd parallel to the disputed (with Britain) 
Oregon. During that era, traders and trappers from the United States also pen-
etrated the borderlands via the Santa Fe Trail. When introducing new trade 
goods manufactured in eastern United States and in Europe and through their 
demand for animal skins, sent to market in Eastern United States and to  Europe, 
they reshaped the environment and further tilted communal relations toward 
intense competition. While the United States expanded into worlds shaped by 
generations of European disruptions, it remade these spaces through its own 
violent agents of empire. Transnational violence both preceded and became 
central to American settler colonial expansion to the trans-Mississippi West.
In the 1830s and 1840s, violence, De Lay describes, transformed the South-
west borderlands into “a vast theater of hatred, terror, and staggering loss for 
independent Indians and Mexicans alike.”2 Outfits of scalp hunters were led by 
Anglos such as James Kirker and John Joe Glanton, and comprised of white, 
Hispanic, and indigenous men, including Shawnees, Delawares, and other east-
ern transplants. Tempted by the reward Sonora and Chihuahua promised on 
Apache scalps, they murdered sleeping Apaches, “friendly” Indians, and some-
times anyone they could get their hands on, caring very little about any kind 
of boundaries. Meanwhile, Comanches and Apaches, as well as Kiowas and 
 Navajos, became full-fledged transnational raiders whose campaigns stretched 
far toward the distant, resource-rich, and vulnerable reaches spanning from 
Tamaulipas to Sonora and from New Mexico to San Louis Potosí. These in-
digenous raiders from deep within the continental interior of plains and deserts 
reached the oceans and visited the lands of rain forests. Their violence created 
manmade raiding deserts of wrecked economies, empty landscapes, and streams 
of Mexican refugees, many of whom headed for the California goldfields. It ate 
away Mexican’s fragile sense of national unity and made Mexico look both 
weak and ripe for the taking in the eyes of U.S. citizens. Many Americans felt 
Mexico reversed the proper arc of history by retreating in face of indigenous 
powers. In this transnational reading of violence, indigenous raiding enabled 
and intertwined with the settler rebellion in Texas and with the aggressive war 
of conquest by the United States from 1846 to 1848.
During the war with Mexico, U.S. soldiers penetrated deep into  Mexico, 
occupying its capital and claiming half of its territory. As invaders, they brought 
Anglo and Spanish America into a violent and intimate contact. Historian 
Amy Greenberg argues that the racist and licentious behavior of U.S. soldiers 
provoked outrages among the Mexican locals, terrible publicity in the eastern 
United States, and antiwar protests throughout the Americas. Anglo filibusters 
 2 DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, xv.
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and indigenous raiders, in turn, took advantage of the new international bor-
der, thus continuing to link the violence in the West to violence in northern 
Mexico for several decades.
As violence flowed across the new border, the international line complicated 
the matters for the U.S. and Mexican armies, who refused to tolerate any inde-
pendent Indians. The border also offered considerable advantage to the Apache 
and Comanche raiders once they realized U.S. troops were forbidden to follow 
them south and Mexican forces could not reach north. Transnational raiders 
created much resentment between Mexico and the United States, as officials 
in both countries tended to protest vocally if any Indians or troops crossed 
the border. For instance, in the mid-1870s, U.S. soldiers from Texas pursued 
 raiding Lipan and Mescalero Apaches and Kickapoos deep into Coahuila and 
thus raised a fury of diplomatic protests from Mexico.
In the 1880s, the Chiricahua Apaches, in turn, made the Sierra Madre in 
northern Mexico their base from where they launched sweeping and destruc-
tive raids across northern Sonora and Chihuahua as well as southern New 
 Mexico and Arizona. As a result, in July 1882, the United States and Mexico 
signed an agreement giving each other the right to cross the boundary when 
in close pursuit of “savage Indians.” The bulk of the last U.S.–Apache wars 
was actually fought in Mexico. In 1883, U.S. troops invaded the  Chiricahua 
homes in the Sierra Madre, while in 1885 and 1886, they chased the 
 Chiricahuas under Geronimo across northern Mexico. Finally, U.S. troops 
escorted the Chiricahuas back to the United States, where they surrendered 
and were sent into exile in Florida as prisoners of war. During these last war 
years, U.S. Army Apache soldiers got drunk in Mexican  villages or were 
fired at by locals south of the borderline, causing international  incidents. 
U.S. officers also found themselves questioned, arrested, and even shot at by 
Mexican officials.
In many ways, borderlands histories provide inside views of unsettling, but 
also empowering, spaces of violence that spanned multiple communities and 
nations. Although whites used violence to capture indigenous lands and destroy 
their economies, violence was nuanced. It came with different purposes and 
meanings, and it often did not fit the kind of dichotomous readings of history 
that depict indigenous victimization and European mastery. Violence operated 
on differing scales, from the most intimate levels of individuals and families 
to grander historical scales involving nations and empires. Obviously, wars for 
empire and settler colonial spaces, indigenous power, and transnational raiding 
were not limited to the Americas. The age of global empires and settler colo-
nialism in the 1800s and early 1900s witnessed numerous conflicts as imperial 
powers used armies to seek access to lands, resources, and labor, as they sought 
to eliminate the Natives and impose their will on local communities ranging 
from Algeria to South Africa, from Australia to the Russian Caucasus, and in 
most spaces in between.
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According to historian Bruce Vandervort, the Plains and Southwest wars, 
the Metis confrontations with Canadian authorities, Yaqui resistance in  Sonora, 
and the Yucatan Caste War produced differing trajectories but also revealed 
continental linkages on several levels. For one, Indians used cross-border sanc-
tuaries located on the many edges of empires: the Apaches in Mexico, the Lakota 
Sioux in Canada, the Yaquis in Arizona, and the Mayas in British  Honduras. 
Thus wars did not tidily follow national boundaries, but instead crossed those 
boundaries, and used the potentially neutral grounds on the other side in search 
for safety and strategic advantage. Wars of conquest against indigenous peoples 
also stirred international cooperation, including American diplomatic pressure 
on Canada to discourage giving asylum to the Sioux and the reciprocal border 
crossing agreement in the Southwest as both United States and Mexico targeted 
a common enemy. On the flip side, both Mexico and Canada feared that the 
United States would use the border area turmoil as a pretext for an invasion, 
that the conflicts against the Apaches, or the Sioux could prompt accompany-
ing demands on Canada and Mexico.
Much like the U.S.–indigenous wars, the nineteenth-century European 
 invasion of Asia, Africa, and Latin America saw prolonged violence, the tar-
geting of whole societies and their material base, guerrilla war, powerful and 
expansionist indigenous polities, and brutal killing by multiple actors. For ex-
ample, post-independence wars against indigenous peoples started in  Argentina 
in the 1830s, expanding white settlement south of Buenos Aires and killing 
thousands of Indians. More wars followed in the 1870s and 1880s, while 
sporadic attacks in the far reaches of the Pampas continued until the 1930s. 
 Meanwhile, while settlers took over new indigenous lands in Argentina, those 
in Chile engaged the Araucanians in a 20-year struggle. Thousands of Indians 
were killed, and the survivors left abandoned in scattered reservations. In many 
instances, indigenous peoples rose up against the invasion of their homelands.
Another potential canvas of comparison for the U.S.–indigenous wars lies 
with the French overseas expansion. Western historians know well that in 
the 1860s, Mexico was occupied by the expansionist France of Napoleon III. 
While French cotton merchants and manufacturers urged their country to rec-
ognize the Confederacy, many Frenchmen dreamed of reviving past glory and 
of building a greater France in the Americas and around the world. Although 
its Mexican venture failed, and France never challenged the United States in 
the Southwest borderlands, in the mid-1800s, the French empire in Asia and 
Africa sprang forward. It gained a foothold in Indochina (Laos, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam, from where France would not leave until forced to do so in 
the 1950s) and penetrated deeper inland in Algeria and on the Senegal coast in 
West Africa.
In Algeria, General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud developed the concept of the 
razzia, or raid. Modifying the indigenous raids that targeted booty and show-
cased enemy vulnerability, in the 1840s, Bugeaud’s flying columns ousted the 
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Arabs by killing their livestock, destroying crops and orchards, and burning 
villages. The troops also built military bastions to claim and control land, to 
help draw European settlers to it, and to secure existing European settlements 
in a “hostile country.” Personally encouraging conquest by the sword and the 
plow, Bugeaud worked on a theory, according to historian Douglas Porch, that 
if the Algerians could not eat, they could not fight. In the Southwest, among 
other places, a similar approach – operated from more or less fixed garrisons 
and never referred to as raids (in the West Native Americans conducted “raids,” 
not the whites) – was applied to end Apache and Navajo autonomy. The plan 
was to bring about their extermination/submission by targeting material prop-
erty and the land and to vacate real estate for white miners and settlers. General 
James Carleton applied a version of this method against the Mescalero Apaches 
and Navajos in 1862–1864, and General George Crook against the Western 
Apaches and Yavapais in 1872–1874. In 1863, troops led by Kit Carson burned 
everything on their path as they invaded the Navajo homelands. With few 
battles or skirmishes, they destroyed Navajos livelihood before removing the 
survivors and forcing them to take the “Long Walk” to the utterly misera-
ble Bosque Redondo, a camp/reservation on the Pecos River. Crook utilized 
mobile flying columns and strived for a campaign that was short, sharp, and 
decisive. He worked to empty central Arizona lands – where rich deposits 
were found – of Indians and forcing the survivors to reservations. Much like 
Bugeaud’s men, Crook’s troops mercilessly attacked Apache and Yavapais vil-
lages, usually making surprise strikes at dawn and destroying everything they 
could get their hands on, from camp equipment to crops, livestock, and people. 
On the Plains, General Philip Sheridan envisioned related tactics, albeit on a 
larger scale, by sending converging columns against the Sioux–Cheyenne alli-
ance in 1876 in an effort to claim the Black Hills country for whites and when 
seeking to keep the Comanches and Kiowas out of the way of the  mushrooming 
Plain settlements in the Red River War in 1873. On the Caucasus, the Russians 
also applied their version of this method as they destroyed villages, initiated 
forceful raids, and used scorched earth tactics and forced removals against the 
Circassians, replacing them with Russian and Cossack settlers.
Much like Carleton, Crook, Sheridan, and the Russians, Bugeaud saw the 
razzia as the only means at his disposal for quickly and effectively vacating 
land for settler use when confronting an enemy that was supposedly warlike, 
understood only force, but would not stand and fight. Similarities do not end 
here. Bugeaud also understood razzia as a way of communicating: he felt it 
was the kind of warfare that the locals understood and respected. He also saw 
it as a means of demonstrating to the locals that the French troops – poorly 
acclimatized, cumbersome, and out of their element, and thus much like the 
U.S. troops in the West – had now mastered their new environment. Working 
toward Native elimination, Bugeaud was at least as certain as Crook, Carleton, 
or Sheridan that the Natives needed a lesson and that only decisive immoderate 
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forms of violence would make their long-term subjugation and administration 
as subject peoples possible. They also viewed these kinds of methods as accept-
able to prevent a more protracted struggle and tolerated the extreme brutality 
because they felt that in fighting Natives, the rules of “civilized warfare” did 
not always apply.
In West Africa, the eastward thrust of the French in the 1850s Senegal, 
ran smack into the Tukolors, a multiethnic Muslim empire of expansionist 
traders, farmers, and fighters controlling some 400 miles of the Senegal River. 
This river functioned as a highway of power and as a corridor in transporting 
trade goods, soldiers, and influence deep into the interior. In some ways it had 
functioned similarly to the Missouri River system as the United States sought 
to project its influence on the northern Plains controlled by the Lakota Sioux. 
By the late 1850s, several U.S. posts already dotted the river, and together 
with the forts on the Oregon Trail, they practically surrounded the Sioux. But 
the Sioux sought expansion as well, combatting the Pawnees in northwestern 
 Nebraska and the Crows for the control of the Powder River  country. When 
the U.S. Army built a line of forts linking the Oregon Trail with  Montana on 
the  Bozeman Trail, the Lakotas under Red Cloud drove the army back and 
burned the forts. The Tukulors also challenged the French invasion, launching 
a jihad in 1853 under the charismatic leadership of al-Haji Umar. The French 
fort on Medina, situated near the outermost navigable spot of the Senegal 
River and on an important communication route, was subjected to a vigorous 
 Tukolor siege in 1857. While the French were saved as reinforcements arrived, 
they, like the U.S. troops on the Bozeman Trail, were badly shaken. In both 
places the dreams of quick expansion were placed on temporary hold, and 
peace agreements favorable to the Sioux and the Tukolors were made. Next the 
Sioux refocused their military muscle on the Pawnees and the Crowns, while 
the Tukolors conquered the neighboring Bambara Empire (in today’s Mali).
The Zulus of South Africa represented another sovereign and dynamic 
indigenous power with strong expansionist tendencies. They had modified 
their heterogeneous society and military through conquest and centralization, 
empowering themselves through the creation of an age-set labor force and a 
“standing” military. They had also absorbed numerous chiefdoms. The Sioux, 
in turn, had made themselves more powerful by embracing the equestrian, 
 bison-hunting economy and the opportunities that the Missouri River fur trade 
offered. They had also made their social structure flexible and  decentralized, 
so as to better suit the needs of conquest and their new lifestyle. Powerful and 
assertive, the Sioux experienced population growth and carved space at the 
expense of their more horticultural neighbors, such as the Mandans and the 
Pawnees, weakened by deadly epidemics. Both the Sioux and Zulus, histo-
rian James Gump describes, accumulated prosperity and power through their 
ability to control and crush others militarily and through their capacity to 
exploit others economically. As white overland trekkers, traders, missionaries, 
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prospectors, farmers, and government officials made increased inroads into 
Sioux and Zulu lands, uneasy collaboration and diplomatic openings were ac-
companied by spouts of violence and increased demands targeting the curtail-
ing of Sioux and Zulu autonomy. By the 1870s, both the Sioux and the Zulus 
had become barriers to the exploitation of natural resources and the spread of 
white settlement.
While the Sioux and the Zulus won major fights and often eluded the troops 
hot on their tail, their triumph was transient and they lost their respective wars. 
The two epic battles, Little Bighorn – the Sioux-Cheyenne annihilation of 
Colonel George Custer and sections of his Seventh Cavalry in Montana – and 
Isandlwana – the crushing defeat of the British forces in Zulu hands in Natal – 
mattered, but mostly as signs of the frailty of colonial power. Pouring more 
manpower and resources to the Plains and South Africa, the United States 
and Britain dissolved and reduced Sioux and Zulu homelands, destroyed their 
military autonomy, attempted to wipe out their cultures, largely crippled their 
traditional leadership and social structures, and energetically promoted fac-
tionalism. In a generation, the Zulus became a major source of wage laborers 
in South Africa, while the Sioux endured cultural loss and poverty in their 
reduced reservations.
In the nineteenth century, several military thinkers in Europe already were 
situating the U.S.–indigenous wars firmly in the framework of global imperial 
expansion. Charles E. Calwell, a British colonial war theorist, lumped the wars 
of the American West together with his analysis of European wars “against 
nature” in Africa and elsewhere. He suggested that in these wars, the indig-
enous fighters were not the principal adversary but the unforgiving climate, 
the heat, scorching deserts, diseases, and vast distances. Also, victories were 
achieved through mobility and perseverance. While Calwell’s analysis down-
played indigenous power, it is useful as a reminder of the linkages between the 
West and the world. Calwell emphasizes how long distances and problems in 
acclimatizing characterized many colonial wars from Sahara to the Southwest 
borderlands. As did wars against whole societies, their material base, and the en-
vironment. Equally common were arduous chases against an  indigenous enemy 
who seldom allowed decisive battles. Steeped in their Napoleonic,  Prussian, 
and earlier traditions of “western way of war,” standing battles were the one 
thing many Euro-Americans hoped to achieve but seldom did.
Nineteenth-century imperial warfare also shared ground in logistics and 
compositions of colonial armies. Whether they were penetrating the vast 
reaches of the Southwest borderlands, the Great Plains, the Caucasus, the 
 Sahara, Australia, the highlands and deserts of German Southwest Africa, or 
the dense rain forests of tropical Africa, getting there – the task of transporting 
troops, supplies, and animals to places distant from the centers of production 
and short on suitable transportation corridors – proved challenging for any 
colonial military force. Quite frequently there existed few roads that a large 
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force could follow and many armies welcomed river routes and the railroads 
in enabling them to relocate to the war zone. Still, much arduous marching 
was nearly always in the cards. Worse still, many armies had to haul their own 
food and supplies to the scene of operations and in the field, or they relied on 
porters to ease the task of white soldiers. For instance, the 1894 plans for the 
French invasion force in Madagascar included 18,000–20,000 porters and mule 
drivers for 12,000 soldiers. Much of what came was also unsuited for use; food 
spoiled, clothing in tatters and incompatible for the terrain and climate, horses 
were poorly acclimatized, and men inadequately trained and in terrible phys-
ical condition. Many soldiers were often sick, with malaria and other diseases 
taking their toll especially in the humid sections of Asia and Africa but also in 
the deserts of Sahara or the Southwest borderlands.
Despite the popular image of white soldiers penetrating distant and exotic 
 locales, colonial armies were typically multiethnic assemblages of men with 
varied geographical and cultural backgrounds, multiple understandings of vi-
olence, and different motivations. The top-rung typically consisted of whites 
from upper- or middle-class backgrounds, while in the lower tiers a mixture of 
working-class and/or immigrant whites shared space with nonwhite recruits. 
Often, local recruits proved crucial to the success of imperial armies, even in 
places you would not expect. According to historian Jonathan Richards, the na-
tive police played a prominent role in the conquest of Queensland. They formed 
the shock troops in a conflict widely understood as a war of extermination. The 
countless “martial races” the British employed included the Punjabi Muslims, 
Sikhs, and Gurkhas in India, the Wakamba in eastern Africa, the Sudanese in 
Egypt, Kaffir Corps and Malay Corps in Sri Lanka, and various units comprised 
of former slaves in the West Indies. From 1857, the Senegalese light infantry, or 
 Tirailleurs Sénégalais, gained a global reputation as the enforcer of French imperial 
ambitions in  Africa. The French preferred Sudanese recruits in Mexico, while 
King  Leopold’s rule in the Congo was grounded on a mercenary force made 
up mostly of Sudanese and local conscripts. Except for Southwest Africa, the 
 Germans enlisted African troopers into their colonial force, the Schutztruppe.
Empires typically did not confront unified peoples or singular nations and 
took advantage of existing grievances and power struggles, offering tempting 
rewards and lifestyles for conscripts. The askari recruited in German East Africa, 
for instance, hailed from diverse backgrounds and multiple vibrant military 
cultures. Many were Muslims from Sudan with a background in the Anglo- 
Egyptian army; others came from the tribes of southern Africa.  Historian 
 Michelle Moyd explains that they joined the German Schutztruppe to advance 
their own notions of manhood and to extend their social and material circum-
stances often destabilized by colonialism. What mattered was closely linked to 
everyday life; large households, acquisition of livestock, and the ability to act 
as patrons and power brokers. During the occupation of German East Africa, 
the askari enabled German rule as the executive arm of a violent conquest. Yet 
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the askari also carried diverse roles in state-making as tax collectors, police, ex-
ecutioners, etc. So did many other indigenous recruits in other colonial forces.
In the American West, indigenous recruits were usually home-grown tal-
ent recruited for specific purposes. After the Civil War, the U.S. Army was 
allowed to enlist no more than 1,000 indigenous men. While officially labeled 
“scouts,” these indigenous recruits were still often used in full combat du-
ties. This was particularly true with the Pawnees who engaged the Sioux on 
army payroll several times in the 1860s and 1870s and in the Southwest where 
 General George Crook in the early 1870s and then again in the mid-1880s was 
an enthusiastic supporter of using Apaches against Apaches. As men recruited 
for specific  operations, Pawnees, Apaches, and other indigenous enlistees bal-
anced between inclusion and exclusion as colonizer labor. They received equal 
pay with other troops, but their enlistment periods proved random and their 
membership in the military community appeared uncertain at best. They were 
typically ostracized by their white peers, and they did not have to do much 
manual labor or to behave, dress, and fight like other troops. Instead, the in-
digenous recruits were expected to use their individual skills and home-based 
training to the army’s advantage in combat operations, as spies, during negotia-
tions, and as reservation police. Yet they also found opportunities for advancing 
their personal and community interests in the service. They could use military 
service to advance their notions of manliness, to gain economic benefits in 
times of poverty, and forward family, clan, and community interests against 
their enemies.
If indigenous enlistees “hired out” to work in “foreign” armies, so did white 
soldiers of fortune. Anglo filibusters and mercenaries were involved in the 
 Yucatan Caste War; the enlisted personnel of the U.S. Army, while generally 
having little military experience, included several veterans whom had served in 
European armies. The global imperial arena also offered opportunities for offi-
cers, who had fought in the U.S.–indigenous wars and the Civil War. Among 
them was John Y. F. Blake, who fought as a lieutenant against the Chiricahua 
Apaches before ending up in South Africa and commanding the Irish  Brigade 
in the Boer War. As many as 50 Union and Confederate officers made new ca-
reers in Khedivi Ismail’s Egyptian Army. One such man was William  Loring, 
a South Carolinian with experience in the Mexican–American War, the 
 California gold rush, the Apache conflicts in New Mexico, and the Civil War. 
He was also a veteran of the invasion of Abyssinia in the mid-1870s.  Loring 
rose to the rank of colonel in the U.S. Army, major general in the Confeder-
ate Army, and a major general ( fereek pasha) in the Egyptian Army. Another 
ex-Confederate in Egypt was Henry Hopkins Sibley. He had tried to create a 
Confederate empire stretching to the Colorado mines and the Pacific, but his 
advance was cut short in New Mexico in 1862. He had also clashed against the 
Seminoles in Florida, participated in the Mexican–American War, fought over 
the spread of slavery in the Bleeding Kansas in the 1850s, and taken part in the 
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near war against the Mormons in Utah. A major in the U.S. Army, Sibley was 
a brigadier general in both the Confederate and the Egyptian armies.
And then there were men like Custer, who carried little personal experi-
ence abroad, but whose character and career demonstrated several parallels 
with other white military “heroes” of empires. While it seems that Colonel 
George Armstrong Custer and his demise at the Battle of Little Bighorn has 
been studied inside out, it has not been seriously connected to the world. 
We are yet to see the global Custer: his life compared, for instance, with 
Charles Gordon, the flamboyant, reckless, and much publicized British gen-
eral whose death at Khartoum in the hands of Islamist fighters both shocked 
the world and was made into a legend, not unlike Custer’s fall in the hands 
of the Sioux. Or how about Garnet Wolseley, another stalwart of the British 
Empire. Ambitious, snobbish, and an unapologetic and glory-hungry op-
portunist, Wolseley, much like Custer, practiced rampant favoritism. He 
also served in the North American West, leading British troops in Canada 
against the Metis when Custer was fighting the Indians further south on the 
Great Plains.
Genocide
For anyone interested in discussing the global linkages of Western violence, 
histories of genocide are at the same time one of the more interesting, po-
larizing, and, until recently, strangely absent issues in the field. Considering 
how much scholarship there has been written on violence in North America’s 
borderlands and frontiers over the years, there exists relatively little directly as-
sessing genocide in the American West. Recently, historians Benjamin  Madley, 
Brendan Lindsay, and Gary Clayton Anderson have, however, flamed the 
 interest, although Anderson prefers the term “ethnic cleansing” to genocide. 
While these discussions should not trump the vast diversity and multifaceted 
power dynamics that often characterized relations between peoples of various 
races, ethnicities, and nationalities in the West, historians might do well to 
ask if genocide and/or ethnic cleansing offer meaningful ways for establishing 
linkages between cases of extreme violence and mass killings in the American 
West and elsewhere.
While refusing to go away, genocide has traditionally been sidelined in 
Western history, irritating some and beckoning others. Many just refuse to 
believe in it, claiming the shoe does not fit or that it is anachronistic to use 
such a modern term to describe past incidents. But why is it such a volatile 
subject? Perhaps it is the idea of discussing U.S. and Western history on the 
same plane with the Nazis and the Holocaust. But if that is the main line of ar-
gument against genocide, then the debate has already been sidetracked. Instead 
we should look at the bigger picture: what are we actually talking about when 
we refer to genocide? What exactly can genocide mean?
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The Holocaust should not be synonymous with genocide, nor is it exclu-
sively representative of the phenomenon in world history if you consider the 
range of historical cases including Darfur, Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, or the 
Armenian genocide, not to mention the colonial genocides that took place in 
King Leopold’s Congo, British Tasmania, and German Southwest Africa. The 
Holocaust constitutes an extreme form of genocide not only because of its scale, 
well-documented plans, and industrial efficiency but also because few legiti-
mate parties today contest it.
To understand genocide in the American West and elsewhere, it is  crucial 
to have an agreed-upon definition and one logical starting point is the 1948 
United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide. It states that genocide includes
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a Killing members of the group;
b Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d Imposing measures intended to prevent births within group;
e Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The Convention also specifies that these acts shall be punishable as (a) genocide, 
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide, (c) direct or public incitement to commit 
genocide, (d) attempt to commit genocide, and (e) complicity to genocide.3
This definition is the most commonly used one and is followed in this 
chapter. It needs to be said that while the UN definition has often proved 
 unenforceable in a legal sense, it offers an internationally recognized rubric, a 
starting point and an analytical tool for scholars from different disciplines in-
vestigating potential cases of genocide across time.
For understanding the nature of genocide, we can go to the source, in a 
manner of speaking. The man responsible for coining the term “genocide” was 
a Polish legal scholar of Jewish parentage, Raphael Lemkin. It seems that he 
actually had both colonialism and the United States very much in mind. For 
Lemkin, genocide consisted of two phases: one, destruction of the national 
pattern of the oppressed group, and the other, the imposition of the national 
pattern of the oppressor. He did see mass killing as intrinsic to genocide, but 
emphasized that genocide can occur without massacres and executions. He also 
 3 United Nations, Resolution 260 (III) Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, the 
United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/RES/260%28III%29 (Accessed Oct. 4, 2017).
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saw the Holocaust – a term he apparently did not use – as a consequence of Nazi 
colonialism coveting living space for German settlers in Eastern  Europe and 
as the outcome of colonialism across the world, including in North America. 
Rather than viewing the Holocaust as a representative of genocide, he saw in 
the extra-European cases of colonial genocide the concept’s generic attributes. 
Projecting a global history of genocide in his unpublished writings,   Lemkin 
wrote of cases involving, among others, the Maoris of New Zealand, the 
 Australian Aborigines, the Herero and Nama in German Southwest Africa, and 
the  Natives of North America. His note cards reveal that he had plans to write, 
for instance, on the 1890 Wounded Knee Massacre, where the U.S. Army 
slaughtered a group of Sioux practicing religious revivalism of “ghost dance.”
Historians of Native America have commonly downplayed the role of 
violence while highlighting disease as the principal engine of demographic 
decline. Encouraging scholars to ask questions about genocidal violence, the 
 anthropologist Russell Thornton published the first scholarly overview in the 
mid-1980s arguing that genocide was one of the main causes in Native  American 
demographic downfall. He also emphasized that it rarely resulted in total ex-
termination of groups. Going a step further, American Indian Studies scholar 
Ward Churchill and American Studies scholar David Stannard make geno-
cide a  central factor in Native American population fall. Taking a hemispheric 
approach, Stannard follows a genocidal path from the late  fifteenth-century 
West Indies to Mexico, across Latin America, and then from Virginia and New 
England to the Plains, the Southwest, and the Pacific states. The destruction 
of the indigenous peoples was everywhere in the Americas. It amounted to a 
holy war and the most massive and sustained act of genocide in world history. 
Churchill shares this idea, proposing that the genocide of Native Americans 
is unparalleled in its size, ferocity, numbers of perpetrators, and the degree to 
which its goals were met.
Gold rush California and its wholesale murder, rape, and enslavement of 
California Indians by white settlers in the mid-1800s occupies much space in 
discussions of genocide in the West. In his reading of genocidal violence ex-
perienced by the Yuki Indians of California, the Aboriginal Tasmanians and 
the Herero of German Southwest Africa, Benjamin Madley identified three 
broad phases: invasion, state-sponsored mass murder, and lethal incarceration. 
First, the settlers, spurred by notions of empty lands and vanishing indige-
nous peoples, sought to grasp natural resources and lands for themselves, which 
led to intense conflicts of interest and rivalries between the settlers and the 
 Natives. In Tasmania, the settler boom came in 1828, in California in 1849, 
and in Southwest Africa a smaller influx commenced in the late 1890s. This 
also catalyzed the sexual abuse of indigenous women and killings of Natives 
by settlers. Driven into the corner, the indigenous peoples responded in kind. 
They organized violent uprisings against injustices in an effort to protect what 
was left of their economies and autonomy, regain access to vital resources, 
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and reclaim lost land. The Hereros revolted, California Indians robbed, and 
the Tasmanian Aborigines made small-scale raids. Colonizers responded with 
 disproportionate violence, including lynchings, massacres, and prolonged mil-
itary expeditions. Unable to quickly crush indigenous uprisings, some settlers 
began calling for extermination and sought to accomplish theirs aims either 
through vigilante, militia, or regular military operations. In the final phase, 
the surviving Natives were locked up in camps and reservations, or they were 
removed (as in Tasmania, to Flinders Island, where systematic malnutrition, 
inadequate medical attention, exposure, violence, overwork, and poor sanitary 
conditions continued the genocide). In all three cases, whites explained geno-
cide as inevitable and natural.
Historian Gary Clayton Anderson opts for an alternate interpretation for 
linking Western violence against Native Americans to an international con-
text. Using the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – crafted 
between 1998 and 2002 to establish the Court – as his guideline, he sees ethnic 
cleansing (which is not a separately listed crime in the Statute) not genocide as 
fitting for the experiences of Native Americans under the United States and its 
colonial antecedents. His studies address the history of Indian removal in the 
East, South, Minnesota, Texas, California, and elsewhere. In the nineteenth 
century, Texas, for example, state authorities, settlers, and Texas Rangers sys-
tematically sought to drive out the Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and other 
indigenous peoples. Ethnic cleansing means a forcible transfer or expulsion of 
population, a method for displacement rather than extermination. While it in-
volves killing, murder is not the primary goal, but rather ethnic cleansing often 
carries moral restraint that stops people from executing genocide.
One of the key problems in the study of genocide in the United States is 
the focus on judging the entire history of the continent from 1492 to the pres-
ent on a single stroke. Applied as a collective brand, one-size-fits-all Native 
 American genocide – or Holocaust, as Churchill, Stannard, and Thornton also 
call it – makes for splashy headlines. But when used in that manner, it falls short 
as an analytical tool for understanding place- and time-specific configurations 
of extreme violence. Proposing that all indigenous peoples throughout the 
United States and the hemisphere experienced a homogenous genocide post-
1492 poses a real danger, not only of overgeneralizing whites as all-powerful 
and wicked but also of casting all indigenous peoples as more or less victims. 
Neither proposition sits well with modern scholars, who underline entangled 
forms of power and differentiated forms of rule and who stress Native  American 
clout, persistence, and continuity. Hundreds of different indigenous powers re-
sisted, from various positions of power, the Spanish, the British, the French, the 
Russians, and the Americans, and neither the whites nor the Natives formed 
harmonious, unified entities. Thus it is no great surprise that oversized collec-
tive definitions of genocide tend to make historians wary of using the term. At 
worst genocide suggests a meticulously planned and executed killing spree that 
Violence 109
lasted for several generations and united people over national, class, and parti-
san lines across time and space in a shared murderous plot. It causes historians 
to think that the concept of genocide has the potential to flatten out the com-
plexities of the past by casting violence in the West, and elsewhere, in a singular 
mold, rather than taking into account its rich diversity of forms and meanings.
The dark cloud of genocide has the potential to cast a shadow over all of 
Western history and reduce the multiple shapes of violence under a totalizing 
formula. Instead of producing broad collective arguments over genocide, we, 
Madley insists, need detailed case studies, tribe-by-tribe, covering  particular 
interactions at particular times and places. He has suggested following four 
specific methods of inquiry – statements of genocidal intent, massacres, 
state-sponsored body-part bounties, and mass death in government custody – 
when evaluating, or ruling out, possible historical cases of genocide in the 
West. Basically, we should first study the trees and only after that make assess-
ments of what the forest looks like.
The debate on what counts as genocide in the West and in the world and 
what does not will likely continue. Some of the more pertinent questions with-
out solid answers include, but are not limited to: what constitutes a group and 
who gets to define it? Does it have to be destroyed in its entirety (after all, 
millions of Jews survived the Holocaust)? Does scale, the number of casualties, 
matter, and if so, how? Should we count genocide rates for different communi-
ties and areas in the manner quantitative historians count homicide rates? Does 
genocide require government planning, organizing, and implementation? If so, 
then at what level of government: federal, state, provincial, or local? Does it 
have to be a government action, or government-sanctioned action, at all? Do 
we need a paper trail, written statements to ascertain intent, or do actions speak 
louder than words? Did genocide not happen if diseases destroyed the bulk of 
a certain group, while only some were killed deliberately either before the dis-
eases finished the job or after the microbes left some people alive?
How about genocide in the early West? Lemkin already had plans to study 
Spanish genocide in the Americas. Do Spanish missions in California, where 
indigenous death rates proved staggering, or their massacre of the Tiguex in 
1540, their mass murder at Acoma in 1599, and the whole period in New 
 Mexico up to the 1680 Pueblo uprising qualify as genocide? Furthermore, do 
the perpetrators of genocide in Western history always need to be whites? This 
is certainly not the case elsewhere in the world. Just think of Rwanda, Darfur, 
or the Khmers in Cambodia, for instance. While scholarship today underscores 
indigenous power, does it make any sense to take this trend so far as to exam-
ine whether the Comanches might have been genocidal against the Apaches 
in the 1700s or the Sioux against the Pawnees and the Crows during the next 
century? I am not suggesting that they were, but perhaps we ought to ask even 
these kinds of questions when making sense of the scope and role of genocide 
in Western history.
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In many ways, violence seems integral for grasping Western history in the 
world. It took many shapes, factoring in personal, group, national, and imperial 
empowerment and loss. It blended interpersonal violence, vigilantism, raiding, 
total war, and genocide and involved conquest, taking of land,  extermination of 
groups, control over resources and labor, as well as ethnic suppression. Violence 
contributed to strong military cultures and to the building of settler societies in 
the West and around the world. Violence could make local communities and 
 relations – both conflictive and cooperative – within and  between groups. It could 
also split peoples and communities apart, marking and escalating divisions. Used 
for stability, violence often caused instability. Used for controlling people, violence 
often proved uncontrollable. In the end, Western violence spilled across national 
boundaries and came with multidirectional global connections and parallels.
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inTimAcies oF emPires
Born to a respected New England family in 1863, Elaine Goodale East-
man functioned within a middle-class Victorian culture that tended to link 
white women like her with fragility, virtue, tenderness, and gentility and that 
 expected them to safeguard the morality and respectability of their household, 
community, race, nation, and empire through domesticity. Very much a par-
agon of Victorian womanhood, Elaine embodied middle-class respectability 
through her writings and her role as a wife, a mother, and a teacher. She was 
also one of those numerous settler women who actively partook in the world-
wide attempts to transplant the era’s middle-class domesticity to colonized 
spaces and who used the domestic sphere to civilize the nonwhite world. Yet, in 
her own way, she also challenged the prevailing notions of propriety, stretched 
the parameters of white respectability, and contested narrow definitions of civ-
ilization and race.
College-educated and an avid writer from childhood, Elaine taught Native 
American children from the early 1880s onward. She worked at the Hampton 
Institute in Virginia and then in a day school she set up at the Lower Brulé Sioux 
agency in today’s South Dakota. Later she worked at the Carlisle Indian School 
in Pennsylvania. Wanting the respect of the Sioux, she associated closely with 
them at the Lower Brulé. She preferred Sioux companions to whites and spent 
her vacations traveling the reservation. She also became fluent in the Sioux 
language and adopted some of their housing and dress. For most  middle-class 
whites, this kind of behavior would have indicated alarming signs of racial 
and cultural slippage, of contamination and condition the white colonizers 
around the world knew as “going native.” Defying prevailing conceptions of 
propriety even further, in 1891 Elaine married Charles Eastman, a boarding 
school-educated Sioux medical doctor. Their wedding was held in New York, 
and it proved a social curiosity that was commented on widely, including two 
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sensationalist articles in the New York Times. Placed in the spotlight, the couple 
would go on to have six children, who were considered and who themselves 
identified Native. Explicitly linking her career and conjugal arrangement – the 
public and the private realm – Elaine represented the marriage as a logical ex-
tension of her devotion to the Native people. While interracial marriages in 
colonial situations were typically associated with the degeneration of the white 
race and the pollution of white women by nonwhite men, Elaine apparently 
was quite successful in extending the parameters of middle-class respectability. 
As historian Katherine Ellinghaus remarks, many of her white contemporaries 
also saw Elaine’s marriage as connected to her vocation of civilizing Native 
Americans. Of course, it helped that she was both a middle-class lady and an 
educator and that her husband was a college-educated professional, a reformed 
and “civilized” Indian.
Attending the influential gatherings of reformers at the Lake Mohonk con-
ferences of the Friends of the Indian, Elaine remained an activist after be-
coming a wife and a mother. Thus while she channeled Victorian norms of 
domesticity to Natives as a teacher, she nevertheless challenged those same con-
ventions that sought to contain married women inside their households. She, 
moreover, went against the prevalent policy that favored the removal of Native 
children to off-reservation boarding schools, where the children were not only 
physically separated from their families, often by considerable distance, but also 
subjected to a curriculum and discipline that targeted the eradication of their 
cultures. Elaine preferred reservation day schools where white teachers could 
personally reach and impact the homes of Indian children. Rather than wipe 
out all Indianness, she, historian Margaret Jacobs mentions, strove for a more 
moderate assimilationist policy where Indians could take some aspects of white 
culture and yet retain their language and clothing, for instance. Perhaps this 
had something to do with her own family situation, as her biracial children 
were potential candidates for removal and assimilation themselves.
Back in Amherst, Massachusetts, in the early 1900s, the Eastmans struggled 
to uphold their middle-class veneer as Charles’s medical career was repeatedly 
hindered by racial barriers. Yet, they ran an “Indian-style” summer camp for 
white girls in the New England wilderness, published numerous writings, and 
engaged in lecture tours where Charles related his Native cultural heritage and 
experiences to white middle-class audiences eager for “authentic” Indianness. 
Charles’s extramarital relations caused the couple to split in 1921, but they never 
officially divorced. Through her writings, Elaine kept on building a public 
 image of herself as an angel of civilization working on the front lines of Native 
American assimilation. She claimed identity as a maternalist, a savior of Native 
lives, and a promoter of Native cause and humanity. She was hardly a “rebel” or 
social outcast, but rather every bit the middle-class lady who embraced, tested, 
and operated the intimacies of empire on multiple planes. Preoccupation with 
the civilizing mission, interracial sex, middle-class respectability, domesticity, 
118 Global Circulations
and whiteness were themes that resonated far beyond the Eastmans and the 
settler colonial West. In fact, they spanned across the global colonial map and 
demonstrated how power rested and operated in the intimacies of empires.
The central tension at the heart of colonial projects in the modern era re-
volves around the rule of difference. This typically manifests itself in the seem-
ingly paradoxical preoccupation with creating distance, of differentiating and 
excluding “Others,” especially Natives, on the one hand and the urge to close 
that gap, to civilize those “Others” and make them more like us (meaning 
whites of European extraction) through erasing their cultures and identities 
on the other. To put it differently, efforts to establish frameworks of difference 
that distinguished whites from nonwhites/Natives operated together and in 
tension with a civilizing mission, a determination to erase difference (at least 
to a degree) through the universalization of white norms, customs, and prac-
tices. This, in turn, would potentially validate colonialism as a benevolent 
enterprise. Thus, as colonial empires in the 1800s and 1900s were driven by 
the idea of  Euro-American (white) identity as superior in comparison with 
all the nonwhite peoples and cultures, they tried to make the world to better 
 correspond to their notions by importing their norms, values, and practices and 
making these the universal standards. In these processes built on asymmetries 
of race, class, and gender, as discussed by anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler, 
colonial rule infiltrated the most intimate domains in people’s lives, turning 
households, leisure, education, conjugality, and sexuality – the social fabric 
of the everyday – into dense transfer points of power and anxiety. Matters of 
the intimate and affective dimensions – respectability, sentiments, desires, and 
bodies – in fact served as the very grounds for the creation and maintenance 
of colonial power, historians Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton remark. 
Played out across the transnational imperial terrain, crossing borders, connect-
ing empires, given new meanings in specific colonial social orders, and riddled 
with, Stoler points out, tense and tender ties, these intimacies of empires were 
products of  accumulating interconnections within a specific global field. Fueled 
by  transnational anxieties, they both marked and blurred community/racial 
 membership, management of self and subject peoples, and the boundaries be-
tween “us” and “them.” They also linked the West and the world.
Performing Whiteness
When reaching across the globe, white settlers, administrators, soldiers, traders, 
missionaries, and other representatives of the colonial powers formed heteroge-
neous and disharmonious communities riddled with class divisions, competing 
political and economic agendas, and contending ideologies and discourses. In 
this context, whiteness itself was contested, stratified, and hierarchical, and it 
was closely associated with power. Gentleman’s status had traditionally rested 
on possession of landed estates and on personal disdain for labor coupled with 
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devotion to leisure, while success in commerce made the bourgeois elite. While 
Britain’s gentry possibly set something like the global norm for middle-class 
gentility in the nineteenth century, in colonial situations whiteness equaled 
something that was performed on a daily basis as men and women of varied 
vocations and backgrounds positioned themselves as heirs of Enlightenment, 
bearers of civilization, brave liberators, honorable gentlemen, true ladies, cul-
tured, and moral. They did this hoping to matter as emblems of a transnational 
middle-class, Victorian, culture and to establish difference against the host 
populations in the colonies.
Some whites carved common ground, for instance, through the ideology of 
Anglo-Saxonism. They found authority in notions of self-proclaimed ethnic, 
political, and moral superiority of individuals and traditions of British  origin. 
The Anglo-Saxons ostensibly excelled in the Darwinistic contest between men, 
representing the highest form of culture and civilization and conquering lands 
in all corners of the planet. While notions of Anglo-Saxonism indicated hierar-
chies of privilege and power, these kinds of rankings characteristically revolved 
around “respectability” in colonial situations. Respectability in turn was a ten-
uous shorthand for a whole range of desirable character traits and habits. It de-
noted standards of living and a set of cultural competencies; it correlated with 
profession, family, home, personal outlook, leisure, socializing, and character. 
People could gain respectability through their lifestyles, living arrangements, 
and appearance; by embracing certain values and practices. They could also lose 
it; “go native,” become poor “white trash,” and risk their whiteness altogether. 
Fluid, liminal, and subject to negotiation, respectability and with it racial iden-
tity habitually denoted more than skin tone alone. To acquire European legal 
equivalence in the Dutch East Indies in the 1880s, for instance, one had to be a 
Christian, speak and write Dutch, have a European upbringing and education, 
and demonstrate suitability for European society. It was also possible to acquire 
white status through marriage to or adoption by a European.
White middle-class women held a key role in the communication and val-
idation of respectability, race, and civilization. According to the  Victorian-era 
norms, it was the job of the woman to “create home,” to “revitalize the 
community,” and to “build the nation” wherever she went. However, white 
women occupied an ambiguous position across the colonial terrain. Perceived 
as paragons of racial purity with an instant civilizing impact, women were 
also depicted as highly vulnerable and in need of constant and vigorous pro-
tection against the dangerous colonial environment and the primitive sexual 
aggressions of Native men. Thus the entry of white women often caused great 
anxiety, or it was closely monitored or restricted. When traveling overland to 
Arizona in the 1870s, Martha Summerhays, a New England wife, was given 
a gun by his husband. He made Martha swear that she would use it on herself 
in case the Apaches attacked because if captured a fate worse than death, de-
noting sexual slavery, surely awaited her. In the hill stations of British India, 
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the cultured single women, known as the “fishing fleet,” who arrived from 
England each year to locate husbands among the bachelor officers and civil 
servants, were tightly chaperoned during their stay, so as to prevent intimate 
transgressions and to guard them against Indian men. Several European and 
American commercial enterprises – including tobacco companies and banks – 
operating in Africa, India, and Southeast Asia limited marriage among their 
white employees during the first years of service, while some prohibited it 
altogether. Furthermore, white enlisted men in colonial armies, including the 
U.S. frontier army, were often recruited among the bachelors and were strongly 
encouraged not to marry during their service.
These policies not merely served to protect white women from Native 
 aggression but were also meant to prevent the proliferation of a lower-class 
white population, a proletariat who would not afford a “respectable life.” In 
many colonies, there existed a growing anxiety that poorly paid white workers 
would not have the money needed for maintaining a respectable marriage, a 
household, and a lifestyle suitable to a white wife. This could in turn lead to 
poverty and prostitution to white women being sullied by the touch of non-
white men. What these anxieties actually did lead to was a shortage of white 
women. This gender imbalance in the colonies, in turn, actively contributed 
to the prevalence of interracial sex and concubinage as white men turned to 
Native women for intimate companionship.
While these commonplace apprehensions over white women applied to 
 settler colonial projects alike, it was also the case that settler colonialism 
especially depended as much or more on founding mothers as on founding 
fathers. To put it simply, no white women meant no settler colonial futures. 
Thus, rather than restrict their presence, settler colonies tried to lure respect-
able female settlers through promotional literature, assisted emigration, and 
cheap land. It comes of little surprise that in this cultural fabric women were 
again closely associated with the roles of the wife and the mother. Their sta-
tus was often defined by their sexual restraint and dedication to their home, 
husband, and children. In the American West, women’s  literature at large 
praised the merits of domesticity, maternalism, virtue, purity, and passivity, 
or what historians refer to as “true womanhood.” In French, British, and 
Dutch colonial manuals, the message was very much the same: white women 
were offered detailed instructions to ensure a happy home, proper social 
order, and good hygiene. They were also to prevent any  laxity in morals. 
As historian Margaret Strobel observes, in colonialism white middle-class 
women became associated with daily rituals of racialized rule, elevated 
 standards of living, and more insulated social spaces built and moderated 
according to metropolitan norms. They would lead the civilization of the 
colonial spaces through personal example and their presence put new de-
mands on white communities to clarify their racial and class boundaries and 
mark out their social space.
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In colonial armies, where marriage was by and large the privilege of officers, 
wives often had no official status. Yet, they enacted social norms, modeled ap-
propriate racial, gender, and class relations, and confidently executed their duty 
as domestic imperial agents. For the wives, the home operated as a microsite of 
empire, historian Verity McInnis contends. In the American West and in British 
India, the wives commanded the household and subordinated domestic workers 
through racial discrimination and the feminization of male servants, while si-
multaneously enacting the social norms of the metropole. In German  Southwest 
Africa, historian Lora Wildenthal explains, the  German middle-class wife was 
purportedly able to preserve and strengthen the  German race. Her presence was 
necessary to reinforce the moral backbone of German male settlers tempted by 
local women and to counteract interracial relations (as  German men supposedly 
always preferred German women over Natives). She was needed to steer and 
motivate German men toward productive  enterprises and other pioneering ac-
tivities. Moreover, it was essential to produce racially pure offspring and nurse 
and educate a moral and hardworking next generation of settlers. The list of 
stock features and tasks of this “ideal” German colonial woman would suit any 
number of other settler colonial  locales, including the West.
Expected to produce prudent, ordered, and spotless family spaces, women 
often faced an uphill struggle. In the summer of 1871, Lieutenant Frederick 
Phelps and his new bride Mary arrived at Fort Bayard, New Mexico. Com-
ing from established Ohio families of college-educated teachers, lawyers, and 
judges, the Phelps’ felt unease in the isolated post hundreds of miles from the 
closest mark of civilization, the railroad. Their social circle was restricted to 
the few officers and their wives stationed at the post. Besides, there was nothing 
“proper” to eat as government rations entailed beef, coffee, bacon, sugar, and 
little else. Also, if not for a bachelor officer who let them have his house, the 
Phelps’ home would have been a tent. Even this house seemed hardly worth 
the title. It was originally meant as a stable. Renovated, it now came with a 
parlor that had one wall of stones, one of adobe, one of pine logs set on end, and 
one of slabs from the sawmill. Rough boards covered the floor, canvas acted 
as the ceiling and mud as the roof. The only window had an immovable sash. 
The smaller room in the house had no window at all, and its floor was of hard 
smooth mud. This was hardly the ideal middle-class residence. Phelps’ home 
also included two tents, one used as a dining room and the other as a kitchen. 
Furthermore, the house looked very much occupied: by a number of tarantulas, 
centipedes, and the occasional snake.
Ideally for middle-class Victorians such as the Phelps, home mattered as an 
important symbol that expressed the respectability of its inhabitants by showing 
how they could emulate idealized middle-class domesticity. This is why Fort 
Bayard proved such a shock. And one needs to acknowledge that in colonial 
settings, middle-class domesticity was not merely the concern of married offi-
cers and their wives. In British India, for example, bachelor officers often joined 
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together to rent a bungalow and furnish their home “European-style” with 
rented furniture. Furthermore, the concept of “home” stretched to include not 
only bachelor and family housing, but also boarding houses, immigrant hostels 
and lodges, all ideally offering residents a familiar and familial environment 
through their food, conversations, values, décor, and atmosphere.
Household commodities played a key role in creating a proper “home” as they 
marked close connections and similarities between the “civilized world” and the 
colonial domains. In her examination of cosmopolitan domesticity,  historian 
Kristin Hoganson recognizes that bourgeois households proved enthusiastic for 
imported goods and styles, especially European artistic production and cultural 
attainments, but that some of them also valorized ethnographic and geographical 
knowledge when it came to household décor. Staging the whole civilized world 
in their households, many middle-class whites in the colonies arrived abun-
dantly supplied or used mail-order houses such as Sears and Montgomery Ward 
that sprung up in the late 1800s. Furniture, wallpaper, matting, and portraits 
were used to create homes that looked welcoming, cozy, and familiar. It was the 
growth of transoceanic shipping and the railroads that caused consumer prod-
ucts, foodstuffs, and other manufactured items to flood colonial spaces, reducing 
their transports costs and times, and thus enabling a “home-like” diversity and 
elegance in selection. This meant that more and more colonial homes came 
armed with such bourgeois trappings as sewing machines, pianos, linen, shawls, 
china, chairs, mattresses, and matting for the floors. Important also were the 
scores of pictures, mountains of newspapers, and piles of books (from cooking 
manuals and dime novels to children’s fairytales and literary classics).
It was not just the items, but their use that gave them meaning. In more dis-
tant outposts, books and newspapers were kept and stored and read over and over 
again, sometimes out loud, sometimes in private. Some resorted to rationing the 
meager news supply by, for example, reading one paper per day. They could place 
the paper on the breakfast table so that whoever read it could imagine he/she was 
a civilized person who lived in a civilized home “in the real world” reading the 
news of the day, no matter how old the paper actually was.  Maintaining their 
“high standards” and civilized ways, Kenya’s white settlers insisted on having 
afternoon tea and dressing for dinner, as did other colonizers across the British 
Wests. Whites also put a lot of stress on eating: on what they ate, how the meals 
were organized, and what kind of tableware was used. While colonialism fos-
tered plenty of culinary mixing, certain food stuffs, some of them initially of 
non-European origin, like potatoes, butter, milk, bacon, and white flour, as well 
as canned delicacies like oysters, acted as markers of civilized life and were trans-
ported across the West and the world. Imported whiskey and cigars played a sim-
ilar purpose, albeit one more masculine in tone. Other household and hygienic 
products associated with civilized whiteness abounded: body soap, face creams, 
powder, laundry detergent, bleach, and toothbrushes and toothpaste were part 
of the white people’s commodities “cleansing” and “whitening” the colonized 
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terrain. Soap especially was widely used as a metaphor for colonization, for civ-
ilizing peripheral areas and its “dark and filthy” Natives.
Thus, respectable homes and proper whiteness also concerned appearance 
and the body. Regardless of their actual amount of attiring, Natives were 
 typically identified as naked, or half-clad, while whites were represented as 
decently and properly dressed in white people’s texts. Because white skin was 
a vestige of civilization, the colonizers, especially women, took pains to keep 
their skins pale in the West and in other colonial settings. Whether the women 
covered their bodies with full skirts, long-sleeves, and high-necked clothing, 
or possibly adapted and used khaki skirts and plain white shirts, they seldom 
exposed their extremities to the sun. They also used brimmed hats – or, like 
their men and children, pitch helmets – as well as gloves to safeguard their 
hands from exposure to the elements.
Housing, dress, and food marked social space where whites were stratified 
by class distinctions but from which Natives were barred, except as servants. 
Servants occupied the inner recesses of bourgeois life, enabling middle-class 
lifestyles, keeping settler homes running, and mediating between the home 
and the outside space. Thousands of Europeans and white Americans migrated 
to colonial spaces to take jobs as house servants, nursemaids, and cooks. And 
there existed a constant need for white female servants, who would protect the 
domestic sphere from racial and cultural contamination that the use of  Native 
servants might subject the white household members to. Furthermore, the 
nineteenth-century practice of indicating social distance between middle-class 
and working-class white females by reserving the title of “ladies” to the former 
also applied to the colonies. Yet, the paucity of white women willing to work as 
domestics and the fact that new hires were often quickly lost to marriages com-
plicated the divide and enabled upward mobility among working-class white 
women. Moreover, more often than not the servants proved a racially mixed 
lot, and they included plenty of men as well as women. Army officers had their 
batman (British India) and striker (American West) to provide invaluable ser-
vice, yet both groups of soldier-servants were feminized by the officers’ wives. 
Often the middle-class people hired whomever they managed to get. They 
brought with them former black slaves or employed Mexican or Chinese men 
and women. Unlike in the Eastern states, the Chinese made up a large part of 
the household servant pool in the West, especially in urban environments.
The drive to transplant and perform respectable whiteness – to both 
 reinforce the barriers between respectable people and others, whether lower- 
class whites or colonized others, as well as to reduce the imagined difference 
between colony and metropole – also reached outside of homes to leisure and 
public spaces. Leisure functioned as a vital ritual consisting of carefully or-
chestrated performances, often to restricted membership. There was nothing 
better than proper dances, dinner parties, masquerades, picnics, and amateur 
theatricals to showcase class and racial sensibilities and level of respectability. 
124 Global Circulations
Social calls were equally imperative in performing whiteness and practiced 
routinely by army officers and civilians alike. So was clubbing. Most famous in 
the British  Indian context, it also spread worldwide and entailed networking, 
social cohesion among the elite, and specific customs built around coffee- and 
tea-drinking, eating, card playing, cigar-smoking, and whiskey-sipping.
While sweating and toiling was unbecoming of a gentleman, many middle- 
class whites, especially in British India, were enthusiastic toward sports, notes 
historian Byron Farwell. They engaged in polo, cricket, poon (badminton), and, 
of course, hunting. In the nineteenth century, hunting was widely considered 
a sport suitable for gentlemen. There being no foxes in India, the wily jackal 
proved an adequate substitute. In the American West, well-to-do  businessmen 
and European aristocracy organized numerous hunting extravaganzas on the 
Plains (see Chapter 5). The U.S. Army officers’ corps also  included many en-
thusiasts who would go hunting anytime and anywhere. They prepared hunt-
ing trips that lasted several days or weeks. Sometimes a supply of horses and 
dogs were used, copycatting European aristocratic practices.
And then there were the retreats. Hot and humid climates were perceived 
as especially dangerous to white women and children. Developed in the early 
nineteenth century as sites for military stations and sanatoriums, hill stations 
in cooler altitudes in British India proved hugely popular. Importantly, they 
provided home-like environments. The Nilgiri railway in South India en route 
to the hill stations of Konoor and Ootacamund had stations such as  Allderly, 
 Hillgrove, Runnymeade, Wellington, and Lovelade whose mere names 
 resonated with familiarity. With their modest yet English-looking buildings, 
these stations echoed the comfort and quiet of far-off, rural, England and sig-
nified the attempted recreation of home away from home. In the North, on 
the foothills of the Himalayas, Simla was for six months a year the practical 
capital of British India for both the military and civilian upper echelons. In 
1903, Simla had a Gothic-style church, a promenade (forbidden to Indians), 
and  numerous shops offering British and other Euro-American goods. It also 
boasted a Royal Hotel for the visitors, as well as over 1,400 European houses.
In the West, the scale was perhaps more modest, but the idea very much the 
same. Take, for instance, the army officers from Fort Grant, Arizona, who had 
a retreat built for themselves up in the 1880s in the nearby Mount Graham for 
use during the hot summer period. This quickly became a favorite resort for 
officers, their families, and visitors, who, with the necessary servants, went to 
enjoy the grassy flat bordering a small stream of cold water and surrounded by 
pines, aspen, and other trees. Unsurprisingly, enlisted men were ordered to cut 
trees and construct log cabins for elite use. When the soldiers labored, officers 
and their guests often ascended the summit of Mount Graham to catch the 
grand views of mountain ranges and long broad valleys that reached Mexico. 
The evenings they spent around campfires talking and singing, as soldier cooks 
prepared lofty meals for them. A special pack train operated between this re-
treat and the fort, keeping the former amply supplied.
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Colonial urban enclaves in the American West and in places such as  Victoria, 
Australia, Nairobi, Kenya, Windhoek, German Southwest Africa, Calcutta, 
 India, Hong Kong, or Singapore, identified with civilization through architec-
ture, through imposing administrative buildings, churches, and elegant private 
homes modeled after the metropole. The choice of building materials played a 
similar function as whites preferred brick, mortar, or wood and contrasted them 
with Native “mud” or bush structures. The layout built around the grid and pub-
lic parks, and street design with their straight lines and wide streets and avenues 
further cemented the community’s association with civilization and respectabil-
ity. Living apart from the civilian population, the cantonments and forts of colo-
nial armies represented experiments in modernity where middle-class ideas and 
ideals of public space and domesticity, as envisioned and transplanted by the of-
ficers and their wives, were played out. The typical U.S. Army posts in the West 
displayed a village-like layout. It promoted mastery over nature – exemplified by 
the urge for landscaping and other improvements – and proper social divisions 
thorough hierarchical housing. The masses  (enlisted men) lived in inferior, stuffy, 
and overcrowded barracks and the elite (officers and their  families) in individual 
homes of refinement and taste. All this was meant to offer an example of what 
a respectable civilized settlement looked like. Many other colonial communities 
also displayed a hierarchical and segregated layout in housing. Respectable peo-
ples were secluded from lower classes and from the nonwhite neighborhoods of 
“China towns,” “Mexican towns,” or “Native quarters.”
With their elegant homes, imposing structures, organized layout, straight 
lines, and orderly public spaces, communities were meant to signal moder-
nity, power, and white prestige when imposing Euro-American forms on 
formerly indigenous spaces. Those uncolonized spaces were connected with 
images of vacant emptiness or wilderness, while certain kinds of landscapes, 
quite frequently deserts, were represented as wastelands. Native villages, in 
turn,  frequently stood for dirty, unordered domains of mud houses, bush 
dwellings, or holes in the ground. For Sarah Harris, an English settler in New 
Zealand, the Maori domestic spaces were more fitting for animals than for 
humans, while Frederick Phelps thought little better of the Apache homes he 
saw in New Mexico. Still, many white colonizers were forced to live in tents or 
huts with sand floors, mud walls, and shrub roofs. The Plains had their sod huts 
and the Southwest borderlands teemed with adobe structures, while settlers in 
Kenya built bandas, made of wattle and daub in the fashion of black Kenyans. 
The urban atmosphere was also often far from gentile with saloons, gambling 
halls, brothels, and rowdy residents occupying public spaces. The daughter of a 
colonial administrator, M. H. Hamilton, remembered how towns in interwar 
Kenya could “only be likened to the towns of the old American West” with 
“their reckless Wild West atmosphere (Figure 4.1).”1
 1 Quoted in Riley, Taking Land, 92–93.
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In their efforts to domesticate and claim control over the colonized terrain, 
whites also tried to shape the land to meet their expectations. They turned out en-
thusiastic amateur scientists: gazing, sampling, and collecting flora and fauna. They 
brought seeds and planted gardens of vegetables, rolling green laws, and flowers. 
Rows of familiar trees surrounded settler homes and communities whether on the 
Australian Outback or on the Great Plains. Often little regard was given to the 
suitability of the natural surroundings to any particular kind of plant. For a colonial 
place to be claimed “civilized,” it needed European greenery. One woman in Kenya 
explained that “it was proverbial of the English that they love to make two blades of 
grass grow where there was one before.”2 It was also equally proverbial of the set-
tlers entering the West, those invading French Algeria, and numerous others places.
You can scarcely conceive what pleasure it gives us to walk out and see so 
many houses, gardens with corn growing, fine roads and boat building, 
in less than two years, when we landed no houses, no cattle, no poultry, 
no vegetables but native potatoes and pumpkins, no roads, in fact nothing 
but pigs and potatoes.
 2 Quoted in Riley, Taking Land, 128.
FiGure 4.1  Custer County, Nebraska Historical Society_NHS10766. “My little 
German home across the sea.”
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claimed Sarah Harris when describing the conditions in the 1840s at New 
Plymouth on the west coast of New Zealand’s North Island.3
Marred by constant fears over losing their sense of self as well as home 
and of losing touch with civilization in a strange land, respectable white-
ness was also about connections. Affective ties of home and family, colony 
and metropole, were performed in private letters. They allowed a person to 
bridge the  separation created by distance and to occupy and meditate between 
the  familiarity of the metropole and the strangeness of colonies. As historian 
 Angela Woollacott shows, personal correspondence was a lifeline that created 
and funneled knowledge and embodied connections between the settlers place 
of residence – in her example, the Australian colonies – and the globalizing 
world – including India, the West Indies, Canada, and beyond. Correspon-
dence thus conjoined personal stories and lives with the story of the nation and 
the world. Given the need to maintain contacts, home leaves also were import-
ant. Such stints offered opportunities to “tank up” on civilization, to rejuvenate 
family ties, embark on civilized activities, and recharge self-belief so that one 
could then return to the colonial ground full of energy and confidence.
Whites strived to show that colonial spaces participated in the Victorian pre-
scriptions for middle-class respectability and that good people could perform 
proper whiteness practically anywhere in the world. It resulted not merely in 
unpredictable outcomes but in what seemed like a perennial struggle against 
the colonial milieu as one sought to bridge what was often a considerable gap 
 between desirable level of refinement and reality. Colonizer lifestyles were often 
far from practical. Heavy clothing, food that was hard to digest, expensive, diffi-
cult to obtain, and that went rancid characterized everyday lives. As did furniture 
that retained the heat, rotted, and fell apart. Proper leisure failed to materialize 
as the lack of social peers meant a corresponding lack of entertainment. Whites 
typically were forced to improvise in home décor. Homemade furniture was 
“dressed up” with flower and other decorations, newspapers acted as wallpaper, 
and curtains were made from old sheets or petticoats. They also had to rely on 
packing crates as furniture, making boxes and chests into chairs, lounges, sofas, 
cupboards, wardrobes, desks, and bookcases. Following weeks of improvements, 
their house at Fort Bayard became quite cozy and comfortable, Frederick Phelps 
assured. It was now suited for a middle class to live in, socialize with their peers, 
and to showcase as proof of their status. Still, others were never satisfied. What 
troubled them was that the houses did not live up to the  standards or provide 
much security against the elements. Not only snakes and other wildlife, but fires 
as well damaged homes. Locusts stormed settler spaces with devastating intensity 
from the Great Plains to Kenya. Martha Summerhayes remembered her life at 
Ehrenberg on the Colorado River in the 1870s: “the desert literally blew into 
 3 Quoted in Cozzens, “With a Pretty Little Garden at the Back,” 515.
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the house,” leaving “a deep layer of sand on everything on the room, and on 
our perspiring bodies.” One storm was “so bad,” Summerhayes noted, that her 
servant “had to use a shovel to remove the sand from the floors.”4
As middle-class domesticity sought to create islands of civilization amidst a 
sea of darkness, it not merely enabled the creation of a series of others but was 
meant to control whites. One sphere of anxiousness was to prevent social lapses 
and racial degeneration that would result from “going native.” Closely entan-
gled with an overriding concern over white prestige, “going native” meant 
 different things in different colonial situations. It usually signified fears that 
whites would adapt local customs and habits, thus blurring who was who. This 
would result in an absence of boundaries, of falling beneath one’s class status 
or losing one’s whiteness. This was seen as a potential pitfall for particularly 
lower-class whites. The concern over the presence of poor, “unfit” whites was a 
widespread phenomenon on different colonial frontiers. In British India and the 
Dutch East Indies, European pauperism was a real social problem, reportedly 
affecting as much as half of the white population. South Africa was calculated 
to have some 300,000 poor whites in the 1920s. Many of these were sent back 
home, others were forced into workhouses, while various relief organizations 
were set up to feed them.
Yet, middle-class peoples also needed to convince others and themselves 
that residency in the colonies had not reduced them to savagery. In these cases, 
degeneration was often seen as a result of distance from civilization and respect-
able white community. Colonial medicine affirmed a version of this slippage as 
a mental disorder, often diagnosed as Neurasthenia, a major problem in French 
and Dutch colonies. It could reveal itself through social choices: for instance, if 
a person mingled with the wrong crowd or cohabited with a Native woman. 
This “disease” claimed a victim also when a white person embraced nonwhite 
lifestyles, appearance, and dress. White children who played with Native peers 
and mimicked their dress and behavior were thought especially vulnerable, in 
danger of absorbing local languages and customs at the expense of their own 
white cultures. Much anxiety also surrounded the use of Native nursemaids 
and house servants who possibly introduced white children Native customs, 
foods, and languages. Making sure their offspring would grow up “white,” 
scores of middle-class parents sent their children to Europe, or back “east” in 
the American West, for schooling.
Going native could also be a sign of individual resistance and defiance against 
middle-class social protocol. Expressing a willingness to question  middle-class 
norms and conventions, it could signal an escape toward the formation of al-
ternate, hybrid, identities. There were educated men like Johann Baptist von 
Anzer, a German missionary in late-1800s China, who represented himself 
 4 Quoted in Lahti, Cultural Construction, 166.
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as a hybrid of a Chinese mandarin and a Catholic bishop through his attire, 
customs, and living arrangements. Von Anzer further shocked the middle-class 
audiences and earned their criticism by advocating indigenous priesthood. 
While doing fieldwork at the Zuni Pueblo, the anthropologist Frank  Hamilton 
Cushing engaged in mimetic modern escapism by dressing as a Zuni and par-
ticipating in their rituals. He became something of a celebrity through his open 
performance of a Zuni identity and when decorating his New York apartment 
in what he perceived was the authentic Zuni fashion for a kiva. While this kind 
of cross-cultural boundary hopping, of becoming the “Other,” was viewed 
with suspicion, playacting and dressing in Indian costume, building teepees, 
and living “like a Native” in the outdoors also hit the mainstream. It was es-
pecially poignant with the Boy Scouts, a movement initiated by the English 
Lord Robert Baden-Powell, a veteran of several colonial wars in Africa, and 
other such transnational organizations that encouraged youngsters to act out 
the  Native and settler experience. In these situations, performing whiteness 
actually entailed performing “nativeness” by copycatting and appropriating 
indigenous customs, dress, and cultures for the benefit of the settler societies.
Parameters of race
In colonial settings, whiteness was seldom self-evident, and this is why it needed 
such stringent performing and safeguarding. And this urgency and uncertainty 
was made evident in the preoccupation with middle-class respectability and 
its manifestation through domestication, the fears over poor whites and “go-
ing native,” as well as in the ambiguous position of white women. Shaping 
the performances and parameters of whiteness were also multiple entangled 
 discourses over miscegenation, interracial relations, land use, and the civilizing 
mission. They concerned assigning and claiming identity when realities poten-
tially straddled, muddled, and entangled the boundaries of race and crossed the 
lines supposedly separating “us” and “them.”
In the early 1860s, Fanny and Ellen, two Strait Salish Native women in 
the Pacific Northwest, married European immigrant men who originated 
from the Danish-German borderlands. These two women came from a world 
where interracial relationships between Native women and Euro-American 
traders had been common for generations and where lives typically spanned 
both sides of the international line between the United States and Canada. In 
fact, the San Juan Islands, their home, were jointly occupied by Britain and 
the United States until 1872, when Kaiser Wilhelm I of Germany settled the 
boundary issue. When both sisters gave birth to their first children in the mid-
1860s, interracial households remained the norm. Soon thereafter, historian 
Katrina Jagodinsky explains, the influx of white settlers saw the emergence 
of new social attitudes and legal structures that sought to limit the choices of 
Fanny, Ellen, and their offspring.
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Native-white unions had actually been first banned by Washington State 
 already in 1855, but this miscegenation stature was ignored and actually re-
versed in 1868. Still, in 1876, as Fanny’s husband died, federal law in the United 
States ensured that Natives could not inherit the property of their white hus-
bands or fathers, though courts did make some exceptions granting biracial 
children as legitimate heirs. But it was possible to return to live in the Native 
communities. The 1876 Indian Act in Canada, in turn, declared that those 
Native women who married white men had their Native status revoked. Thus, 
if Fanny, Ellen, or their children chose to join kin in British Columbia, they 
became non-Natives by definition. But if they joined relatives in the Lummi 
Reservation, in Washington State, attended federal boarding schools, or mar-
ried Native neighbors south of the borderline, they became full Natives and 
wards of the government disposed of their homelands in the Straits Salish. 
As it happened, Fanny’s and Ellen’s biracial children were subjected to forced 
 removal. White educators took them from their nonwhite parents and exposed 
the children to schooling as well as indentured labor and sexual assaults. This 
later led to a dangerous cycle where these biracial children negotiated poverty, 
premarital pregnancy, and hard work and exploitation as domestic servants. It 
also led the children to marry white men and mixed-race women.
In negotiating the new realities of the settler colonial West, the lives of 
Fanny, Ellen, and their offspring were characterized by deep racial ambigu-
ity and shifts in racial identity. In census records, Fanny and her children 
would consistently claim British Columbian origin and Canadian status. 
 Ellen and her kids would alternate between U.S. and British/Canadian iden-
tities for several decades. By 1900, compelled to choose a singular racial 
identity, some of Fanny and Ellen’s family members reclaimed Native status 
and enrolled in tribes.  Others ignored their Native heritage and wanted to 
be recognized as whites.
As this case demonstrates, the imposition of national borders and the cre-
ation of settler colonial spaces not only partitioned many homelands but recal-
ibrated intimacy and shaped affective economies. Like Fanny and Ellen, many 
communities with interracial marriages and biracial children faced difficult 
choices between whiteness and nativeness. They balanced between an effort 
to maintain their kinship networks and tribal social status on the one hand 
and carving a more secure legal standing in the eyes of the settler colonial 
government on the other. These borderlands peoples with complex, shifting 
identities included the Metis communities on the Red River of the North. 
Comprising of  heterogeneous groups of peoples, their roots lay in the old North 
West Company, numerous indigenous communities, and the northern Plains 
fur trade. The Metis were assigned status as Canadian halfbreeds –  habitually 
 neglected by the Canadian government – or as American Indians – who went 
typically unrecognized by the settler nation. For good measure, both settler 
states regarded the Metis as border-crossing interlopers. In the Southwest, the 
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O’odham living in Arizona became recognized as Indians with their own res-
ervation, while their kinsmen in Sonora did not enjoy similar status but oc-
cupied the lower rungs of the Mexican mainstream. Both the Metis and the 
O’odham faced increasingly hard times from the 1860s onward as incoming 
settlers, boosters, businessmen, government representatives, and armies took 
up their space. Their right of belonging was questioned as settler colonial states 
drove these groups to the margins of society. Metis families sought various tra-
jectories between white and Indian worlds on both sides on the border. They, 
for instance, worked as laborers, scouts, and teamsters for the North American 
Boundary Commission in the 1870s. The O’odham also occupied a liminal 
cultural and political space between settler nations. They as well used the bor-
der that divided their homeland to their advantage and sought wage labor and 
economic opportunity on either side of it. In their varied ways, the Metis and 
the O’odham resisted and refused to choose a single national identity or place to 
live (or to vacate the borderlands) as state officials sought to control the border 
and regulate the lives of its peoples.
The emotional entanglements of borders, race, and whiteness also occupied 
the center stage when Anglos in the mid-1800s married into, usually promi-
nent, Spanish-speaking families from California to Texas. Scholars have viewed 
this mixing as serving the economic motives of white men more than to in-
dicate any incorporation to the Hispanic culture. While this was not always 
the case, it is an easy conclusion to reach, especially as, while not shying away 
from forming sexual relations with Mexican women, numerous whites showed 
open contempt toward all things Mexican. In the process, white borderlanders 
produced a discourse of miscegenation where the Mexicans were no longer 
Spanish but represented European empire-building gone terribly wrong. This 
discourse held that the Spanish had permanently lost their whiteness, “gone 
native” for good, when becoming Mexican. What used to be Spanish and 
white had by the 1800s become a swarthy, copper-colored, half-Indian, and an 
 inherently flawed, treacherous, lazy, and intellectually handicapped race. The 
long list of intimate markers designating Mexican inferiority in Anglo eyes 
included chili-flavored food, crooked streets, dirty adobe “mud” houses, and 
weird sports. It also entailed poverty-stricken people, naked and repulsive chil-
dren, and sexually licentious women who in their dress and behavior grossed 
the boundaries of decency just by, for instance, smoking tobacco and exposing 
their arms, necks, and ankles. Thus in the eyes of many borderlands whites, 
the borderlands Hispanics were failing in performing respectable whiteness 
on multiple levels. It is revealing of the weight placed on proper whiteness 
in settler colonial situations that while there had been those Americans who 
wanted more or the whole of Mexico at the zenith of the U.S.-Mexican War, 
those arguments prevailed that cautioned against this approach largely because 
whites felt Mexico had too many Mexicans who could potentially contaminate 
the whiteness of the U.S. settler empire.
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Different colonial situations adopted quite diverse takes on interracial in-
timacies. In general, the fur trade society that spanned inland North America 
across the Pacific to New Zealand in the 1700s and early 1800s represented 
spaces where European empires and independent Natives relied on interracial 
sexual encounters and racial mixing to further trade, diplomacy, and cross- 
cultural networking. In this context, Native women played a pivotal role in 
ensuring their white husbands’ success, access to hunting grounds, skins, and 
Native kin networks. Native communities, in turn, were motivated to monop-
olize the benefits transnational trade brought by ensuring that visiting French, 
British, Russian, Spanish, American, and other white traders fancied their 
women over neighboring groups for casual encounters or long-term unions. 
In this social fabric, sex was a major diplomatic and commercial asset, even if 
white men tended to view Native women as natural resources sexually available 
for the taking, and even if violence and captive-taking cast its long shadow on 
cross-cultural intimate relations. Interracial intimacies also frequently proved 
short and transient, discarded after their economic and social function waned. 
It is this heritage that Fanny and Ellen carried as their lives were altered by the 
settler colonial projects.
In fur trade societies, as well in other trading colonies around the globe, 
interracial sex and marriage did not necessarily lead to the assimilation and/
or incorporation of white men to the Native world or vice versa. Moreover, 
it did not ease nervousness over racial boundaries and membership as colonial 
projects became increasingly nationalized projects in the late 1800s. Referred 
to as nyai in Java and Sumatra, congai in Indochina, and petit épouse throughout 
much of the French Empire, Native women living with European men as con-
cubines proved the most common domestic arrangement in many nonsettler 
colonial situations. This lasted until the early twentieth century and, in many 
places, beyond.  Decrees limiting concubinage were enacted, but they were 
largely left unforced, for instance, in the Dutch East Indies and throughout the 
British Empire (where concubinage was officially banned in 1910). The reason: 
 concubinage was seen predominantly as a stabilizing force. It kept the white 
men – a mixed lot of shopkeepers, traders farmers, eccentrics, soldiers, sailors, 
and civilian  administrators – out of brothels and sick wards and thus disease-free. 
It offered a good-enough substitute for home life and emotional comfort, which 
in turn made the men better businessmen and workers. Culturally, local women 
provided a prerequisite to speedy acclimatization, useful entryways to local lan-
guages and societies. Importantly, concubinage curtailed homosexual relations, 
often seen as “unnatural” and immoral, between European men.
A noticeable shift concerning metissage and concubinage happened un-
evenly and at different times in different places. Oftentimes the question who 
was European and who was not concerned name, upbringing, education, life-
style, domesticity, home milieu, and respectability. All persons born in French 
Indochina, for instance, who had at least one parent presumed to be French, 
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could claim recognition as “la qualité de francais.” Yet there was a growing 
attack among colonial states against the intimate arrangements with Native 
women. These relations were seen to lower white men as they contracted im-
moral proclivities and susceptibility to uncivilized lifestyles. Soon these liaisons 
and the mixed offspring became perceived as a danger to the European com-
munity and the white race as such. The biracial offspring especially occupied 
a precarious ground between cultures, “dangerously” straddling the division 
between white and Native, between ruler and ruled, blurring that line and 
making it irrelevant. The cure to all this: legislation and white women.
In the Dutch East Indies, the law of 1898, stipulating that biracial children 
would receive European status only if their white fathers recognized them, 
tried to curtail the fact that concubinage remained the domestic arrange-
ment of choice. It was also meant to curb another development that saw some 
 European women choose to cohabit with non-European men. In German 
Southwest  Africa, mixed marriages were officially forbidden in 1905. And this 
law took force retroactively, thus nullifying existing marriages and stripping 
biracial offspring of their rights as Germans. Similar laws were soon enacted in 
other German colonies. Besides laws, the “seduction” of white men by Native 
women needed to be curtailed by happy family life with white wives. Efforts 
targeted the prevention of racial degeneration as well as stemming the radical-
ization of the working class. Preference moved to hiring white recruits already 
married to white wives. Many of the imperial companies and colonial govern-
ments that previously banned white women began to welcome them with open 
arms by the early 1900s. One unintended consequence throughout Africa and 
much of the British Empire proved a growing hysteria over the “black peril,” 
a metonym indicating the threat to colonial order caused by the “primitive 
sexual urges” Native men had toward white women. Take New Guinea, for in-
stance. There the White Women’s Protection Ordinance of 1926 provided the 
death penalty for rape or attempted rape of a European woman. Under these 
circumstances, “attempted rape” could mean pretty much any kind perceived 
transgression of social space.
In the American West, the term “miscegenation” was not coined until 1863, 
when the racial contact between whites and emancipated black slaves became 
an issue due to fears that racial mixing would reduce and contaminate the white 
race. Legislatures in almost all states introduced laws to prevent racial “amalga-
mation” and “miscegenation,” and scientists and physicians warned of the risks 
that mixing brought. These measures reflected widely held social beliefs, but 
they mostly concerned the relations between whites and blacks. While blacks 
were coded as a sexual threat to the purity of the whole white settler project, 
Native Americans never were depicted in quite the similar manner. Yes, fears 
of Native male sexuality and rape of white women abounded in captivity narra-
tives. And white men who married Native women were increasingly ostracized 
as “squaw men” in the eyes of the settler society, and their offspring despised 
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as no good “half-bloods.” Still, Natives were also at least sometimes close to 
acceptable spouses for whites, subject to acculturation and incorporation.
Only 12 states legislated against white-Native marriages in the United 
States, writes Katherine Ellinghaus. More typically, white-Native relationships 
and the offspring they produced could be understood in terms of assimilation 
to the settler society, or as a way for white men to gain access to tribal property 
rights. For a white woman marrying a Native man who lived an “Indian life” 
in a tribal society, things looked instantly more precarious. However, if Native 
men appeared more reformed, then the marriages could again make more sense 
in terms of assimilation. This was very much the case with Elaine Goodale 
Eastman’s marriage to Sioux Charles Eastman. In Australia all sorts of inter-
racial relationships – especially if long-term and “serious” rather than casual 
sexual encounters – were in turn seen as outside the bounds of normal society. 
Or they were interpreted as means for biological absorption, outlets toward 
whiteness as white men engaged in sex with nonwhite women were “breeding 
out the color.” In the 1920s and 1930s, however, there rose public concerns that 
the growing mixed-race population could instead possibly threaten the nation’s 
whiteness.
In settler colonial projects, notions concerning interracial sex and misce-
genation were habitually linked with the drive to assimilate the Natives and 
with the fluid parameters of racial designation and membership. These tensions 
concerning the parameters of race and the assimilationist drive also regularly 
entangled with notions of land ownership and use. Here again perceived racial 
difference evoked policies of exclusion and ordered the realities of interracial 
intimacies into simpler dichotomies. While sovereignty in  Euro-American 
eyes was theirs by virtue of discovery, the question of Native property rights, 
meaning whether land could be seized from the Natives or whether it needed 
to be purchased, was the subject of differing policies. In the steppe, Russians 
followed long-standing practices and simply declared property state land. 
The British treated Australia as terra nullius, unowned land, a definition that 
gave no legal recognition to Aboriginal land rights and indicated that land 
was free for the taking for whites. Even the critics of terra nullius, historian 
Stuart  Banner shows, suggested only compensating the Aborigines and set-
ting aside reserves for them. Encouraged by the precedent set in their North 
American colonies, Britain acknowledged the New Zealand Maoris as own-
ers of all land, and the government acquired it through purchase from tribes 
until 1865. It helped that the Maoris practiced farming, which was always 
in white eyes a sign of civilization, had organized rights to particular lands, 
and proved militarily powerful. All these factors reduced the arguments for 
terra nullius and supported purchases. In Canada, land acquisition saw British 
 Columbia treated as terra nullius, while other western provinces often obtained 
land through government purchases. The largest land exchanges were worked 
through the 11 numbered treaties made from 1871 to 1921 between the crown 
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and indigenous communities in the Canadian West. Compared to the United 
States, historian Roger Nichols asserts, such treaties gave the tribal people less 
land, tiny annuities, and fewer benefits, but they were the product of intense 
negotiation where Native communities made successful demands for provisions 
such as hunting rights.
In the United States, powerful tribes, like Red Cloud’s Sioux in 1868 or 
 Cochise’s Chiricahua Apaches in 1872, could make demands as equals. More 
often treaties and reservations were dictated by whites on Native groups who 
were militarily defeated, hit by diseases, impoverished, and/or internally 
 divided. Sometimes the necessary signatures to make the treaties valid could be 
lured from the acculturated and/or biracial tribal members. Under American 
law, the federal government was the only lawful purchaser of Native land. Pri-
vate purchasing was illegal. The government made treaties with Native tribes 
and then funneled the land to white buyers. This practice lasted until 1871 
(the year Canada started making treaties) and after that the policy continued 
through other agreements that also ostensibly at least required the consent of 
Native tribes for any land transfer to take place. It has been calculated that 
the  Louisiana Purchase landmass was taken over piecemeal in over 200 (222) 
cessions from 1804 onward. Still, there were exceptions. Jointly occupied by 
Britain and the United States, Oregon was in legal limbo before 1846 as white 
settlers poured in and took lands without any government purchase. Califor-
nia, Banner comments, was treated as terra nullius. The government got to 
 California too late as a violent settler intrusion due to the gold rush in 1849 saw 
the Natives stripped of their lands. Furthermore, the early treaties negotiated 
in 1851 and 1852 went unratified by the U.S. Congress, and new ones were 
never signed. This was in part because California Natives were perceived as be-
ing more primitive than other Native Americans; they did not pose a military 
challenge and did not farm.
Numerous treaties made by federal representatives in the West went unrat-
ified by the budget-stingy and indifferent U.S. Congress. On the ground, land 
acquisitions were often riddled with structural inequalities, trespassing, and 
fraud that revolved around racial difference. Exploitation was so systematic that 
historian Jill St. Germain in her comparative analysis of U.S. and Canadian 
practices refers to a tradition of broken treaties. In her research, she juxtaposes 
the Treaty of 1868 between the Lakota Sioux and the United States and Treaty 
Six (1876) between Plains Cree and Dominion of Canada. St. Germain notes 
that the United States sought not only to arrest conflicts and bring land to white 
settler use but also to settle the Lakotas and start “civilization” measures aiming 
for their assimilation. Lakotas, in turn, wanted to protect as much of their lands 
as possible and secure hunting rights and compensation for any lands lost. For 
Crees, short on game due to white competition, protection and help in sub-
sistence from Canada were the key issues. Canada’s focus was on getting Cree 
lands as cheaply as possible. In both cases, whites approached the negotiations 
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with a sense of superiority and an appearance of benevolence. They proclaimed 
to act for the good of the Indians while simultaneously projecting images of 
future ruin if the indigenous peoples would not comply.
From the Cree perspective, Canada did not hold up its end of the bar-
gain. Crees first blamed ignorance and tried to make their grievances known 
and actively approached any Canadian official willing to listen. Their access, 
however, was more limited than the Lakotas, who sent several delegations to 
Washington. Frustrated Crees began to think that Canada knowingly deceived 
them. These frustrations were vented during the Northwest Rebellion in 1885. 
In the United States, the presence of independent Lakotas and the controversy 
over the ownership of the mineral-rich Black Hills, sacred to the Lakotas, led to 
the Great Sioux War in 1876. Afterward, the reduction of the Lakota reserva-
tion marked a new era of unilaterally developed and implemented Indian policy 
where the Lakotas had little say. In Canada, Cree and Canadian interpretations 
of Treaty Six remained as far apart as they ever had.
In the 1860s, Britain had already forged new rules in New Zealand. It 
wanted to quell Maori resistance to land sales by individualizing Native ti-
tle, which meant that individuals could from now on sell their lots regardless 
of tribal opinion. In Canada, the Indian Act of 1876 organized an attack on 
tribal government. It called for Native enfranchisement and saw the crown 
issue location tickets giving individuals rights to particular plots within the 
reserves. In the United States, general allotment became the norm after 1887 
and the Dawes Act. Allotment was also carried out at the Kat River Settlement 
in South Africa, at New Norcia in Western Australia, and elsewhere in places 
such as the steppe, where the Russian government deemed allotment the most 
efficient means to civilize the Kazakhs. According to the Dawes Act, each 
Indian head of house was eligible to receive a 160-acre tract of land; single 
individuals over the age of 18 would get 80 acres, and children under 18 would 
be given 40 acres. Authorities promoted allotment as a way to reduce govern-
ment expenditures and to promote indigenous assimilation and the eradication 
of tribal structures, which supposedly held the indigenous individuals back in 
a permanent state of barbarism. The results were much the same: white land 
rush with numerous fraudulent sales well below market value coupled with 
 Native alienation, alcoholism, poverty, and desperation. While in 1861 the 
Maori owned 22 million acres in the North Island, by 1911 their land mass 
had been cut down to seven million acres. In the United States, Native tribes 
owned an estimated 138 million acres in 1887, of which 52 million acres re-
mained theirs in 1934 when the United States changed its policies in favor of 
tribal self-government. What was left was often the most barren lands. Not 
unlike the Native Americans, Kazakhs were forced to settle in the desert, on 
hilltops, and on mountainsides.
If the thinking on Native property rights varied, the general sentiment 
among whites across different settler spaces around the world was that they 
Intimacies of Empires 137
deserved the land: Natives did not use the land properly, but kept it as un-
used wilderness. Many also believed that the Natives would somehow “nat-
urally” disappear when coming to contact with a superior white civilization. 
Christian notions of “God’s plan” were mixed with evolutionary theories as 
this line of thinking took on the guise of a more “scientific” discourse in the 
late nineteenth century. The accepted wisdom that “autogenocide” was taking 
place among Natives traveled remarkably well, circulating throughout North 
 America as well as Australia, New Zealand, Tahiti, and French Algeria.
Comparing American and Russian civilizing mission of the northern Plains 
and the Kazakh steppe, historian Steven Sabol describes how each imperial gov-
ernment considered their respective region to be underutilized, sparsely populated 
by a “vanishing race,” and suitable for extensive agricultural development and 
settlement by the industrious and civilized white settlers. Seeing the Kazakhs in 
 Russia as the “Red Indians of the West Siberian steppes,” the Scott John Foster 
Fraser, known for his round-the-world bicycle outing, stated that the Russians 
“have conquered them, and pushed them upon the least fertile tracts of land to 
make room for immigrants. The race is decreasing in number, and will one of 
these days disappear from the face of the earth altogether.” The Kazakhs must 
either die or be civilized so that Russia may exploit “land capable of immense 
agricultural possibilities, great stretches of prairie waiting for the plough… I saw 
a country that reminded me from the first day to the last… of the best parts of 
western America.”5
While some authors across the global colonial map saw Native disappear-
ance as inevitable, others worked on a theory that in order to prevent the 
“vanishing” from happening the Natives needed saving by whites. This civ-
ilizing mission, and its goal assimilation, also appealed to those who realized 
that  Native populations would not naturally “vanish” and that their continued 
presence represented a problem if nation-building rested on white homogene-
ity as it often did in settler colonial projects. Utilizing concepts like primitive-
ness, backwardness, and underdevelopment, assimilationists saw Native present 
as white past and thus turned the concept of time into a vehicle of power. 
Good-intentioned whites could pull the Natives up the evolutionary ladder 
through Christianity, education, and work. The colonial ideology in France, 
for instance, tended to celebrate its civilizing mission in Africa, especially in 
Algeria, with its large European population. It was able to draw from a globally 
applied stock of parental images: great white fathers, white mothers, and Native 
children. Together, these made for one happy family. In the Dutch East Indies, 
terms such as moral tutelage and parental guidance were inseparably linked 
to any commentary on Dutch presence in the area. Certainly these notions 
were familiar throughout the American West as well. Whether operating in 
 5 Quoted in Sabol, “Comparing American and Russian Internal Colonization,” 40–41.
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the West, or within the Russian, French, German, or British empires, those 
who believed that “civilizing” the Natives was not just possible, but the “right” 
thing to do, often employed an ambivalent desire to justify conquest and the 
taking of Native lands by seeing it as a civilizing mission offering backward 
peoples the benefits of the dynamic imperial culture. To be humanitarian in the 
1800s was not to believe that Native cultures were equal to white culture, but 
rather to believe that with white tutelage and good training Natives could be 
elevated and become one day (nearly) as civilized as whites were.
Still, assimilation was not a universal goal, even in the settler colonies. By the 
early 1900s, France moved from a position of assimilation to association in its Mus-
lim colonies. This policy stressed respect for local customs and  segregation of the 
colonized from the Natives. It was criticized by socialists and feminists for denying 
French civilization to colonized peoples. Most nonsettler British colonies also relied 
on association rather than assimilation, as did the German colonies in the Pacific.
Yet, on the Great Plains and on the steppe, assimilation, Sabol explains, 
became the goal as the Americans and Russians denigrated and destabilized 
the sociopolitical structures of the Sioux and the Kazakhs. Civilian agents, 
army officers, and missionaries were part of a process of interference and ef-
forts to change indigenous cultures. There were few more important tools in 
this process than the Bible. Translated into a whopping 500 languages by the 
end of the nineteenth century, it proved the most obvious path from barbarity 
to civilization in the colonial world. Missions involved religious ceremonies, 
teaching in schools, medical outreach and hospitals, agricultural projects, and 
printing ventures. They proved extremely active in promoting their version of 
colonialism and advancing it on the ground.
In the West and elsewhere, segregated Native spaces, known as reserves, 
reservations, or camps, became spaces for Native assimilation. Moreover, they 
became spaces for white control and refashioning of Native lives where whites 
told the Natives how they should live and work, what they should look like, 
and how to worship; in general, what to do, and where, when, and how they 
could do it. Management of subject peoples happened through the reorganizing 
of Native living space and the regulation of labor and cultural practices. Many 
reservations, for instance, insisted that Natives live in “civilized” houses, not in 
their own dwellings. They also imposed strict temperance campaigns designed 
to stop indigenous alcohol production and consumption. Native cultural prac-
tices such as the Sun Dance were outlawed not only in the United States but 
also on the Canadian Plains. These forms of power operated in concert with 
extensive farming programs that gave little consideration to indigenous prac-
tices (even if the Natives had been farming for generations) or the suitability of 
the land for agriculture. The design also included flipping Native gender roles. 
Native men should be placed in farm work through individual freeholds (thus 
replicating the settler dream of yeoman lifestyles), and women’s place was the 
domestic sphere in accordance with Victorian values.
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Reservation regeneration was grounded on notions that Natives were by their 
nature lazy, dishonest, frivolous, brutal, and impulsive and that these  behavioral 
patterns of “unruly children” needed to be eradicated through strong “parental 
guidance” by the whites. Parental images abounded as Natives were referred to 
and treated like children, ignorant, if not innocent, wards who needed stern pa-
rental guidance. Native women were often represented as helpless drudges and 
the men as tyrannical loafers prone to polygamy. Used to assert the validity of 
colonial rule, parental images were not unique to colonial situations. Instead, 
notions of unruly children who needed civic education before being capable of 
self-government as adult citizens were widely used in the public discussion dealing 
with peasants and working-class people in Europe and the eastern United States.
Erasing hundreds of years of savagery took firm measures. Intimidation, 
violence, and surveillance became the standard in many places. So did tags. At 
the White Mountain Reservation in Arizona in the 1870s, each Apache man 
was numbered and had to carry with him, day and night, his metal check, with 
the number and designation of his tribe stamped thereon. The officer in charge 
then had a corresponding record with the number of members in each family 
and a personal description of every man. Obviously, day-to-day policies varied 
quite a bit. At some reserves, for instance in New Zealand, the Natives were 
not subject to surveillance and control measures like they were in the West, 
Australia, and Canada. Also, while the United States demanded that all Natives 
become small farmers, seeing farming as a step upward from hunter-gatherer 
lifestyles in human evolution, officials in Canada at least recognized that ranch-
ing often represented a more plausible option on the Plains.
Furthermore, as historian Tim Rowse has suggested for Australia, rationing 
in colonial situations was a vehicle for surveying and controlling colonized 
peoples. The different goods and the ways they were distributed formed the 
relationship through which the forging of social routines, dependencies, and 
surveillance took place. Typically, the indigenous people had to gather at the 
agency or make the symbolic crossing to some other white-controlled space. 
They needed to come at regular intervals dictated by whites, not their own 
needs, in order to receive the white man’s food and supplies. They also needed 
to wait where told, form lines, proceed in an order dictated by whites, and 
 receive without complain what was given – no matter how meager, unsuited, 
or offensive to their cultural beliefs. In Arizona, Apaches had to gather near the 
agency from all sections, each band seating themselves separately, men gener-
ally distinct from the women. Army officers counted them and then distributed 
ration tickets, after which the 1,500 people present were admitted, in a line, to 
a small stockade where they received their ration of corn as it was scooped out 
to them as well as a piece of beef. Numerous Apaches protested with remarks 
of most obscene character that they wanted more and snatched any morsel they 
could put their hands on. In three hours, the ritual was over, and the people 
dispersed, the next rationing taking place in five days time.
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Indigenous child removal and schooling constituted noteworthy civilizing 
weapons in the arsenal of the state in different imperial settings. According to 
historian Margaret Jacobs, in the American West “assimilation” and in Australia 
“protection” implied similar policies of indigenous child removal designed to 
“save” and “civilize” the children. While making the children “useful” mem-
bers of the society, these policies aimed at reducing indigenous dependency on 
government aid. The method worked to break the affective bonds that tied the 
children to their mothers, families, communities, and homelands and regen-
erate the children in socially isolated institutions where they would associate 
with white female teachers. There the children would be regenerated and made 
into clones of whites: to look, dress, behave, and think like the whites. If the 
children did not want to go, they could be forced to participate.
Education had a broader function in enabling the success of Victorian so-
cial values across the racial and social spectrum. The authority of the  middle 
class was secured by private schools and institutions of higher education, 
which, like elementary-level whites-only schools, were set up across the set-
tler colonial terrain, from Arizona to Kenya and Australia. Education also 
pushed working-class offspring toward higher standards and subjected Native 
children to civilization. Historian Michael Coleman writes about how be-
tween the early nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries both the Native 
 Americans and the Irish confronted systematic, state-controlled, and assim-
ilationist educational campaigns as the United States strove to Americanize 
the Indians and the British government to Anglicize the Irish. To effect long-
term permanent change through assimilation, the missionary schools gave 
way to Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) built day schools and boarding schools 
for Indian children. The British government in turn launched a nationwide 
elementary school system in Ireland, administered by the commissioners of 
national education.
By 1902 the BIA had established some 150 boarding schools and a similar 
number of day schools, while in Canada, 177 day schools for Native children 
were in operation in 1895. The schools included instruction in behavior and 
dress, while practical skills such as handicrafts and industrial skills were taught 
to boys. For girls the emphasis was on the diffusion of domesticity, reproduc-
tion and marital practices, household skills, and maternalism. White female 
teachers played active roles in carrying out and advocating schooling, painting 
it as a benevolent act. They concurrently stigmatized Native mothers as un-
loving and incompetent and Native families and living environments as filthy, 
degenerate, and backward. In all instances, the schools targeted the erasure of 
minority cultures and identities. The rigidly ethnocentric curriculum aimed to 
strip the students of tribal cultures, languages, and spiritual concepts and turn 
the children into cultural brokers who would carry the new order back to their 
own peoples. Yet in terms of social mobility, this schooling actually promised 
the Natives little more than a role at the bottom rungs of the settler society.
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Some scholars, like historian Andrew Woolford, who has investigated 
 indigenous boarding schools in Canada (Manitoba) and the United States 
(New Mexico), argue that this kind of forced assimilation constitutes a form 
of genocide. The results certainly were often traumatic. There was plenty of 
misery, homesickness, and deadly disease at the schools. Cultural alienation 
was  common as students lost touch with their families. After school ended, 
problems often multiplied. Children who got out did not fit into their Native 
societies nor the white world. Apparently, some realized then for the first time 
that they were not white. On the other hand, many Natives returned home 
from schools determined to remain Natives. Education had brought indige-
nous peoples into trans-imperial circuits of knowledge, enabling them to use 
their knowledge of English literature and Christianity to protest and petition 
colonial authorities.
As the civilizing mission shook their world, indigenous communities, like 
so many peoples throughout world history, sought solace from religion for their 
everyday misery and emotional confusion. Combining Christian beliefs with 
Native practices, Western Apaches, Paiutes, Comanches, the Sioux, and others 
turned to religious revivalism in search of hope of a better tomorrow. The 
best known of these movements are the various manifestations of the Ghost 
Dance religion in the 1880s and 1890s. They typically advocated the return 
of old Indian practices, including abstinence, living plainly, and the return of 
game such as the bison. They also prophesized the return of old leaders and 
kin coupled with the disappearance of the whites. Like the Ghost Dance, the 
Boxer movement in China was part of this spiritual anticolonial struggle driven 
by religious beliefs that advocated a return of old ways. These movements that 
frequently led to violent outbursts shared stories of colonial dispossession, frus-
tration, drought, and hunger, as well as foreign invasion and cultural infiltra-
tion. Furthermore, some Native dancers and the Boxers apparently assumed 
they could become impervious to Western weapons. In Africa, practitioners of 
Mumboism, an anticolonial movement in the Nyanza region of British Kenya, 
also believed that spells could repel bullets of the white settlers. Historians 
Dominic Capeci and Jack C. Knight write how the Sioux embraced a the-
ology that practiced peace and used ritualized resistance of the Ghost Dance, 
while the Maji-Maji of German East Africa applied the Bokero Cult for similar 
purposes. But both movements culminated in violence. During the winter of 
1890, U.S. soldiers smashed a group of Sioux dancers at Wounded Knee, while 
 German attacks eventually killed hundreds of thousands of East Africans be-
tween 1905 and 1907.
While the civilizing mission spread across the colonial world, the United 
States exported its version of conquest and colonization from the Native com-
munities of the West to its overseas empire. Sweeping aside the remains of 
Spain’s imperial power in a one-sided war in 1898, the United States took 
control of the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. Although Cuba 
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gained nominal independence, the United States brutally suppressed Filipino 
resistance from 1899 to 1902 and then kept the Philippines for a half a century. 
It still has Puerto Rico and Guam as colonies. Pressure from the U.S. sugar 
industry led to the annexation of the independent Hawaii at the same time, and 
in 1903, American officials engineered a revolt in the Panamanian section of 
Columbia. The president organizing the Panama coup, Theodore Roosevelt, 
who had missed the Indian wars, represented himself as the embodiment of 
Western manhood. The coup not only fashioned Panamanian independence 
under American tutelage but also enabled the U.S. administrative control of 
the zone in which to build the canal connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
The Panama Canal opened in 1914, boosting American influence regionally 
and globally. It mimicked the British actions and interests in the Suez Canal 
route, though Americans retained more direct control of the valuable shortcut.
Many administrators and almost all of the American generals in the 
 Philippines had previous experience in the U.S.–Indian wars. They wanted to 
distinguish their own overseas empire from European rivals by modernizing 
and civilizing their newly acquired colony in a manner they had done already 
in the West. They wanted to see themselves and be seen as benevolent rulers, 
while the Filipinos constituted unruly children with generations of savagery 
that needed erasing. To this end, they built roads and dams and fostered sci-
entific forestry. They introduced widespread schooling in the Philippines and 
advocated moral reform. They also strove to ban opium smoking and supported 
giving up this lucrative business. This made the Americans to see themselves 
as morally superior to other empires, and they employed the kind of self- 
celebratory rhetoric to that end. Their empire should not be morally stained 
like the British Raj, which sanctioned licensed prostitution. While realities in 
prostitution and in sale and use of alcohol proved different in the Philippines 
and elsewhere than this rhetoric, the goals supporting the moral exceptionalism 
of the United States were served. In 1900, U.S. senator Albert J. Beveridge 
defined the United States’ presence in the Philippines as a chivalric mission to 
rescue the Natives who could not govern themselves.
As we have seen, the intimate realm was crucial as colonial powers engaged 
in the coercive incorporation of people into an expansionist state and invidi-
ous distinction, rule of difference, which involved hierarchies and ranking and 
 othering of peoples based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, nationality, or religion. 
And none of the colonial powers acted in isolation, but the local and the global, 
the colonies and the metropole, and the different empires operated in entangled 
spaces. They were caught in circulations of ideas and knowledge and consti-
tuted relationships of rivalries, borrowing, and influence. Subject to constant 
negotiation and contestation, these intimacies of empire were typically fragile 
and permeable creations punctured with mobile identities and relations, dynamic 
constructs that needed to be produced, maintained, and guarded. We can see 
how colonial empires consisted of a maze of contradictions and instabilities, a 
Intimacies of Empires 143
mosaic of social differences and ethnic and religious antagonisms, of compilations 
of conflicting discourses and relations where communities were anything but in-
ternally coherent and identity and power were typically fragmented and unstable.
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imPeriAl eyes
In 1910, agent Johan Adrian Jacobsen was busy rushing to the Pine Ridge 
 Reservation in South Dakota. This Norwegian was not the kind of agent usu-
ally mentioned in history books in relation to the Sioux; he was not an em-
ployee of the federal government. Instead, this well-known adventurer and 
ethnologist was in the service of one Carl Hagenbeck, a German merchant with 
a long career in selling wild animals – to American P. T. Barnum, for example. 
Hagenbeck was also an entrepreneur exhibiting “savage”  populations.  Since 
the mid-1870s, he had recruited Sámi, Sudanese, Mongols, Hindus,  Australian 
Aborigines, Bella Coola (Nuxalk) Indians from British Columbia, and other 
indigenous peoples from around the world to perform in hugely popular hu-
man exhibits that toured Germany, Britain, and much of Europe. In 1907, 
he opened a permanent Tierpark, or zoo, in Stellingen outside Hamburg, 
Germany. Its attractions included exotic animals as well as exotic peoples put 
on display in extravagant ethnographic villages and in bloodcurdling perfor-
mances. Each troupe could include as many as several hundred people. And 
this was the reason why Hagenbeck had hired his old friend Jacobsen, who 
came with massive experience in recruiting peoples for ethnographic shows, 
and  dispatched him to Pine Ridge. His job was to get the Sioux to come to 
Stellingen. But Jacobsen needed to hurry because five other agents working 
for competing entrepreneurs were also converging on the reservation, while 
Buffalo Bill’s representative was also reportedly on his way.
That the Sioux were in such high demand speaks not only of their experience 
as performers but also of the global popularity of human exhibitions featuring 
Native Americans. Eventually Jacobsen managed to hire over 40 Indians from 
Pine Ridge, among them several veteran showmen who had already toured with 
William F. Cody, known as Buffalo Bill, in the 1880s and 1890s. In Stellingen, 
the Sioux dressed in feathered headdresses and other regalia expected of them 
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by audiences familiar with the West from dime novels and human shows. They 
also occupied a “traditional” teepee village. Their program, historian Eric 
Ames writes, comprised dances, horse-stealing acts, and ambushes of settlers 
and the Pony Express. With the revenge motif and last-minute rescues, it was 
a pretty much the standard package recycled from the “Wild West shows.” In 
this case, familiar meant the same as popular. During their five-month stay at 
Hagenbeck’s zoo, the Sioux were gazed at by 1.1 million visitors. It is safe to 
say they were a big hit among the Germans eyeing for imperial amusements.
The European and global fascination with the American West not only goes 
back several generations but is comprised of an expansive assortment of con-
nections, diverse forms of mobility, and variations of entanglements.  Prominent 
among those engaging the West were the upper-class European travel writers 
whose lives crossed multiple borders and who personally eyed the West from 
the early 1800s onward. They used it as a source of inspiration, a reference 
point for global empires, or as a stage for amusement. In search of adventure 
and the exotic, they came for wild natives, pristine and majestic wilderness, 
and great beasts. The first two they wanted to glimpse, draw inspiration from, 
take notes on, capture with pen and paintbrush, and collect material artifacts/
samples from them. The animals they preferred to shoot. Armed with varying 
pedigrees of scientific and/or artistic knowledge and aspiration, as well as er-
ratic hunting skills, European travelers often brought along their dogs, sporting 
guns, and servants, and always the attitudes and prejudices of their class. Not 
all published books or articles about their experiences, although many did, 
and most at least penned letters or kept private diaries. A good number also 
hauled sizable quantities of Western specimens (including bison) and artifacts 
back home to Europe. They also spread the word on the West through their 
family and social connections. In the process, these European travelers typi-
cally viewed the West in a deexceptionalized context and integrated it to the 
mental landscapes of global empires. Especially in the early twentieth century, 
 American travelers similarly headed abroad, in search of the last frontier and 
hoping to find the equivalent of the rugged and untamed West in some corner 
of the increasingly colonized world.
The West also featured opulently in the imperial visions of Europeans 
 contemplating expansion. During the Kaiserreich, the American westward 
expansion worked as an inspiration in German domestic debates relating to 
settler expansion and as a model for concrete colonial policies in the  Prussian 
East (German–Polish borderlands) and in Southwest Africa. Later, the con-
quest of the West also stimulated many of the influential Nazis. Its role as 
inspiration and precedent was not limited to Europe, but perceptions of the 
West shaped Japanese conquests as well. In fact, only the dearth of scholarship 
on the American West as an imperial inspiration prevents us from seeing what 
other imperial regimes and colonial projects the West encouraged and played 
precursor to.
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And then there were the human exhibitions. It was Columbus who first 
brought Native peoples from the Caribbean to Europe, while Hernán Cortés 
did the same with the mainland Aztecs. This trend was later extended, by 
Jacques Cartier, for instance, who exported Natives from Quebec to France, 
and by the English, who shipped indigenous visitors from Roanoke. An early 
Indian delegation from the West, from present-day Kansas and Missouri, 
 visited the French court, performed dances at the Paris opera, and demon-
strated riding skills in the royal woods. This was in 1724. These early exports 
of exotic peoples and their performances were mainly meant to be royal and 
noble amusement. As the culture industries of the 1800s extended across multi-
ple borders, they turned the European and American fascination of the “other” 
into a global business that increasingly catered to mass audiences. Various types 
of human exhibitions displayed colonized peoples and performed colonialism 
as a thrilling adventure and as a noble and triumphant advance of civilization. 
These entertainments could be found in international expositions, and they 
also went under the rubric of “Wild West shows,” “people shows” (Völkerschau), 
“freak shows,” and anthropozoological shows (Hagenbeck’s would fall under 
this category). Some modern scholars have lumped these exhibitions under the 
common name “human zoos.” They gained new momentum in the late 1800s 
and became a hugely popular part of the fin de siécle era attractions, while grad-
ually losing their zeal by the mid-1900s.
When taken together, the travel authors, interimperial inspirations, and 
human zoos, as well as other forms of cultural production such as novels, 
movies, and comics demonstrate some key points in how the West has caught 
the  imperial eyes of Europe and the wider world. Whether Buffalo Bill, Carl 
 Hagenbeck, Adolf Hitler, Rudyard Kipling, Isabella Bird, or The Leatherstocking 
Tales and the Italian-made Western comic Tex Willer, the West has displayed 
remarkable portability in its various entanglements with Europe and the world. 
The West has reached to the world, engaged it, entered its psyche, and fed its 
interests, dreams, and imaginations, while the world has appropriated, rep-
resented, and reacted to the West. Unquestionably, the flows and influences 
have advanced in multiple directions, producing histories that have operated 
on varied scales and occupied different spaces. Some of these connections and 
circulations are discussed here.
Travel Writers
It has been estimated that close to 2,000 travel books were published between 
1830 and 1900 in the United States alone. The volume of travel writing ex-
ploded especially in the late 1800s as numerous books and periodicals told 
tales of various parts of the world to growing European and American audi-
ences captivated by distant and exotic places and thirsting for adventure and 
 knowledge. One of the more popular genres in English literature, travel writing 
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has typically been underutilized, as well as overlooked, by today’s scholars 
studying the American West and the global empires. Many simply dismiss it as 
biased and/or sentimental writings of perennial outsiders. They should think 
twice. In colonial situations, literary scholar Mary Louise Pratt explains, travel 
writings constituted one tool in justifying conquest and building hierarchies 
of difference – sometimes in the form of dichotomies – between the ostensi-
bly civilized Euro-American spaces and the exotic and uncivilized terrains of 
what can be called the “rest of the world.” Yet travel writings, historian David 
 Wrobel explicates, were not always straightforward accounts justifying colo-
nialism as dozens of nineteenth-century travelers produced complicated and 
contradictory portraits of the world and the role of empires in it. Some of these 
travelers also crossed into the West, observed and placed it in a broader global 
context, and used it as a springboard to champion as well as criticize empire 
building.
One eyewitness to the global reach of empires in the mid-1800s was the 
Hamburg-born German Friedrich Gerstäcker. His first visit to the United 
States lasted five years in the late 1830s and early 1840s and spanned Arkansas, 
Ohio, Texas, and Louisiana. During this time, Gerstäcker worked, for exam-
ple, as a hunter, a cattle herder, and a fireman on a steamboat. Returning to 
 Germany, his articles and novels – including such titles as The Regulators in 
Arkansas and The River Pirates of the Mississippi – portrayed frontier life and 
adventure and made Gerstäcker a household name in German-speaking areas.
From 1849 to 1852, Gerstäcker traversed the world. His route took him 
from the German settlements in Latin America to gold rush California,  Hawaii, 
the British Wests in Australia and New Zealand, and the Dutch East Indies 
( Java). This time adopting more the role of a critical observer, he compared 
imperial regimes and their impacts on local peoples. His account, Narrative of 
a  Journey Round the World, saw daylight in Germany, Britain, and the United 
States in 1853. Reaching San Francisco, Gerstäcker wrote how he was “simply 
bewildered” by the profusion of people, makeshift accommodations (tents), and 
the never-ending activity. “The eye found no time to take in all at once,” he 
 commented. Every place was packed to the max, even the bay itself.
A perfect forest of them opened at once to our sight. Ship after ship, 
forming a perfect town upon the water, filled the inner bay, and hundreds 
of little boats and small sailing crafts were darting everywhere over the 
yet unoccupied places. 1
Gerstäcker recorded confusion and excitement, as well as meetings with  Mexicans, 
Frenchmen, Spaniards, Germans, Texans, Yankees, and Indians from India. 
 1 Friedrich Gerstäcker, Narrative of a Journey Round the World (New York: Harper, 1853), 135.
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He thought it remarkable that the whole world was there in this rather unremark-
able place that just a few months earlier had been a small, sleepy, and out-of-the-
way Mexican hamlet on the Pacific coast. He drew several parallels between the 
 California Indians and the Aboriginal Australians, rationalizing that they were 
the least warlike Natives in the world. He also expressed sadness and anger on how 
the Natives were being taken advantage and driven to desperation on the opposite 
sides of the Pacific, how they were killed in scores by prospectors rushing in from 
all corners of the world.
Captivated by how imperial expansions brought together peoples from di-
verse parts, yet critical of the impacts settler booms had on the indigenous 
peoples, Gerstäcker would go on to make a tremendously productive career as 
a travel writer. In 1867–1868, he once more returned to the United States on an 
extended journey across the continent. Traveling mostly by train this time, the 
trip also spanned into Mexico from where the French had recently been driven 
off and to West Indies, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In the course of his lifetime, 
Gerstäcker visited five continents, as well as several islands in the Pacific and 
 Indian oceans, all along placing the West in a global context. In the end, his 
travel stories and novels numbered in the hundreds. Succumbing to a stroke 
in 1872, he was a widely popular celebrity author on the world stage. Still, 
 Gerstäcker is relatively little known and certainly understudied today.
This is definitely not the case with the British authors Charles Dickens, 
James A. Froude, Robert Louis Stevenson, Oscar Wilde, and Rudyard Kipling. 
They are all eminent names, but comparatively little has been made of the 
fact that they all entered the West at one time or another as travel authors. 
 Typically, Western destinations formed a slice of their larger journeys that 
spanned  Australia, Southeast Asia, and India. And yes, they habitually situated 
the West against these larger imperial horizons, commenting on and contrasting 
its nature, peoples, and imperial traits. Take, for instance, Kipling, the hugely 
popular Anglo-Indian fiction author and the man behind the quintessential 
imperial poem “White Man’s Burden.” This poem addressed the U.S. con-
quest of the Philippines, but it resonated globally and was widely interpreted 
to justify colonialism as a noble civilizing enterprise. In 1889, ten years before 
penning his influential poem, Kipling had crossed the West on his way from 
India to  London. Having just ended a stint as a newspaper editor in  India, his 
travel itinerary compassed California, Oregon, Washington,  British  Columbia, 
Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and Nebraska. En route Kipling sent 
numerous letters to his newspaper publishers in India, where they stirred the 
imaginations of an appreciative audience. He represented the West as a space 
of imperial fantasies. The British and Anglo-Indian readership could read how 
Kipling celebrated Western scenery as a prime settler destination and com-
mented on its grand scale. He, for example, noted that England was about the 
size of Yellowstone National Park. Readers also saw Kipling admiring what 
he saw was the independent spirit of the Western settlers. But they could also 
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pick up how Kipling felt bored by the abundant sagebrush. Or they could take 
to heart his remarks on places like Omaha, Nebraska, as despicable medleys of 
Germans, Poles, Slavs, and all the human waste of Eastern Europe, and thus as 
warnings against ethnic/racial mixing.
Obviously, Gerstäcker and Kipling represent just a small sampling on a long 
line of nineteenth-century international travel authors who have contextual-
ized the West as part of a globe-spanning network of empires. Historian Harry 
Liebersohn maintains that already in the first half of the 1800s, an aristocratic 
discourse emerged among well-born French and German travel writers, who 
were fascinated with their own romanticized vision of North American  Indians 
as a being of rank and honor like themselves. One of these early elite travel-
ers was Prince Alexander Philipp Maximilian zu Wied-Neuwied, a nobleman 
and a former Prussian Army officer who gained international fame as a nat-
uralist and an ethnologist. Accompanied by the Swiss painter Karl Bodmer, 
 Maximilian conducted an expedition to the Great Plains starting in 1832. En 
route in St. Louis, the party met with the explorer William Clark. Drawing on 
his help and knowledge, they accompanied Clark to a meeting with Sauk and 
Fox Indians. Using the Missouri River as their entryway, they also met Omahas, 
Poncas, Sioux, Plains Crees, and the Blackfeet. The party visited Fort Union 
and wintered among the Mandans and the Hidatsas at Fort Clark.  Already a 
famed naturalist following his Brazil expedition in 1815–1817,  Maximilian was 
a compulsive notetaker and a diarist, with an eye for detail. When describing 
the natural riches of the Plains, he habitually compared the abundant speci-
men of flora and fauna as well as the peoples and places he saw with those in 
Europe and Brazil. He argued, for instance, that the North American and the 
Brazil  Indians were of same race. Bodmer’s paintings in turn captured the ar-
tefacts, customs, and appearance of Plains Indians. After returning to Germany 
in 1834, Maximilian released a famous account of his Plains travels in Reise in 
das Innere Nord-Amerika (Figure 5.1).2
Maximilian’s party also literally blasted its way across the northern Plains 
as was typical of European travelers in the West at the time. Loads of buffalo 
were shot in each outing just because they could be had and the carcasses were 
regularly left to rot. One of these high-profile sportsmen was Sir St. George 
Gore, a wealthy Irish nobleman and the baronet of the Gore Manor in  Donegal 
County. Guided by the famous mountain man Jim Bridger, his Western tour 
lasted from 1854 to 1857. It covered Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, and the 
Dakotas, and possibly ended up costing as much as $500,000. The exact num-
ber of animals killed by Gore for sport remains unknown. He claimed the 
casualty sheet comprised 2,000 buffalo, 1,600 deer and elk, and 105 bears.
 2 A recent edition of Maximilian’s writings is to be found in Marsha V. Gallagher, ed. 
Travels in North America, 1832–1834: A Concise Edition of the Journals of Prince Maximilian 
of Wied (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017).
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Gore saw no need to rough it in the wilderness. His party included 27 
wagons, more than 100 horses, 18 oxen, and 3 cows. One wagon was just for 
weaponry, being crammed with pistols, shotguns, and about 75 rifles. Gore 
also brought a large striped green and white linen tent, a brass bedstead, a 
rug, a portable table, and several other luxury items. He had over 40 men on 
his payroll doing tasks from cooking and hunting to tending greyhounds and 
staghounds. It was much the same kind of material wealth and entourage with 
Charles Murray, the second son of the Fifth Earl of Dunmore. He followed 
the Pawnees on their summer hunt in 1835 dressed as a British dandy. He 
came with his English rifle, brace of pistols, Scots valet, and a kilt. Sir William 
Drummond Stewart, the Lord of Grand Tully and Baronet of Murthly, and a 
veteran of the Battle of Waterloo, tried to merge into the fur trading scene in 
St. Louis in the 1830s as a cultured gentleman hunter. Yet, he also brought from 
Europe special cheeses, wine, brandy, and servants.
Historian Monica Rico observes how the West served as an imaginative and 
literal site on which Stewart and other aristocratic travelers from Europe con-
structed their masculinity. As late as the 1870s, most of these gentlemen hunters 
and nature tourists in the West were still foreigners. And they kept on shooting, 
as well as collecting and writing of the West as an imperial playground not 
FiGure 5.1  Indians Hunting the Bison, Tableau 31 by Karl Bodmer. Courtesy of 
the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division/Wikimedia 
Commons.
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unlike the African safari. On his return to Scotland in 1839, Stewart sought to 
recreate the West on his estate in Perthshire. For this purpose, he had imported 
Western plants, bison, deer, and even grizzly bears. Stewart quickly emerged 
as a trendsetter, and it became something of a fashion for the British gentry to 
have bison on their estates. Stewart also filled the Murthy Castle with Native 
American artifacts and tried his luck as a Western novelist. Here as well other 
British aristocrats followed his example.
Perhaps the most famous of these international visitors was the Grand Duke 
Alexis, the fourth son of Czar Alexander II of Russia. Alexis arrived in New 
York City on October 1871, set to begin a goodwill tour of the United States 
at the request of his father. Americans of higher class, historian Lee Farrow 
discloses, readily welcomed European nobility, fancying impressing royalty 
with their taste and style. Alexis was lavishly entertained as he stopped in 
 Philadelphia and Boston, took a detour into Canada, and continued to Chicago 
and St. Louis. Then he went hunting. Guided by Buffalo Bill and accompanied 
by General George A. Custer and the Sioux leader Spotted Tail with approx-
imately 100 of his fellow Sioux, Alexis’s hunting party advanced from Fort 
McPherson, Nebraska. It did not take long for Alexis to kill several buffalo and 
become enamored with the West and the Indians, and allegedly with Buffalo 
Bill as well. Next Alexis continued to Denver. He practiced some more social-
izing and hunting in Colorado, before heading through the southern states and 
embarking to sea from Pensacola, Florida, on February 22, 1872. Alexis’s tour, 
however, was not just about the West or the United States, but it was global in 
scope. From Florida, his party continued visitations, observations, and hunts in 
Spanish Cuba, Brazil, the Dutch East Indies, the  British Cape,  Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Canton, and Shanghai. On October 1872, Alexis landed in  Nagasaki, 
 Japan. Then his world tour drew to its final leg as the party set for  Vladivostok 
and overland across Siberia. They arrived home in St. Petersburg with a 
rich palate of experiences and wondrous collection of specimen and artifacts 
 representing the world’s different empires (Figure 5.2).
While most of the European visitors in the West were well-to-do men, 
several women travelers also reached the West. Among them were British elite 
ladies such as Theodora Guest but also middle-class people such as Ida Pfeiffer, 
a lawyer’s widow from Austria. Enthusiast for foreign places and cultures, 
Pfeiffer waited until her two sons had their own families and then used the 
money she earned from her regional travel publications – describing trips to 
 Scandinavia and Iceland – for fulfilling her dreams of two world journeys in 
the late 1840s and early 1850s. These trips took Pfeiffer not only to California, 
Oregon, and the Great Lakes but also to Brazil, Chile, French Tahiti, China, 
Persia,  Ottoman Turkey, the British Cape, the Dutch East Indies, among other 
places. In other words, her world tour was also an imperial tour.
After visiting Australia and Hawaii, the British writer and naturalist 
 Isabella Bird in turn spent a good deal of 1873 in Colorado. Historian Robert 
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Athearn notes how Bird took in the buckskin-clothed, gun-carrying men 
and commotion of Denver with curiosity and felt most unimpressed by the 
rough town of Cheyenne, Wyoming. She also rode horseback in the wintry 
Plains, roughed it up Long’s Peak, and in pretty much every way challenged 
the Victorian gender norms of her day. Still, Bird’s books on her travels are 
filled with depictions of herself and other women that reinforce the prevalent 
Victorian domestic and behavioral codes of the era, geographer Karen Morin 
comments. Bird was also often described as sickly, short, and almost an in-
valid. That did not stop her from exploring in Japan, Malaya, Tibet, China, 
Persia, and elsewhere.
Much like Pfeiffer did, Bird cheered the expansion of imperial systems and 
the benefits of civilization they would bring to the world. Neither woman 
found much value in indigenous lifestyles. Describing the Ainu people of 
 Hokkaido and the California Indians, Bird drew similar descriptions of savage 
life, of what she deemed was the lowest form of human existence. She was 
also keen to compare the Malay locals and Native Americans, writing how 
both peoples purportedly left no marks of their existence after being swept 
away by the tide of white civilization. Wrobel comments how Bird’s “ journeys 
serve as a good example of how western American experiences could shape 
the experience of world travel, just as global travels could shape perceptions of 
the West.”  Authors like Bird reminded the readers in North America that the 
FiGure 5.2  Alexei Alexandrovich and General Custer in Topeka.  Courtesy of the 
Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62– 
42305.
156 Global Circulations
United States was “thoroughly connected to the world of empire building and 
that their western frontier served a primary stage for imperial endeavors, not 
an escape from them.”3
The British Richard Francis Burton offers yet another window to international 
travelers situating the West in the world; that of a high-profile  world- renowned 
celebrity explorer. An officer in the army of the British East India Company, 
a veteran of the Crimean War, a master of numerous languages, self-taught 
ethnologist, and a prolific and provocative writer who published extensively on 
all his exploits, Burton was at the height of his fame when he entered the West 
in 1860. He had visited Mecca in the Arabian Peninsula disguised as a Muslim 
pilgrim. He had also entered the fabled city of Harar  (Ethiopia) as an Arab 
merchant. Just prior to his travels in the West, Burton had been part of an ex-
hausting and highly controversial expedition to the Great Lakes region of East 
Africa. This journey saw Burton “discover” Lake Tanganyika and claim it was 
the source of the White Nile. His partner John Hanning Speke argued that the 
correct answer to that puzzle was Lake Victoria (Lake Nyanza), where Speke 
had visited on their return leg while Burton had been too ill and exhausted to 
make the detour. Who saw what and who held the authority as a true explorer 
and the hero of the British Empire became a heated public controversy as the 
two travelers returned to England and as Speke launched a second expedition 
into the area, this time without Burton. On September 1864, Speke died from a 
self-inflicted, yet apparently accidental, gunshot wound just a day before he was 
to publicly debate the Nile matter with Burton.
Before that, Burton had sought temporary escape from the heated con-
troversy by traveling to North America and across the Plains to Utah and 
 California. Upon reaching Kansas, his narrative was already peppered with 
numerous remarks juxtaposing the West with the Orient. The wagon trains 
he saw reminded Burton of the caravans of the Sahara, and the Plains and 
the  Nevada deserts appeared to him as a sea of waste much like the deserts of 
Northern Africa and the Middle East. The Plains Indians, Burton felt, were 
like the  Bedouin Arabs, while the Sioux seemed African-like and therefore, 
he felt, could not be trusted. Burton also expressed deep dislike for the mes-
tizo population and noted that they as well as the Indians were heading for 
 disappearance as white civilization advanced to the Plains and the Rockies. 
While Burton cast the Pawnees as Ishmaelites, he advocated Mormon Utah as 
a reincarnated Holy Land. All these and the many more similarities and link-
ages he observed, Burton made known to an international audience in his 1861 
popular book The City of the Saints and Across the Rocky Mountains to California.
The West also reached toward the world via a man who was perhaps the 
biggest self-promoter of his era on a global stage: Henry Morton Stanley. 
 3 Wrobel, Global West, American Frontier, 66–67.
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A journalist by profession, Stanley made the most of the peoples’ appetite for 
the exotic and the dangerous in his highly popular writings that described his 
travels and exploits. Extensive publicity surrounded Stanley’s 1871 “discovery” 
of the British explorer David Livingstone in East Africa and his 1874–1877 
trans-African expedition, cosponsored by British and American newspaper 
proprietors and trying to settle the origins of the Nile yet again. Working 
for King Leopold II of Belgium, Stanley also journeyed to the upper Congo 
River to open trade and sign a large number of treaties with the locals, killing 
many of them in the process. Eyes of the world were again on Stanley when 
he outdid the Germans and the British and pulled off a successful yet grueling 
journey into southern Sudan to rescue Emin Pasha. This German-born ruler 
of Ottoman Equatorial Africa had been displaced by the Mahdist uprising that 
had similarly led to the fall of Khartoum and the death of the celebrated British 
General Charles “Chinese” Gordon.
A global celebrity, and feverishly disputed, disliked, but also admired, one 
could easily forget that Stanley had also once been a man of the West. Born in 
Wales, he journeyed to Louisiana at age 17 and supposedly fought on both sides 
in the Civil War. Then he went, as a journalist, to Colorado for the gold rush. 
His travels also led Stanley to write about the U.S.–Indian wars and the exter-
mination of the bison on the Plains. While Stanley’s Western phase preceded 
his rise to international fame, it undoubtedly influenced his racist views of the 
nonwhite peoples of the world as savages that should be pushed aside from 
the way of civilization. It most likely also stimulated his support for imperial 
expansions. For Stanley, a version of the West could be found in the remote 
reaches of Africa. The West represented a testing ground and a source of inspi-
ration supporting white mastery over nonwhite peoples and their lands for this 
world-renowned imperial traveler.
By the twentieth century, travel to and from the West changed considerably. 
It became more easily available to an ever-broader assortment of peoples from 
inside and outside the United States. In their efforts to be exclusive, the rich 
turned to ever more exotic landscapes: Egypt, Japan, and Africa were among 
the places the European elite sought out. But the West still drew its fair share as 
well. Travel was much more comfortable than ever before when one could opt 
for sumptuous “palace cars,” arrange overnight stays at elegant hotels even in 
the more remote locations, enjoy hot springs, and marvel at nature in the safety 
of national parks such as Grand Canyon, Yosemite, and Yellowstone. Where 
the rich trotted, mass tourism soon followed. Package tours, budget train tick-
ets, and inventive advertising, together with middle-class lifestyles champi-
oning consumerism and travel as well as increased opportunities for  leisure 
brought by the rise of living standards in the industrial world, provided the 
incentives for the masses to enjoy the pleasures once reserved for a special few.
Much of this travel was also fueled, historian Hal Rothman explains, by 
lingering ideals of westward expansion, the quest for the sublime in nature, and 
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anxiety about modern life. Disgusted with the impacts of the Industrial Rev-
olution and escaping urban ugliness and modern hectic lifestyles, many artists 
drew on modernist concepts of primitivism. They came looking for peace and 
serenity, trying to discover their souls in the lost Edens of the West. Many 
headed for New Mexico, setting up artist communities and seeking  alternate 
lifestyles. One of the more famous destinations was Taos, where the commu-
nity that the art patron Mabel Dodge created pulled an international crowd. 
Its visitor list saw, among others, D. H. Lawrence, an English novelist, poet, 
playwright, and painter whose wanderlust took him to South of France,  Italy, 
 Ceylon, Australia, Mexico, and the United States. It also included Aldous 
 Huxley, an English writer and philosopher who visited Lawrence at Taos.
As Europeans entered the West to escape modern life, Americans who felt 
their own West was becoming too civilized desired to find the “West” of ad-
venture and wilderness, the primitive and the exotic, somewhere else. One such 
American traveler who combined a global reach with a social conscience and a 
sharp mind was Mark Twain, probably the best-known American author of his 
era. Famous these days mostly for his novels, Twain was a passionate traveler 
and writer of his own exploits. In 1897, he set out on a world tour for the simple 
purpose of making money. Yet he ended up providing sharp commentary on the 
extermination of Australian Aborigines and of the brutal racial regime in South 
Africa. In the process, he also became highly critical toward American expansion.
The Scottish-born John Muir, who had found wilderness perfection in 
the Yosemite and helped to found the Sierra Club, also toured the world in 
1903–1904. Dreading that wilderness would disappear in America and across 
the world as empires claimed and settled more space, Muir went up the Nile 
and experienced the Australian outback, the springs of New Zealand’s Rotorua, 
and the volcanic cones of Hawaii. And then there was the onetime friend and 
neighbor of Marquis De Morés in North Dakota (see Chapter 2), Theodore 
Roosevelt. A frail easterner who wanted to be a rugged westerner, Roosevelt 
passionately sought to transform himself and project an image of masculinity 
through his hunting, military, and other exploits. He just needed a “West” to do 
it in. Seeking adventure, he famously got himself nearly killed on the Amazon 
in 1913–1914. Prior to this, in 1909 Roosevelt had gone on safari extravaganza 
in Africa, escaping modernity and killing hundreds of animals. He plunged into 
wilderness in East Africa that he felt resembled the Dakotas a generation earlier. 
Using Africa as a substitute for the West, Roosevelt drew comparisons to the 
West while advocating further colonization in Africa in the Western model. He 
was also quick to draw parallels between the American continental expansion 
and its overseas imperialism, depicting the former as a prelude to the latter.
Several traveling American social commentators also found the West in 
 Australia and New Zealand, while missionaries headed to China and Africa 
did much the same. The American explorer George Kennan, in turn, drew 
connections between the American West and Russia’s Siberian frontiers. 
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 Furthermore, American, and also European, travelers also frequently located 
the West in Europe, when, for example, comparing the Rocky Mountains 
with the Alps and California with the Italian Riviera. It was also customary 
to come across the West in the Oriental lands of the Middle East. Historian 
Richard Francaviglia writes that there is a long tradition, by travelers and other 
commentators, of giving Native Americans Oriental identities and seeing sim-
ilarities in the landscapes and plants of the Great Plains or the Southwest with 
the Middle East. According to literary scholar Susan Kollin, Arab-as-Native 
American configurations were also commonplace already in the nineteenth 
century. Fascinated by the Arabs as exotic yet warlike savages in the mold of 
the Native Americas, there was a tendency among many American sojourners 
to depict the whole Middle East as a place of adventure, heroism, and romance 
and to project their fantasies of conquest and otherness on it.
imperial inspirations
At the time when the U.S. conquest of the West and the European scramble 
for Africa coincided, the American West was widely used as a global reference 
point and a template epitomizing colonial expansion and management of sub-
ject peoples. It also acted as a model to emulate. Take, for instance, the national 
parks, a system designed to provide an assurance that America’s authentic West 
had not disappeared. Established in 1872, Yellowstone was the first national 
park in the world, but in Africa, Australia, Canada, and Europe, the example 
was soon copied. The process was pursued with a distinct Western flair in ad-
dressing what kind of wild, often majestic, nature was suitable for preservation. 
National parks, however, proved just one thread in much larger and complex 
transnational webs as the West inspired and tempted consideration and com-
parison by Europeans who contemplated their own colonial ventures in what 
seemed an increasingly squeezed world.
According to historian Raymond Betts, what struck the imagination of 
those inclined toward British imperial federation, to whom the aggressive 
 Native policy in the West usually went unnoticed, was the double vision of an 
extension of the American people westward and the steady absorption of newly 
acquired territory into a preexisting political system. The flair of the West 
penetrated the upper tiers responsible for the direction of the British Empire. It 
was no accident that in his 1907 Romanes Lecture at Oxford, Lord Curzon, the 
former viceroy of India, kept on referring to the West as he described the logic 
of empires and expansion. He even suggested that movement from the culti-
vated European center to the sparsely settled (by whites) periphery in the West, 
and elsewhere in the world’s numerous colonial zones, brought with it a form 
of physical and spiritual vitality for white people, a type of personal energy 
unattainable in the metropolitan Europe or the eastern United States. Thus, for 
Lord Curzon, the West signified dynamism and power.
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It seemed that every expanding colonial empire had its own “West” some-
where, a place compared and measured against the American West because of 
its dynamism, scale of opportunity, process of conquest, fierce Natives, charac-
teristics of its settler communities, and imagined physical likeness, or any com-
bination of these elements. The pastoral expanses of the South African veldt 
and the Kenyan highlands induced easy comparisons with the American prai-
ries and plains, mimicking their sense of spatial freedom. Morocco was dubbed 
by some Frenchmen as their “far West,” as was Algeria. Here as well spatial 
vastness prompted much of the comparisons, while in Algeria, settler farms 
and villages were also seen in likeness to the West. The diamond “rush” in 
the vicinity of Lüderitz in Southwest Africa in 1908 made the place an instant 
German “wild southwest” in common parlance and folklore. The United States 
itself saw the Philippines and Cuba as potential “Wests” beyond its actual West.
Hokkaido (Ezo) played the part of the Japanese West. The Japanese 
 represented it as an uninhabited terra nullius and its indigenous Ainus as a van-
ishing race. In this manner, they justified colonialism and produced resilient 
images of a frontier between savagery and civilization as Japan extended its 
reach to this northern island. They also produced a forceful rhetoric of a civiliz-
ing mission, including claims that settlers, farming, and free land would make 
the island prosper. Commonalities also reached the actual colonizing process. 
The Ainus changed from sovereign, militarily powerful people to a dependent 
people plagued by diseases, forced labor, dislocation, and cultural assimilation 
programs. In 1899, Japanese law declared the Ainus as former aborigines. This 
was revoked and the Ainus recognized as indigenous peoples only in 2008. The 
Japanese also sought direct counsel from the United States. In 1870, Kuroda 
Kiyotaka, who would later become the prime minister of Japan, traversed to 
the West to learn about settler colonialism. He brought back the American ag-
ricultural expert Horace Capron, who taught farming techniques to Hokkaido 
settlers. He also imported cattle, fruits, and vegetables from California and 
suggested bringing in large numbers of settlers from the other Japanese islands.
There was also a German “far West” in southern Brazil. Starting in the 
1890s, a large number of German publications suggested that the areas of Rio 
Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Parana were the latest best West, like the 
American West, but, if possible, only more so. Comparisons with the  American 
West were a defining factor in German understandings of the peoples, nature, 
and prospects of southern Brazil. Like the American West, the Brazilian “West” 
was also the land of plenty, unlimited possibilities, where all dreams could be 
made a reality. It promised easy access to land for individual settlers, guaranteed 
to make the depressed and out of luck drudge from Germany into a master 
yeoman of his own land to whom nothing looked impossible. Those caught 
in the Auslandsdeutsche discussion and others concerned about  Germanness and 
German immigration demanded, like did the economist Robert Jannasch, that 
the Germans should “develop the far west of southern Brazil as the Americans 
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have developed their Far West.”4 Even the killings of Brazil’s indigenous peo-
ples, the ethnic cleansing that made possible the extension of the settler domain 
in Brazil’s “West” was typically referenced in relation to the fate of Native 
Americans in the American West. Both were often depicted as defensive mea-
sures or as unavoidable, preordained, disappearance of the Natives in the face 
of a superior civilization.
If the world was divided between empires, then power rested with those 
who could best find and utilize space in extraction of resources, consumption 
of industrial goods, and spread of its growing populations. Germans seemed 
particularly drawn to this kind of thinking, and for many of them, the West 
proved the most powerful allegory, inspiration, and concrete model for expan-
sion, greatness, and racial survival. Numerous German expansionists toured 
the West personally. One of them was the geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who 
 visited Mexico, Cuba, and North America in 1874–1875. He studied, for in-
stance, ethnic groups of California and the lives of German settlers on the 
Great Plains. Writing his dissertation on the Chinese global diaspora, Ratzel 
was enthralled by racialization and space in the West. In 1901, he went on to 
coin the term lebensraum (living space), using it to denote the space needed 
to sustain a species or people. Drawing heavily from the West, as well as 
 Tasmania and New Zealand, Ratzel posited that to survive nations need to 
extend their realm by emigration or conquest or face rapid decline. In short, 
he suggested there was an ongoing global struggle for space between empires 
and different races. What the West demonstrated to him was how the avail-
ability of land for individual settlement stabilized domestic policies and ener-
gized the nation and the race. Ratzel’s ideas were subsequently adopted by the 
Nazis, who linked living space to biological survival of a race and approached 
it in apocalyptic terms.
Ratzel also praised the work of historian Frederick Jackson Turner,  especially 
his “frontier thesis.” Turner, in turn, seemed taken by the German geographer. 
He quoted Ratzel at length and cooperated with his devotees. Turner also rec-
ognized connections between German fantasies of colonies in the American 
West – notions voiced by politicians, businessmen, newspapers, and German 
immigrants in the mid-1800s (see Chapter 2 and the Mainzer Adelsverein) and 
which Ratzel also reflected on 30 years later – and its eventual acquisition of 
colonies in Africa and Asia in the 1880s. Where the two men differed was 
that Ratzel saw Turner’s frontier as a global phenomenon. For Ratzel, fron-
tiers  signified places around the world where whites pushed aside indigenous 
peoples. Thinking that the American West represented the best example of 
this kind of frontier process in the world, Ratzel felt it could and should be 
replicated and emulated by Germans in their colonial projects. It is possible 
 4 Quoted in Conrad, Globalisation, 288.
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that Turner agreed when he wrote that “American colonization has become the 
mother of German colonial policy.”5
Many pro-colonial Germans saw that the American West offered antecedents 
for German settler colonialism in its one truly potential overseas settler colony, 
Southwest Africa, as well as fuel for the German Drang nach Osten (drive to the 
East) that, historian Robert Nelson remarks, took on a modern colonial form in 
the late 1800s. It was no accident that the head of the German Colonial Office, 
Bernhard Dernburg, held the American West as the biggest colonial endeavor 
in world history and as an important reference point for German colonialism. 
For his part, Oskar Hintrager, the Deputy Governor of German Southwest 
Africa, was dedicated to turning Southwest Africa into model agricultural col-
ony after having spent years studying the farms and ranches of the Great Plains. 
From 1904 onward, the German Colonial Association actually financed study 
trips to the American West. Civil engineer Alexander Kuhn was dispatched 
to Arizona to learn about indigenous policies there and how they could be 
best adopted to Southwest Africa. Kuhn viewed the Indian reservations in the 
American Southwest as exemplary sites for segregating the races and civilizing 
the Natives and felt they should be emulated in Southwest Africa to solve the 
so-called Native problem.
When looking for stimulus, the Kaiserreich’s most notorious advocate 
of colonialism, Carl Peters traveled to North America in 1893, as historian 
 Jens-Uwe Guettel notes. Peters was a founding member of the German East 
Africa  Company in 1885, leader of a violent filibustering expedition in 1888 
that led to the annexation of German East Africa and the man who lost the 
globally  publicized race to save Emin Pasha to Henry Stanley. Peters also 
proved an exceptionally brutal colonial administrator in East Africa. He was 
eventually ousted after an infamous scandal in 1897: residing near Mount 
 Kilimanjaro,  Peters had his Native mistress and personal servant executed for 
an alleged affair. When questioned about his cruel handling of East Africans in 
the Reichstag, Peters argued that the treatment – the subjugation, expulsion, and 
 extermination – of locals was basically similar in all of world’s successful colo-
nies. Peters expressed that in East Africa, he had just followed the example set in 
the  American West and in Australia. Wanting Germany to excel in its colonial 
projects, Peters thought that the country needed to pay close attention to the 
West. He was profoundly impressed by the subjugation of Native  Americans 
and the pace and success in the spread of white settlement. Peters’ reputation 
was later exonerated by the Nazis, who applauded him as a  magnificent speci-
men of German colonial masculinity.
 5 Frederick Jackson Turner, “American Colonization,” in The Eloquence of Freder-
ick  Jackson  Turner. Robert H. Carpenter, ed. (1893; reprint San Marino: Huntington 
Library, 1983), 190.
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Another German traveler who reached the West with imperial lessons in 
mind was the agrarian economist Max Sering. Sent by the Prussian govern-
ment to determine what possible lessons the colonization of the Great Plains 
could offer, Sering returned from North America in 1883 advocating German 
colonization of those German areas in the East such as West Prussia and  Posen 
that had significant Polish population. His methods included small family farms 
and plenty of German settlers. Sering was sure that mimicking the settler ex-
pansion of the Great Plains would stop the flight of German farmers from the 
eastern provinces, dam the Slavic flood there, and reinvigorate the German 
nation. Over the next three decades, while Sering devoted his career to study-
ing settler colonization, the German government carried out programs settling 
between 120,000 and 200,000 Germans in its eastern borderlands.
The notion that if the United States had a manifest destiny to fulfill in the 
West, Germany had a similar appointment with destiny in the European East 
(including areas extending beyond Kaiserreich’s borders) gained more and more 
popularity in German thinking in the late 1800s and early 1900s. As a colo-
nial ideology, Drang nach Osten was first popular in the 1860s. It indicated a 
wide assortment of beliefs, historical interpretations, and calls for German cul-
tural, biological, political, and military expansion, forming one of the principal 
ideas of German nationalist movement by the early 1900s. It was connected 
to longstanding traditions of German settlement colonies in the European 
East, ranging from the expansion of the Teutonic Order in the Middle Ages to 
the widespread influences of the Hanseatic League, the long history of Baltic 
 German presence, Frederick the Great’s conquests, and the Polish partitions. 
But it also connected with the American West. The drive to the East, historian 
Vejas Liulevicus remarks, was seen as Germany’s destiny expected to cure all 
national problems much like the American westward expansion. The East, like 
the West, was moreover a vivid dreamscape and a state of being. There was a 
dirty and savage “native” East marked by chaos and degradation, a promised 
land of tremendous future possibilities for Germans, and a frontier indicating 
generations of ethnic struggle.
Literary scholar Kristin Kopp describes how the influence of the West was 
clearly visible in German writings conceptualizing Poland as colonial space, 
a “wild East.” It was common in the Kaiserreich to compare Poles to Indians 
and to view the Poles through a colonizing gaze and a language of backward-
ness and perilous contamination. In German writings such as Gustav  Freytag’s 
wildly successful 1854 novel Soll und Haben (Debit and Credit), which went 
through dozens of reprints by the end of the century, the Poles were uncivilized 
peoples both in racial and cultural terms. Kopp also discusses how  German au-
thors penning cheap dime novels, so-called Ostmarkenroman (novels of the East-
ern Marches), from the 1890s onward depicted the East as an ancient  German, 
 Teutonic, ground that had become a wasteland as result of  Polish influence. The 
Ostmarkenroman contained rural settings, traditional social values, a civilizing 
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mission rhetoric and strict differences between the righteous and brave  Germans 
and the dirty and treacherous Poles. They also contained sexually promiscuous 
dark Polish women tempting and targeting brave yet naïve blond German men, 
thus carrying messages about the danger of blurred identities and the lack of 
clearly defined racial boundaries. These writings had much in common with 
Western dime novels emerging at the time. They also shared ground with the 
literature describing Anglo-Mexican relations such as Charles Averill’s pulp 
novel The Mexican Ranchero, in which muscular American manhood was preyed 
upon by Mexican bandits and seductive senoritas.6 In all, the principal lesson in 
the Ostmarkenroman seemed obvious enough: as  Kulturvölker, people with cul-
ture, the Germans, unlike the primitive Poles who were Naturvölker, people 
without history or culture, could make this “wild East” civilized much like the 
white settlers had done in the American West.
Looking for direct precedence and encouragement from the American 
West, policies of Germanification, as part of the Reich’s Kulturkampf in the late 
1800s, centered on land acquisition, assimilation of Poles, and border control. 
In 1886, the Royal Prussian Colonization Commission (Königlich Preussusche 
 Ansiedlungskommission) was established to buy up Polish lands in the East, partic-
ularly in Posen, Upper Silesia, and West Prussia where the majority of the pop-
ulation was Polish. The state put pressure on these domestic Poles to voluntarily 
sell their lands to German settlers and then make the move to North America. 
It also encouraged and assisted German settlers in choosing settlement in the 
East instead of heading to the Americas. And then there were organizations 
like the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband) and especially the German 
Eastern Marches Society (Deutscher Ostmarkenverein) that argued for German 
settler East and de-Polonization of German territory. They repeatedly urged 
Germans not to even think about moving to the United States, but instead to 
find a new home as settlers in the East. Furthermore, the use of Polish language 
was curtailed in schools, churches, and political organizations by increasingly 
forceful methods by the turn of the century. In schools, history and geography-
valued and celebrated all things German while undermining and disparaging 
everything Polish. Not unlike the aims of assimilationist Indian policies and 
 schooling in the West, these methods targeted the regeneration of Poles as 
 Germans, their uplift in patterns similar to the colonial civilizing mission.
As the United States and other white settler societies started to worry about 
transnational labor migration, so did Germany, historian Sebastian Conrad 
writes. The state demanded and issued travel documents and began to differ-
entiate immigrants according to nationality on its eastern borders. Here the 
fight was not against the Chinese, but Polish seasonal workers. Different than 
 6 Charles Averill, The Mexican Ranchero; or, the Maid of the Chapparal: A Romance of the 
Mexican War (Boston: F. Gleason, 1847).
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the domestic Poles, these were foreign Poles, an agricultural labor force from 
Russia and Galicia that filled the gap left in the East by the numerous Germans 
moving to the Americas and the industrial regions in western Germany. In 
1913, over 360,000 foreigners were employed in agriculture in Prussia. Of the 
more than two million Poles who emigrated abroad between 1870 and 1914, 
most first moved to Europe, and 90% of them went at some point to Ger-
many. Many ended up in the industrial Ruhr Valley, back home, or in North 
 America. Much like the Chinese in the West, the Poles were perceived as a 
danger. They were depicted as a flood and foreign infiltration of cheap, uncivi-
lized, and cunning inferiors who would drive out the German workforce. The 
remedies proposed and implemented included forced deportations of foreign 
Poles back to Russia and Galicia, or onward to North America.
Yet, by the early twentieth century, there were also actual plans to bring 
Chinese “coolies” to Germany to replace the Polish seasonal workers. Here 
again the German press and numerous writers representing various political 
ends drew examples from the American West, as well as Australia and South 
Africa, to substantiate their claims that the Chinese stood for “yellow peril” 
and that they were totally incompatible with German culture and constituted 
a threat to the Kaiserreich. Much of this German discourse was influenced by 
the global panic over the Chinese and their “hidden agendas.” The notion that 
the “the yellow race” was preparing to fight for world dominance gained most 
attention in Australia, but was also recurrently voiced in Germany and in the 
American West. Among those who warned of a military invasion from eastern 
Asia was the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. Much was also 
made of the demographic side of the matter. Rumors and claims circulated 
that millions of Asians were heading to flood Europe and the American West, 
their arrival bound to trigger a bitter fight for existence between the white 
and yellow races. Although Prussian landowners made petitions to start hiring 
 Chinese, nothing came of these efforts. The Junkers would have to settle with 
the Poles and the Ruthenians (Ukrainians). The latter were also meant to re-
place the Poles or at least reduce the dependency on them as the principal labor 
force of Prussian agriculture. Eventually thousands of Ruthenians reached not 
only Prussia but also the Great Plains of the American West.
By the time the Nazis came to power, the American West remained firmly 
part of the social imaginary in Germany. It conjured up notions of spatial ex-
pansion, hardy settlers, individual freedom, noble, yet racially inferior Native 
Americans, racial conflict, and reservations. Historians such as Mark Mazower, 
Carroll Kakel, Edward Westermann, and Jens-Uwe Guettel disagree to what 
extent the Nazi leaders looked to the West for encouragement or as tangible 
prototype for their military campaigns and settler projects in the European 
East. Many point out that Hitler, for instance, referred to Ukraine as  Germany’s 
California and equated Eastern European partisans with Native American 
fighters, while others suggest these types of linkages were actually very rare 
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in his voluminous speeches and writings. Scholars further imply that Hitler’s 
understanding of actual Western history was very limited. In the end, it seems 
easy to agree with Westermann’s recent conclusion that there existed parallels 
as well as vast differences between the American West and the Nazi East as 
colonial projects.
Westermann suggests that while the American Manifest Destiny constituted 
a broad cultural belief posited in messianic terms and served to unify a divided 
nation, the Lebensraum ideology was a government-controlled national impera-
tive often portrayed in apocalyptic terms. He also posits that westward expan-
sion prioritized economic incentives in displacing the Natives from their lands 
and ultimately favored Native assimilation through education. The quest for 
living space in the East was in turn very much government/party-driven proj-
ect, tightly controlled by the state elite, and with a strong emphasis on large-
scale physical extermination of subject peoples. Assimilation and education of 
Slavs and Jews was discouraged and strictly limited. While there existed plenty 
of rhetoric about Native extermination in the West, there was no government 
policy stating such an aim or working toward it unlike in the Nazi East. On 
the other hand, imported diseases contributed significantly to the conquest of 
the West, while no such “help” was available in the Nazi East. In the East, the 
Wermacht, the SS, and local auxiliaries worked in concert, in close interaction, 
and under tight control of the central government in Berlin. In the West, the 
oversight of Washington was relatively weak, and the federal troops and local 
volunteers were often at odds with each other, as were the civilian Indian 
agents and the U.S. Army officers. Also, massacres like Camp Grant in 1871 
and Wounded Knee in 1890 stand out in Western history, whereas comparable 
atrocities were not only much bigger but also very much routine practice in 
the Nazi East.
One possible way to contrast the American West and the Nazi East is 
through Generalplan Ost. Wanting to top the United States and other settler 
empires, this plan of Hitler’s, sketched by the SS during World War II, out-
lined plans for future Nazi living space in the European East. From what we 
know of it, the plan seemed to offer an overblown and ultraviolent version of 
settler colonialism, but also one that had some similarities to the conquest of 
the American West. It envisioned a project that comprised of ethnic struggle 
on the frontier lasting for generations. Its focus was firmly set on the land itself, 
on the so-called Germanization of the soil. And it involved the substitution of 
millions of “natives,” in this case Jews and Slaves, by German settlers. The plan 
also called for extermination, removal, and enslavement of subject peoples, as 
well as the civilizing of racially suitable (a small minority) “natives.” It painted 
the future in broad sweeps: in 20 years, the racial border between settlers and 
“natives” would be pushed further east. Some 45 million non-Germanizable 
peoples would be removed, and another 14 million people enslaved as slave 
labor to make way for 8–10 million German settlers plus other racially suitable 
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migrants from the Americas, the Baltic states, and elsewhere. While much of 
the plan was left unaccomplished, Generalplan Ost was no armchair fantasy. Not 
only do the Holocaust and the killing and ethnic cleansing of millions of Slavs 
attest to this, but by 1944, some 300,000–400,000 ethnic Germans had already 
settled in the annexed territories.
Arguably, more serious study on the similarities, differences, and con-
nections between the American West and German colonialism as a whole is 
needed. This is also the case more broadly on the ways the American West 
shaped global circulations of colonial mindsets as a precedent, model, and an 
inspiration. The West certainly mattered as Europeans thought about empires 
of vast spaces and settler colonialism. In addition to these transnational flows 
shaping imperial mindsets and processes of empire building, the West held a 
key role in the emerging global mass culture that promoted, filtered, and repre-
sented the world of empires to domestic consumers in Europe, North America, 
and beyond.
mass Attractions
In the scale of ambition, operations, and transnational fame, P. T. Barnum 
was perhaps the American equivalent to Carl Hagenbeck as an impresario in 
human exhibitions (the two actually had business contacts). A veteran show-
man originally from Connecticut, Barnum did not hesitate to launch his first 
 European tour in 1874. With agents and buyers (of “exotic peoples”) in Europe, 
Asia, and Africa, he also had plans of expansion to Asian markets, historian Jay 
Cook states. Already in 1870, he had sent the famous dwarf entertainer Tom 
Thumb to Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, China, Japan, and Egypt, 
 producing one of the first round-the-world tours in mass culture.  Barnum was 
still just one impresario among others who operated on the  international scene 
in a time when the outward impulse of mass culture in novels, periodicals, 
expositions, and human exhibitions, as well as popular waves of Egyptomania 
or resurging Sinophilia, become closely linked to colonialism and expansion-
ist empires. These cultural forms operated in the junctures of exoticism and 
knowledge, fantasy and science, and education and entertainment. They helped 
promote and legitimize colonialism and build mental boundaries between the 
expanding “civilized” world and the vanishing “savage” realm, between whites 
on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other. They also marked 
Native Americans in the same sphere with indigenous Africans, Australian 
 Aborigines, and Europe’s indigenous Sámi peoples.
Billed as attractions principally for the reason of what they were and how 
they differed from whites, not what they did or what skills they had, the human 
exhibitions emphasized racial difference as a form of spectacle. They depicted 
indigenous peoples as vanishing races, as primitive, childlike, warlike, animal-
like, and sexually licentious savages. Hugely popular as a transnational cultural 
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phenomenon, the shows employed an estimated 2,000–3,000 performers a year 
on average by the turn of the century. These exhibitions came in many sizes 
and shapes. Troupes toured different countries on their own and/or were part 
of larger gatherings, such as international expositions. They included ethnic 
villages and performances and were staged in private or public spaces. Some 
groups stayed on the road for years, traveling from one country to the next and 
crossing the Atlantic several times.
The “supply” of performers often closely followed the expansion of the 
French, British, and United States empires. For instance, the Sioux become 
coveted performers soon after they were confined to reservations by the U.S. 
Army, the Tuareg were exhibited in Paris only months after the French  overtook 
Timbuktu in 1894, and Madagascans were put on show a year after France had 
occupied the island. The Zulus also became a spectator success in the midst of 
the Anglo-Zulu Wars and in the aftermath of the Battle of Isandlwana. For 
colonial powers, to exhibit the other became a visible sign of modernity and 
imperial greatness. Besides their popularity in Europe and North America, 
there were also Japanese expositions and shows from the 1890s onward that 
featured human exhibitions. On display were the Ainus, Taiwanese, Chinese, 
Okinawans, and Koreans: the targets or potential targets of Japanese expansion.
London was the global capital of these exotic shows. A group of  Cherokees 
were exhibited there in 1762 and following the showing of the Hottentot 
 Venus, Saartjie Baartman, between 1810 and 1815, the city witnessed a grow-
ing stream of performing troupes. These included Native Americans, Sámi, 
Inuits, Khois (Baartman was also a Khoi from southern Africa), Australian 
Aborigines, Pacific Islanders, Indians from India, and several groups of Zulus. 
London also organized the first world fair at Crystal Palace in 1851. Thereafter 
numerous high-volume expositions with imperial themes followed, culminat-
ing in the 1924–1925 British Empire Exhibitions at Wembley that reportedly 
pulled approximately 25 million visitors.
One of the earlier promoters of the West in London and Europe was George 
Catlin. This onetime Pennsylvania lawyer had traveled extensively among 
Plains indigenous peoples between 1830 and 1838. Based in St. Louis, and 
hosted by William Clark, and later at Fort Union, Catlin saw the Mandans, the 
 Cheyenne, the Blackfeet, and altogether more than 50 tribes. He produced over 
500 paintings during his sojourns. Then he took his art and extensive ethno-
graphic  collection – his Indian Gallery – on the road. Catlin reached England 
in 1839, and the following year, he set up his Indian Gallery at the Egyptian 
Hall on Piccadilly in London. This was an appropriately global and imperial 
setting. The hall exhibited Oriental enchantment, artefacts from the South Seas 
 collected on James Cook’s voyages, and now materials on Native  Americans of 
the West. Catlin also had a Native village pitched on Lord’s Cricket Ground. He 
lectured and organized performances – dances and chants – to showcase his mes-
sage and to make his efforts financially sound. He first hired 20 people, possibly 
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run-of-the-mill Irishmen, “Paddy Murphy” Indians, to impersonate Native 
Americans. In 1843, he recruited the real thing, a group of Ojibwas and Iowas, 
to perform dances and demonstrate handicrafts. Offering an  education-piece 
disguised as performance, Catlin took his entourage to Scotland and Ireland. 
In 1845, it was Paris and the Louvre where King Louis Philippe and the French 
royal family came to see them. Although drawing sizable crowds,  Catlin’s 
 Indians died in alarming numbers from diseases; also being deep in debt, Catlin 
was forced to shut down. In the 1850s, still struggling to gain recognition and 
fighting off debts, Catlin traveled through Latin  America, painting images of 
local Indians. Later he returned to explore the West.
While failing to make money or gain much fame, Catlin operated in an in-
ternational market where the interest in the frontier and the West exploded. As 
historian Roger Nichols observes, this was largely because of James  Fennimore 
Cooper and the rise of adventure novels and dime serial literature in his wake. 
Cooper, of established upstate New York background, drew influence from 
Sir Walter Scott’s Waverley series. These were novels of historical fictions that 
encompassed adventure, heroism, and romance, an imaginative reconstruc-
tion of Scottish Highland traditions. They were among the most popular and 
widely read novels in all of Europe. Comprising tales of historical frontier 
 adventures, primitive conditions, and resilient settlers taming the land, but this 
time in America not Scotland, Cooper’s own work gained global fame. His 
first novel The Pioneers, published in 1823, was rapidly translated into French, 
German, Danish, Swedish, and Spanish. According to historian Ray Allen 
 Billington, when Cooper’s fifth and final volume of his Leatherstocking Tales, 
The  Deerslayer, came out in 1841, his fame was already such that no less than 30 
publishers competed for the permission to publish its German version.
Cooper’s third book, 1826s The Last of the Mohicans, was not only an instant 
sensation in Europe but also eventually became one of the most popular novels 
ever published. Not only has it been translated into numerous languages and 
reprinted again and again, it has also been made into a movie several times in 
the United States and at least three times in Germany. The first, Der Letzte 
der Mohikaner was released in 1920 in Weimar Germany, the next version in 
1965 in West Germany, and another adaptation of Cooper hit the silver screen 
in 1967 in East Germany and turned out a big hit in the communist bloc. As 
recently as 2004–2007 Cooper’s book was made into an animated TV series by 
the Italian TV network RAI.
After Cooper, American authors flocked to fill the surging market demand 
with a virtual stampede of thrilling stories. Many writers upped the violence, 
made Cooper’s noble (primitive) savages into more barbarian killers, and shifted 
the locale from the Appalachian frontier to the trans-Mississippi West. By the 
late 1850s, the short, easy-to-read dime novels started their breakthrough. 
They were helped by developments, such as cheap paper, fast rotary presses, and 
reduced transportation costs. Also significant were speedily improving literacy 
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rates in North America and Europe, as well as expanding markets among an 
increasingly urban and rapidly growing populace of middle-class and workers 
who yearned for entertainments to fill their free time. An early giant of the 
industry, Erastus Beadle’s publishing house sold some five million copies of 
these novels during its first five years. Western narratives quickly became part 
of a larger, international, trend of adventure and mystery stories. These publi-
cations habitually featured colonial themes and locations in Africa, India, and 
the Middle East. They always had larger-than-life heroes, pretty girls, exotic 
places, and strange and mysterious villains.
As American-made Western stories reached Europe, they inspired  Western 
enthusiasts like the German Karl May. In the 1870s, May started penning hugely 
popular Western novels without ever visiting the West. Set in the Southwest, 
May’s heroes included the Indians, especially Winnetou, the brave Apache 
leader, as well as Old Shatterhand, a German-born frontiersman.  Relatively 
unknown in the United States, his writings sold millions in  Germany and were 
translated to numerous European languages. Their fans also included Albert 
Einstein and Adolf Hitler. While preferring Western stories, May covered an 
extensive imperial terrain of exotic adventure by setting similarly bloodcur-
dling stories in the Middle East and Latin America. His total volume of sales 
is said to hover around 20 million copies, of which approximately half were 
in German. He is apparently the most translated German fiction author ever. 
Many of May’s stories were also adapted to comics, plays, and movies, including 
several Winnetou films made in the 1960s (in German with an international 
cast, including American leading men).
The army scout and buffalo hunter William Cody, and several other real 
Western characters such Christopher “Kit” Carson and “Wild Bill” Hickok, 
also started to feature in the dime novels. According to Nichols, some 20 
 authors put Cody, as “Buffalo Bill,” in at least 500 (some say as many as 1,700) 
dime novels of Western heroics. These novels came out in numerous languages, 
capturing audiences in North America and across Europe. Cody also tried stage 
acting, but made his reputation with his own Wild West show. With its in-
augural performance in St. Louis in 1884, the show grew into a winner in 
the United States before going abroad. It landed in England in 1887 during 
the ongoing celebrations for Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee. Cody’s was no 
small troupe. It traveled on a specifically equipped steamship and included 
200 people, half of them Native Americans, close to 200 horses, 18 bison, 5 
Texas steers, 10 mules, 10 elk, etc., as well an authentic Deadwood stagecoach. 
 Outside the show grounds, the setup included an Indian village where the pub-
lic could gaze at the Indians and wander amidst the tepees. The performance 
itself celebrated U.S. dominion over the West and “reenacted” the great drama 
of civilization and savagery. It included Pony Express riders, roping, riding, and 
sharpshooting exhibitions, an Indian attack on the stagecoach, and a reenact-
ment of Cody’s scalping and killing of a Cheyenne leader. The show in London 
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also featured the kings of Denmark, Belgium, Saxony, and Greece being driven 
around the Earls Court arena in the Deadwood stagecoach with Buffalo Bill on 
the driver’s seat and Edward, Prince of Wales, riding shotgun.
In 1889, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West returned to play London and to appear 
at the Paris Universal Exposition, attended by an estimated 32 million peo-
ple and including the newly completed Eiffel Tower as its attractions. Now, 
as if to further authenticate it as an education piece, the show also restaged 
Custer’s last stand at Little Bighorn. In Paris, Buffalo Bill shared the spotlight 
in a cross-imperial exhibition that also included, for example, a large “negro 
village.” Buffalo Bill’s place in the Jardin zoologigue d’acclimatation (Zoological 
Gardens) where humans on display were living complements to the flora and 
fauna on view, was guaranteed by the presence of Native Americans in his 
group. This was not unheard of at the time. When a group of Sioux arrived in 
Budapest in 1886, they set up their tepees and displayed their clothing, artifacts, 
and dances in a local zoo. The Paris Zoological Gardens had experimented 
with groups of Inuits and black Africans in the 1870s and would host at least 
30 major ethnological exhibitions before World War I. These included various 
Plains Indians, Kalmyks of Siberia, and 150 “wild women” of Dahomey, a 
troupe of African “Amazon warriors” who proved an enormous success, for in-
stance, in St. Petersburg, Berlin, Zürich, Brussels, London, Atlanta, St. Louis, 
and San Francisco.
Soon Cody took his show on a European tour: France, Spain, Italy (with 
a special performance in the Vatican), Austria–Hungary, and Germany. The 
Pope gave the party a special blessing, while in Germany, legend has it, Annie 
Oakley shot a cigarette out of the mouth of Kaiser Wilhelm. In Munich, Cody 
had sold out daily performances on the Theresienwiese, the official grounds 
of Oktoberfest. Europeans flocked to each show to watch this former scout 
portray the West with its cowboys and Indians, sharpshooters, trick riders, 
prairie fires, cyclones, and much more. The show also returned to Britain again 
in 1892, 1901, 1902, 1903, and 1904, when the majority of the performances 
took place in Scotland and Cornwall. The five days in Edinburgh drew an 
estimated 140,000 spectators. In 1905, the show played the entire season in 
France: opening April 2 in Paris and closing November 12 in Marseilles, while 
34 Italian cities were on the program in 1906. Cody also teamed with Italian 
film producer Filoeto Alberini in two silent shorts, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West and 
L’arrivo a Buffalo Bill a Roma. Cody’s show in Milan, historian Renee Laegreid 
reveals, moved the renowned composer Giacomo Puccini to create the opera 
La fanciulla del West (The Girl of the Golden West) in 1910 (Figure 5.3).
Cody’s was not the first or the last Western show or troupe touring Europe. 
For example, the American showman Frank Harvey first brought the Sioux 
to tour Germany in 1887, whereas the sharpshooter William Frank “Doc” 
Carver’s Wild West toured Australia and preceded Buffalo Bill in Europe. On 
his second German tour, Carver, vying for spectators, claimed the available 
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electric lights and set up camp on the opposite side of the street from Cody in 
 Hamburg. The “duel” ended in Carver’s triumph, while Cody, left in the dark, 
gave just one performance before he split town. Gordon Lillie’s, or Pawnee 
Bill’s,  “Historical Wild West, Indian Museum and Encampment,” reached big 
time in the 1890s touring Europe and the United States. Frederick T.  Cummins’ 
Miller Bros. 101 Ranch Wild West staged an Indian  Congress – including 
 “Indian battles,” holdups, cowboys, and stagecoaches at the Omaha  Exposition 
in 1907. The show also toured Europe until World War I and put on the show 
at the  Panama–Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco in 1915. In 
the 1910s, the German Sarrasani Circus (which is still running and world 
famous  today) hired several Sioux as regular performers alongside  Chinese, 
 Javanese, Hindus, Ethiopians, and Argentinian Gauchos. And there were many 
others. At the turn of the century, an estimated 125 to 150 “Wild West shows” 
of  various pedigree were on the road in Europe and North America.
Wild West shows did not only stage shows in the biggest European cities. 
For instance, in August 1890, Doc Carver and his party, traveling on a steam-
boat from St. Petersburg to Stockholm, held a show in Helsinki, the small 
capital of the Grand Duchy of Finland, an autonomous province in the Russian 
Empire. With no more than 90,000 residents, Helsinki emphatically welcomed 
Carver’s act, which had been widely advertised in local papers beforehand. 
Large crowds gathered at the harbor to welcome the authentic Westerners, and 
many more lined the streets as the performers paraded through town. Seven 
years later, Texas Jack Omohundro’s troupe was an even bigger success as it 
performed in Helsinki for a month.
Reenacting Western expansion to European royalty, middle-class, and 
working-class alike, “Wild West shows” had such a broad appeal because they 
were rooted in the bigger story of European expansion and the meetings of 
FiGure 5.3  Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show European tour postcard. McCracken 
Research Library, Buffalo Bill Center of the West, MS 327 James 
 Wojtowicz Collection.
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civilization and savagery. The English saw Buffalo Bill as part of the growth 
of the Anglo-World, while Germans associated Cody with their romanticized 
ideas of nature as well as global expansion of empires. These shows left a per-
manent cultural imprint on the local populace. In Helsinki, the press reported 
how all the streets and courtyards turned into sites were young kids represent-
ing various social classes constantly played “cowboys and Indians” after Texas 
Jack had departed. And surely this was not just the case in Helsinki.
These shows also brought the broader imperial world on display more 
 directly. Cody’s show, for instance, featured the “rough riders of the world,” 
including Gauchos, Georgian trick riders, Arabs, and Mongolians on its roster. 
According to show programs, the Georgian “Cossacks” defended the Russian 
frontier against the Turks and the tribes from the Caucasus and secured it from 
the Black Sea to the Asian plains. Pawnee Bill in turn hired Mexican Vaqueros, 
Japanese performers, and Arab jugglers. As the United States expanded overseas 
in 1898, the shows swiftly appropriated recent episodes: Buffalo Bill had a  Cuban 
contingent, and Pawnee Bill staged incidents from the Spanish- American War 
such as “The Fall of Luzon.” Of course, there were “real”  Filipino soldiers 
and other actual participants from these conquests performing. In 1901, the 
shows in turn incorporated the Boxer Rebellion to their programs, featuring 
the U.S. military together with the British, Sikh, German, Russian, French, 
and  Japanese forces storming the gates and climbing the city walls of Peking. A 
sort of imperial climax was reached in 1908 when the two Bill’s joined forces, 
putting together “Buffalo Bill’s Wild West and Pawnee Bill’s Great Far East.”
While Western shows toured Europe, colonial-themed shows with Asians, 
Pacific Islanders, Africans, and Latin American Natives flooded the West. In the 
1880s, P. T. Barnum called for peoples of all the “uncivilized” races in existence 
to appear in his big show. In response, the American-born Canadian William 
Hunt, the man known as “The Great Farini,” a onetime eminent circus per-
former turned into a swashbuckling promoter of human exhibitions in Britain, 
brought Zulus to the United States. Also, as anthropologist  Roslyn Poignant 
writes, the showman R. A. Cunningham shipped two groups of Australian 
Aborigines from Queensland to San Francisco. The Zulus and the  Aborigines, 
billed as “last of the living cannibals,” as well as the Sioux,  Muslims, and others, 
performed in a number of Barnum’s exhibitions. The Aborigines also appeared 
at the Columbian World’s Fair in Chicago in 1893 alongside the Sioux and 
other Native Americans, Javanese, Samoans, Egyptians, and the “wild women” 
of Dahomey. They also toured broadly in circuses, dime museums, fairgrounds, 
and other showplaces in America and Europe.
As the Columbian World’s Fair in Chicago attests, large contingents of 
Native Americans and other colonized peoples became a standard feature in 
world fairs and expositions. In Chicago, it was Franz Boas who organized the 
ethnological exhibitions. He procured numerous indigenous artefacts, Inuits 
with their sealskin clothing, and Kwakiutl Indians from British Columbia to 
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perform their daily tasks in an “authentic” village setting. As a young ethnolo-
gist, the German-born Boas had been influenced by Hagenbeck’s Bella Coola 
show in Germany. He went on to build a distinguished career in anthropology, 
researching the indigenous languages and cultures of the Pacific Northwest.
The fairs moved West of the Mississippi River. First, in 1894, there was the 
Midwinter International Exposition in San Francisco. It was followed by the 
1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis, the 1905 Lewis and Clark 
Centennial Exposition in Portland, and in 1909 the Alaska–Yukon– Pacific 
 Exposition in Seattle. And they always included a broad assortment of hu-
man exhibitions of “exotic savages” from around the world. For instance, in 
St. Louis, there were showings starring Ainus, Igorots (Philippines), Apaches 
(including Geronimo), and Tlingits (Alaska). Also there was Ota Benga, the 
famous  Congolese pygmy who was controversially displayed in a cage with an 
orangutan at the Bronx Zoo in 1906 and who killed himself in Virginia in 1916.
The 1915 Panama–Pacific International Exposition featured a microcosm 
of the world. It had Hawaiians, Filipinos (the largest exhibit at the fair), and an 
assortment of Native Americans, including a reconstruction of a Pueblo village 
with authentic residents. It also had a ‘49 camp that recreated the gold rush. 
Celebrating the completion of the Panama Canal – seen by contemporaries as a 
realization of the centuries-old fantasy of explorers to find a water passage from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific – and the booming American West- Pacific connec-
tions, the exposition, historian Sarah Moore says, was designed to champion 
muscular imperialism and trumpeted American continental and overseas ex-
pansion. Still, the fair also represented a contested space where various groups 
jockeyed for explanatory power. White women, historian Abigail Markwym 
describes, eagerly promoted pioneer motherhood, whereas  Hawaiian women 
challenged the supposed divide between the civilized and the primitive through 
their dress: they donned shirtwaists, the model shirt for the independent, work-
ing (white) women at the time. So did the Native Americans, who performed 
traditional ceremonies and attacked Custer, but also rode in cars and airplanes, 
admired the attractions of the fair, deposited money in the bank, and smoked 
cigarettes.
For the Native performers of these human exhibitions, the experience could 
be both terrifying and liberating. Signs of cruelty and oppressions were visi-
ble everywhere: poor living conditions, death of performers (mainly from dis-
ease, but also suicides), and the use of wire fences, and even cages, to separate 
performers and audiences. Indigenous people were also captured and kept in 
service against their will and forced into lop-sided contracts and prostitution. 
The performers and their bodies (living and dead) were also examined and 
photographed by anthropologists. Performers also made more intimate social 
contacts. Many spectators not only wanted to help the performers, by, for in-
stance, tossing coins to them, but flirtations, sexual encounters, and love affairs 
were also frequent.
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On the other hand, by joining the shows, colonized peoples found oppor-
tunities to escape colonial war zones in Africa and government control in the 
reservations and earn a living in times of desperate poverty. They also took 
it as a chance to see the world. Born at Acoma Pueblo in the 1860s, educated 
in an Albuquerque boarding school, and operator of a trading post, Edward 
Proctor Hunt exploited the interest in Native life during the 1920s, writes 
anthropologist Peter Nabokov. He traveled in Europe in the Miller Brothers 
101 Ranch Circus, performing as “Chief Big Snake.” In 1928, to celebrate the 
opening of Karl May Indianermuseum, Hunt partook in a large Native dance 
procession from Dresden to nearby village of Radebeul. The performers laid 
flowers and sang funeral dirges on May’s mausoleum and in the presence of his 
widow. Other Native performers also found opportunities and a sympathetic 
ear. One of them was the Sioux Rocky Bear (part of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West). 
He voiced the grievances of his peoples in the hand of the U.S. government 
when invited as a keynote speaker at the Munich Anthropological Society in 
April 1890.
After World War I, the scene gradually changed. Human exhibitions did not 
disappear entirely, but many that remained tended to represent the colonized 
peoples as trophies of the civilizing mission, as tangible proof that colonialism 
represented righteous endeavors, not so much as primitive savages, or trophies 
of colonization. Exhibitions also transformed into living images in cinema, 
representing a change in scale and a new form of otherness.
In Europe, the American Western movie, with its big adventure, big land-
scapes, cowboys, Indians, and settlers, proved hugely popular. Already in 
the 1910, the French, British, and German producers started making their 
own Westerns. In the 1960s, this fascination with Western films expanded 
to  television shows such as Bonanza, Gunsmoke, and Maverick, which domi-
nated television ratings in many European countries as they did in the United 
States (and which have seen numerous reruns ever since). In the 1960s there 
also came the so-called Spaghetti Westerns. These films were usually pro-
duced with joint European funding and shot in Spain with Italian directors 
and mixed European and American casts. The biggest international fame hit 
Sergio Leone’s Dollars Trilogy starring Clint Eastwood and climaxing with 
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in 1966. Plenty of critical acclaim, some of it 
years later, was also bestowed on Sergio Corbucci’s works. There were many 
other Westerns also being made in Europe at the time, especially in  Germany. 
Even in smaller countries, such as Finland, local productions included several 
 Westerns. In Finland, these films were typically set in the “frontier  wilderness” 
of Lapland. Then, there were the Osterns, or “Red Westerns.” These movies 
were set in the American West, but made in Communist  Eastern Europe. 
They included titles such as Lemonade Joe (Limonádový Joe aneb  Konská opera, 
Czechoslovakia, 1964), The Sons of Great Bear (Die Söhne der großen Bärin, East 
Germany, 1966), The Oil, the Baby and the Transylvanians (Pruncul, petrolulsi 
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Ardelenii, Romania, 1981), or A Man from the Boulevard des Capucines (Chelovek 
s bulvara Kaputsinov, USSR, 1987).
The West proved an international hit in advertisement as well. From the 
early twentieth century, manufacturers produced larger quantities of West-
themed consumer goods, from the Marlboro man to Western clothing and 
toys aimed at the growing middle-class markets and to the working-class 
consumers. And the literature scene continued active. In France, George 
Fronval wrote hundreds of bestselling Western books in the interwar years, 
while J. T. Edson penned some 137 novels in the post-World War II years 
in Britain. Starting in the 1960s, the Norwegian Kjell Hallbing, writing 
under the pseudonym Louis Masterson, produced 83 books in the Morgan 
Kane pulp Western series. Fiercely independent white hero Kane captures a 
key role in Western history, appearing in gold rushes, Indian wars, and in 
taking down notorious outlaws. The Morgan Kane series has sold over 11 
million copies in Norway alone, in addition to being published in ten other 
countries. It has been hugely popular, for instance, in Finland, where you 
can still rather easily find copies of old prints in most venues that sell used 
books. Novelists in Spain, Germany, Finland, and elsewhere also produced 
tons of Western pulp fiction flooding the newsstands and bookstores from the 
1950s to the 1980s, much of it turning out to be extremely popular in their 
respective countries.
European enthusiasm for the West also hit the roof in the post–World War 
II burgeoning comic book market. Trendy throughout continental  Europe, 
 although less so in Britain, and scarcely making an impact in North America, 
the biggest comic hits included Comanche (Belgian, 1969–2002), Buddy  Longway 
(Swiss, 1972–2006), Ltn. Blueberry (French, 1963–2010), Ken Parker  (Italian, 
1974–2015), Tex Willer (Italian, 1948-), and Lucky Luke (French–Belgian, 1946-). 
These comics have had a life span of several decades, and some of them release 
new material even today. Set in the wild and rugged nineteenth-century West, 
they both admire Native and Western characters and scenery, making the West 
an epic dreamscape in the process while offering sharp commentary on its 
history. Some, like Blueberry and Ken Parker, are indeed highly critical of U.S. 
conquest and its accompanying exploitation, violence, and racism. They have 
been translated into several languages and printed and reprinted in various 
forms as comic strips, serial albums, and special books.
If anything, the travel writers, imperial borrowings and preoccupa-
tions in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and the mass culture phenomenon 
from human exhibitions to movies and comics, demonstrate that the West 
has actively engaged, enthralled, and captured the attention of the world. 
The West has crossed borders and spanned oceans as an imagined realm, a 
 commodity, and a dreamscape. It has crept into and occupied the minds of 
peoples from around the world, some who have visited it, others who have 
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ePiloGue
The world today continues to engage with as well as entangle and embed in 
the West and vice versa. Up until at least the 1970s, it was very common for 
kids from many corners of the globe to be taken by the imagination of the 
West. This applied equally to Finland or Germany, as it did, say, to Australia. 
 Historian Ann McGrath notes how, when growing up during the 1960s in 
Brisbane, the subtropical capital city of Queensland, Australia, “cowboys and 
Indians” was simply what all the neighborhood kids played.1 Testifying to the 
portability of the West, and colonial culture more broadly, the game looked 
much the same wherever it took place: it involved plenty of chasing, hiding, 
and pretend killing and dying. Plastic bows and arrows and knives were the 
weapons of choice. So were cap guns with a loud bang and a “gunpowder” 
aroma. The play could include some dressing up in store-bought or homemade 
costumes, although this might be as nominal as wearing a feather in your hair. 
Also part of the act were character acting and scenarios that relied upon a 
 dichotomy between the “good” and the “bad.”
In the twenty-first century, much has changed in this respect. In fact, al-
ready when I was growing up in the 1980s Finland relatively few of my buddies 
gobbled up the Western comics, loved the films, read the novels, and played 
cowboys and Indians as I did. The release of new Western movies had dwindled 
since the early 1970s, and the number of novels was also in decline. Today, the 
Western comics have moved to the cultural margins, and practically nowhere 
you see kids playing cowboys and Indians. The West no longer captures the 
attention of kids in Europe, who, rather than let their imagination run wild 
 1 McGrath, Ann. “Playing Colonial: Cowgirls, Cowboys, and Indians in Australia and 
North America.” Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 2 (Spring 2001) doi:10.1353/
cch.2001.0010.
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with the West, engage in social media content and play video games. To today’s 
kids, the West is something archaic and definitely unhip. Most young adults 
and fresh parents probably agree. They may regard Western movies as outdated 
and performing cowboys and Indians as culturally insensitive, if not outright 
racist and comparable to blackface, and thus as something they do not encour-
age their kids to pursue. In this they have a valid point. Curiously, this does not 
seem to prevent the many “Indian dances” or the wearing of “Indian costumes” 
that are still popular in today’s kindergarten and school holiday festivities in 
Finland and elsewhere.
As a cultural commodity, however, the West is still far from dead. It just 
finds most of its audiences today among the adults. In other words, some of 
today’s forty- and fifty-somethings and older, who grew up consuming a steady 
diet of Western films, books, and comics still yearn for more. Lucky Luke, 
“the man who shoots faster than his shadow,” just celebrated his seventieth 
birthday in 2016, with two new comic book albums published in France and 
instantly translated to numerous European languages, including Finnish. The 
fast-shooting, hard-fisted, and righteous Texas Ranger/white Navajo chief 
Tex Willer also remains an ongoing success. Sergio Bonelli Editore in Italy 
 publishes a steady stream of fresh stories, written and sketched by multiple art-
ists. According to my calculations, no less than 30 different Tex Willer comic 
book releases hit the stores in Finland in 2016. Some were new stories, others 
reprints of classics from the 1960s and the 1970s. Altogether, these Tex Willer 
releases in 2016 contained some 5,600 pages of Western adventure. That is 
quite a lot even for a Western enthusiast in Finland to handle. But the trend 
with Tex Willer has been the same for years; its popularity is steady not just in 
Finland. Panini released new collectible Tex Willer trading cards in Europe in 
2016, while a Tex Willer Monopoly board game came out the following year. 
You may ask who buys these things anymore? The answer is middle-aged men 
like me.
You can also experience the West firsthand throughout modern Europe in 
various theme parks. In Kent, England, there is a Western replica town called 
Laredo, complete with townsfolk and cowboys. There is also one in the small 
municipality of Muhos, Finland. In Italy, the Cowboys’ Guest Ranch and 
theme park, outside the town of Voghera, has organized American-style rodeo 
and Wild West shows since 1995. Spain’s Almeria boasts a Mini-Hollywood, 
a Western theme park that features daily cowboy stunt shows, a mock bank 
raid, and a reenactment of the final moments of Jesse James. In all, Almeria 
is not unlike Old Tucson in Arizona. It was also first a shooting location for 
Western movies, in this case the Spaghetti Westerns. In Germany, you can 
attend a “Grosse Apache Live Show” on the Damerower See or a “Bisonfest” 
in  Stuttgart. You can also purchase Indian tipis or Western-style clothing in 
big cities such as Hamburg. Also in Germany, thousands of fans meet at Bad 
Segeberg in Schleswig-Holstein for the annual Karl May Festival. Established 
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in 1952, the festival has “authentic” Native villages, exciting wild West per-
formances, and it shows movies about the adventures of Old Shatterhand and 
Winnetou.
Then there is, of course, the biggest entertainment center in Europe: 
 Disneyland Paris. It not only has a “Pocahontas Indian Village” but also offers 
an extravagant dinner show called “Buffalo Bill’s Wild West.” This show is 
staged on a big arena and includes Native American performers. The program 
is essentially copied from Cody’s days. There is, however, one significant addi-
tion: Mickey Mouse.
While it would appear that the global circulations of Western Americana 
remain potent in our times, what this book set out achieve was to show how the 
West has been in the world and the world in the West for generations already. 
The West has been and is transnational and its reach global. It has stood as a 
dynamic domain of convergence and conquest at the heart of multidirectional 
and entangled histories of colonialism and settler colonialism. It has been a 
magnet for peoples from practically all corners of the world, bringing the world 
to the West to stay or at least to visit. The world and the West have also shared 
plenty of common ground in the globe-spanning circulations of violence, in 
particular ethnic and racial violence. The same holds for the colonial civilizing 
mission and the spread of transnational white middle-class cultures of domes-
ticity and respectability. The West has also joined the world, functioning as an 
inspiration for empires and peoples seeking to emulate or outdo it, and fueling 
the minds of those captivated by its colonizing potential and by its often mythic 
grandeur and excitement. It is these histories of exploration, far-settlement, 
conquest, exploitation, racism, intimacies, imperial envisionings, and cultural 
transfers that resonate widely in the modern world. In fact, they have made it 
and continue to shape it. They bind the world and the West. They are central 
not only to understanding the historical and contemporary West but also cru-
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